Sandhu Highway Regd. Faridkot vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab & Ors.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)

The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the order dated 07.05.2025 (Annexure P-3) passed by the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab, whereby Appeal No.99 of 2023 preferred by the petitioner under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against the order dated 23.12.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Hoshiarpur, has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. The petitioner has also challenged the aforesaid order dated 23.12.2021, whereby its application for grant of one stage carriage permit for operating one return trip on the Hoshiarpur to Faridkot route via Kathar, Adampur, Jandu Singh, Jalandhar, Nakodar, Shahkot, Kamalke, Dharamkot, Jalalabad, Moga, Ghal Kalan, Dagru, Jogewal, Khukhrana, Darupur, Talwandi Bhai, Kotak Road, Mudki, Chand and Baja Kaler was rejected and permits were granted in favour of respondent Nos.4 to 7.

Briefly stated, the pleaded case of the petitioner is that the Regional Transport Authority, Hoshiarpur invited applications for grant of six stage carriage permits involving six return trips daily on the aforesaid route through public notices dated 07.09.2021 and 08.09.2021. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted an application for grant of one stage carriage permit for operating one return trip. In all, 15 applications were received. The applications were considered by the Regional Transport Authority in its meeting held on 09.12.2021, in which the petitioner appeared and pressed its claim. The petitioner states that it highlighted the fact that its firm comprised three partners, one of whom possessed a licence to drive a heavy motor vehicle, that the partners were graduates and unemployed and that a financial certificate had also been produced regarding arrangement of finance for purchase of a bus. The matter was thereafter reserved for orders. According to the petitioner, it was verbally informed that written intimation regarding the order would be duly communicated when passed. It further claims to have visited the office of the Regional Transport Authority and made enquiries regarding the outcome of its application. According to the petitioner, on 08.08.2023 it was informed that the order had already been passed. It applied for a certified copy on the same day and the copy was supplied on 09.08.2023. The petitioner thereafter filed Appeal No.99 of 2023 on 16.08.2023 under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with Rule 85 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

The learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, however, dismissed the appeal vide order dated 07.05.2025. The Tribunal noticed that the petitioner had participated in the proceedings held on 09.12.2021 and that the order was passed on 23.12.2021. It further considered the petitioner's explanation regarding the alleged enquiries made by it after the proceedings and found that no concrete steps or timely enquiries had been demonstrated during the intervening period. The Tribunal consequently held that the petitioner had failed to exercise the requisite diligence and that the appeal was barred by limitation.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the learned Tribunal has erred in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation. It is submitted that Rule 85 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 provides a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order and that the petitioner received the certified copy only on 09.08.2023, whereafter the appeal was filed on 16.08.2023 and was, therefore, well within limitation. It is argued that limitation could not have commenced from the date of pronouncement of the order when the same had admittedly not been communicated to the petitioner.

Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner had repeatedly visited the office of the Regional Transport Authority to ascertain the outcome of its application and was assured that written intimation would be supplied. It is contended that there is no evidence establishing that the petitioner had actual or constructive knowledge of the order prior to 08.08.2023. Reliance has been placed upon the Full Bench judgment in Jagtar Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others to contend that limitation cannot be computed from the mere date of passing of the order in the absence of proof of actual or constructive knowledge. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Tribunal wrongly relied upon the principle that the law assists the vigilant. It is contended that the petitioner could not have filed an appeal against an order of which it had no knowledge and that the delay, if any, was occasioned solely because the order was never communicated to it. It is further submitted that there was consequently no occasion for filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as the appeal was filed within thirty days of receipt of the certified copy.

Learned counsel has also assailed the original order dated 23.12.2021 on merits. It is submitted that the said order is cryptic and non-speaking and does not disclose any proper comparative assessment of the applicants. According to learned counsel, the petitioner had superior qualifications, experience and infrastructure, yet the permits were granted to other applicants. It is further contended that the Regional Transport Authority wrongly divided the applicants into new entrants and existing operators and that the order does not reflect proper consideration of the factors contemplated under Section 80(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Per contra, learned State counsel as well as learned counsel for private respondent(s) submits that the appeal was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation. It is contended that the petitioner had participated in the proceedings on 09.12.2021 and was aware that its application had been considered and the matter reserved for orders. Despite the same, the petitioner remained inactive for more than one and a half years and has failed to produce any material demonstrating any concrete or timely effort to ascertain the outcome of its application. The mere oral assertion regarding repeated visits, it is submitted, cannot satisfactorily explain such prolonged inaction.

