High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 07 MP CK 0837

Sanjay Borkar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 10 July 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anand Pathak, J · B. P. Sharma, J
CASE NUMBER
WRIT APPEAL No. 1844 of 2026

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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 1,122 words

Per: Justice B. P. Sharma

This appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been preferred against the order dated 21.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.21193/2011 whereby the writ petition filed by respondent No.4 was partly allowed.

2.

The facts in brief are that, an advertisement was issued by the Municipal Council, Pandhurna in the year 2011 inviting applications for reserved backlog posts including the post of Assistant Grade-III. The prescribed eligibility consisted of passing the Higher Secondary Examination along with Hindi Typing Certificate issued by the Madhya Pradesh Board. Out of 237 applications received, 164 candidates were found eligible. Since only one post was available, twelve candidates were shortlisted in the ratio of 1:12 and called for interview. The Selection Committee resolved that marks would be awarded under five different heads namely educational qualification-(10 marks), typing test-(10 marks), additional qualification- (5 marks), experience- (5 marks) and interview-(10 marks), making the total maximum marks forty. Respondent No.4, despite claiming to possess all prescribed qualifications including Hindi typing qualification from the Madhya Pradesh Board and additional qualifications, was not selected and therefore, instituted W.P. No.21193/2011 challenging the selection process as arbitrary and discriminatory. During the pendency of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge summoned the original recruitment record and found that although, the Selection Committee had prescribed a maximum of ten marks for interview, the appellant was awarded an average of twelve marks in the interview, thereby securing an aggregate of 30.9 marks and ultimately obtaining appointment on 26.12.2011. Holding that award of interview marks beyond the prescribed maximum was contrary to the declared methodology, had vitiated the entire selection process. Learned Single Judge quashed the appointment of the appellant and directed fresh preparation of the merit list in accordance with law.

3.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge committed an error in quashing the appointment after the appellant had rendered nearly fifteen years of unblemished service. It was argued that the appellant had participated in every stage of recruitment process and thereafter, was selected by the competent authority and had not played any role in the alleged irregularity committed by the Selection Committee. It was submitted that an employee who has served for such a long period cannot be deprived of his livelihood merely because of an error committed by the authorities. It was further argued that during the pendency of the writ petition, the appellant had specifically brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge that six reserved category vacancies are still available in the department and respondent No.4 could conveniently be accommodated against any of those vacancies without disturbing the appellant's appointment. The appellant also emphasized that he has now crossed the age limit for Government employment and if his appointment is cancelled, he would loose not only his employment but, also all retiral and pensionary benefits despite having rendered unblemished service for almost one and a half decades.

4 . Per contra, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State as well as learned counsel for respondent No.4 contended that the learned Single Judge rightly noticed from the original record that although, the Selection Committee had prescribed only ten marks for interview, the appellant had been awarded twelve marks, thereby altering the comparative merit in his favour. Such deviation from the prescribed methodology rendered the entire selection process arbitrary and unconstitutional. It was further submitted that respondent No.4 fulfilled every eligibility condition prescribed in the advertisement including possession of Hindi Typing Certificate from the Madhya Pradesh Board, whereas the appellant admittedly possessed a typing certificate issued by the Government of Maharashtra and not by Madhya Pradesh Board as required under the advertisement. Respondent No.4 also asserted that from the very inception he had consistently challenged the legality of the selection process and that the appellant could not seek equitable protection merely because the litigation remained pending for a long period. It was argued that the existence of vacant posts cannot validate an appointment, which itself is founded upon an illegal selection process and no equity can be claimed to perpetuate such illegality.

5.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6.

The controversy does not merely relate to comparative assessment of merit between rival candidates but goes to the very legality of the recruitment process. The original record produced before the learned Single Judge unmistakably establish that although, the Selection Committee had prescribed a ceiling of ten marks for interview, the appellant was awarded twelve marks. Awarding marks in excess of the prescribed maximum was not a minor irregularity but, a fundamental deviation from the methodology framed by the Selection Committee itself. Once the recruiting authority formulates objective criteria for evaluation, it is bound to adhere to the same and cannot arbitrarily deviate therefrom. Such deviation directly affects the comparative merit of candidates and violates the constitutional mandate of fairness and equality in public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge therefore, rightly held that the appointment flowing from such an arbitrary evaluation could not be sustained.

7.

The submission of the appellant that he has rendered fifteen years of unblemished service also does not persuade us to take a different view. Continuance in service pursuant to an appointment which is subsequently, found to be founded upon an illegal selection process does not create any indefeasible right to continue in service. Equity cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality. The appellant's long continuation in service cannot cure the foundational defect in the recruitment process itself. Likewise, the contention that respondent No.4 could simply be accommodated against one of the existing vacancies cannot be accepted because the legality of an appointment has to be judged with reference to the recruitment process under which the appointment was made and not on the basis of subsequent availability of vacancies. The learned Single Judge has adopted a balanced approach by neither directing appointment of respondent No.4 nor substituting the Court's own assessment of merit but, by directing the authorities to undertake a fresh exercise in accordance with the methodology prescribed by the Selection Committee. Such directions restore transparency and fairness to the recruitment process and cannot be said to be arbitrary or excessive.

8.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge neither suffers from any perversity nor discloses any error of law warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 21.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.21193/2011 is hereby affirmed. No order as to costs.