Learned State counsel further submits that the original order passed by the Regional Transport Authority was a reasoned order and was passed after considering the competing applications. It is contended that the petitioner has failed to establish any patent illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference. Learned counsel appearing for the private respondent also submits that the order of the Regional Transport Authority was passed after considering the inter se merits of the applicants and that the successful applicants were found suitable on the basis of the criteria considered by the Authority. The Tribunal also noticed that an earlier appeal, Appeal No.218 of 2022, had been dismissed on 21.08.2023 in favour of respondent No.6.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The principal question which arises for consideration is whether the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal was justified in dismissing the statutory appeal on the ground of limitation.

Rule 85 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 prescribes the period within which an appeal under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to be filed. The Full Bench in Jagtar Singh has considered the question of commencement of limitation where an order has not been formally communicated. The Full Bench recognized that, ordinarily, limitation is to be reckoned from receipt of the order, but also made it clear that where the aggrieved party has acquired actual or constructive knowledge of the order, such knowledge becomes relevant for determining the commencement of limitation. The question of actual or constructive knowledge is necessarily dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

At the same time, the principle laid down in Jagtar Singh cannot be understood to mean that a party who has participated in the proceedings and is aware that its application has been considered and reserved for orders can remain completely inactive for an indefinite period and, thereafter, seek to compute limitation solely from the date on which it obtains a certified copy.

In the present case, the petitioner admittedly participated in the proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority on 09.12.2021. It was thus aware that its application had been considered and that the matter had been reserved for orders. The order was thereafter passed on 23.12.2021. The petitioner claims to have made repeated visits to the office of the Regional Transport Authority thereafter, but the Tribunal has specifically found that no concrete steps or timely enquiries were established from the record.

The petitioner admittedly applied for the certified copy only on 08.08.2023, more than one and a half years after the proceedings had culminated in the order. Though the petitioner asserts that it had been making repeated oral enquiries, no specific dates, written representations, applications, receipts or other contemporaneous material have been produced to substantiate the said assertion. The Tribunal, after considering the explanation, found the same to be unsupported and concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate due diligence.

The fact that the petitioner acted promptly after 08.08.2023 by obtaining the certified copy on 09.08.2023 and filing the appeal on 16.08.2023 does not, by itself, explain the substantial period preceding 08.08.2023. The subsequent promptness has to be considered separately from the petitioner's failure to demonstrate any meaningful effort during the earlier period to ascertain the outcome of the proceedings.

The Tribunal has also relied upon the principle of diligence and the Full Bench judgment in Jagtar Singh, observing that a party cannot sit back indefinitely and thereafter seek to avail the statutory remedy at its own convenience. The Tribunal further noticed that the petitioner had not filed any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner had taken the stand that there was no delay at all, and therefore did not seek condonation. Once the Tribunal rejected the petitioner's explanation and found the intervening period unexplained, the absence of any application seeking condonation became an additional circumstance against the petitioner.

The finding recorded by the learned Tribunal is essentially a finding on the factual question of diligence and the petitioner's conduct. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, is not required to substitute its own assessment for that of the statutory appellate authority merely because another view of the explanation may be possible. Unless the finding is shown to be perverse, based upon no material or suffering from a patent jurisdictional error, interference would not be warranted. No such infirmity has been demonstrated in the present case.

The petitioner has also challenged the original order dated 23.12.2021 on merits. The petitioner seeks, inter alia, a re-appreciation of its comparative qualifications and suitability vis-à-vis the successful applicants. However, the statutory appeal itself having been dismissed on limitation, and the Tribunal having consequently not examined the merits of the original order, this Court would not undertake a first-instance comparative assessment of the applicants in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

In any event, the mere fact that the petitioner considers itself more qualified or better placed than the successful applicants does not, by itself, establish a patent illegality in the decision of the Regional Transport Authority. The grant of a stage carriage permit involves an assessment by the competent statutory authority, and interference in writ jurisdiction would be justified only upon demonstration of arbitrariness, perversity, jurisdictional error or violation of a mandatory statutory requirement. No such infirmity has been established so as to warrant interference with the original order.

Consequently, the petitioner has failed to make out any ground for interference either with the order dated 07.05.2025 passed by the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab, or with the original order dated 23.12.2021 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Hoshiarpur.

The present writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Civil Miscellaneous application pending, if any, is also disposed of.