High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 10 P&H CK 6338

Sandeep Singh vs State Of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 31 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Surya Partap Singh, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No. S-1009-SB of 2005

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Judgment

62 paragraphs · 3,203 words

Surya Partap Singh, J.

1.

This is appeal against conviction.

2.

The convict/appellant, hereinafter being referred to as ‘appellant’ only, has preferred this appeal against the judgment of conviction dated 11.05.2005 and order on quantum of sentence dated 12.05.2005. By virtue of order dated 12.05.2005, following sentences were awarded to the appellant:-

Offence under SectionSentence
25 of the Arms ActRigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of ₹5,000/-. In default thereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.
3.

In nut-shell, the facts emerging from the record are that the appellant was sent to face trial for the commission of offence punishable under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act, 1959’ (‘Arms Act’) by SHO, Police Station Sadar, Moga, vide FIR No. 29 dated 31.03.2002. The trial was conducted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, hereinafter being referred to as ‘trial Court’ only, and for the above-mentioned trial the judgment of conviction dated 11.05.2005, hereinafter being referred to as ‘impugned judgment’ only, and order on quantum of sentence dated 12.05.2005, hereinafter being referred to as ‘impugned order’ only, were passed.

4.

The FIR in the above-mentioned case was lodged at the instance of ‘Inspector Baldev Singh’, the then SHO of Pllice Station Mehna. It was reported by the above-named police officer that on 31.03.2002 when he was leading a team of police officials, deputed for patrolling duty, he raided a place, apprehended the appellant and his co-accused and found that the appellant and his co-accused had gathered on the spot for the purpose of planning dacoity. According to above-named police officer when the appellant was apprehended for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 399 & 402 of IPC, the FIR No. 27 dated 31.03.2002 was lodged. As per prosecution during the course of investigation of above said case, from the possession of appellant, a .12 bore pistol was recovered. As such the FIR No. 29 dated 31.03.2002 was lodged in the same police station and the investigation was taken up.

5.

To discharge its burden of proving charges against the appellant, the prosecution, in the instant case, had relied upon oral and documentary evidence, both. The documents proved, and marked with exhibits, by the prosecution, were:-

Ex.PA - Rough sketch of .12 bore pistol

Ex.PB - Seizure memo of .12 bore pistol and cartridges from the possession of accused

Ex.PC - Seizure memo of currency note of the denomination of ₹20/-

Ex.PD - Arrest memo of accused

Ex.PE - Test Report of firearm (.12 bore pistol), recovered from the accused

Ex.PF - Sanction order dated 22.05.2002 for the prosecution of accused under Section 25 of the Arms Act, for the recovery of .12 bore pistol

Ex.PG - Information-memo, sent by the Investigating Officer to the police station

Ex.PG/1 - Copy of First Information Report

Ex.PH - Scaled site plan of place of occurrence

Ex.P1 - Pistol (.12 bore)

Ex.P2 - Cartridges & Ex.P3

6.

To provide support and corroboration to the above-mentioned documentary evidence, as many as five witnesses were examined by the prosecution. They were:-

PW.1 - ASI Dilbag Singh

PW.2 - SI Tara Singh, the Armourer

PW.3 - Satnam Singh, Ahlmad in the office of District Magistrate, Moga

PW.4 - HC Bhupinder Singh

PW.5 - SI Jasvir Singh

7.

Once the prosecution evidence had been recorded, the learned trial Court completed all the formalities, enshrined under Section 313 Cr.PC.. Thereafter, opportunity to lead defence evidence was afforded to the appellant. However, the appellant did not opt to lead any evidence in defence.

8.

When the stage of recording the evidence was over, the learned trial Court gave opportunity to the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the appellant, to address arguments. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was pronounced against the appellant. Accordingly, the sentences, detailed hereinbefore, were awarded to the appellant.

9.

Heard.

10.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that instant case was absolutely a false case wherein the entire story had been cooked-up by the police officials. As per learned counsel for the appellant despite opportunity, an independent witness was not joined at the time of alleged recovery of weapon (fire arm), and that the testimonies of official witnesses were contradictory on material points. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even the material witnesses, who being police officials, were available for examination, had been withheld by the prosecution during the course of trial and thus, the entire prosecution case was rendered doubtful.

11.

The learned counsel for the appellant has further contended that in addition to the fact that the testimonies of official witnesses were unreliable, there were other defects also in the instant case, such as the Arms Expert, who was examined as PW-2 had not deposed that he had test fired the weapon. As per learned counsel for the appellant sanction order for prosecution of appellant under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’, was defective in view of the fact that the weapon was not produced before the District Magistrate at the time of seeking sanction and the District Magistrate passed the order for sanction of prosecution in a routine manner, without application of mind.

12.

It has also been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the weapon produced in the court was not in working condition and therefore, the learned trial Court should have drawn this inference that the prosecution had failed to prove that -

Firstly, that there was recovery of an instrument from the possession of appellant; and

Secondly, that the above-mentioned instrument was a fire arm.

13.

In view of above-mentioned arguments, it has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that an error of judgment was committed by the learned trial Court when it failed to take into consideration all the above-mentioned facts and, merely, on the basis of assumptions and presumptions concluded that charge for the commission of offence punishable under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’ was successfully proved by the prosecution.

14.

While assailing the ‘impugned judgment’ and ‘impugned order’, it has been further contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the ‘impugned judgment’ and ‘impugned order’ were passed on conjectures and surmises and therefore, the same are not sustainable and required interference and indulgence appellate jurisdiction vested in this court. Thus, the request for allowing the appeal and acquittal of appellant.

15.

It has also been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that instant case is a case wherein major part of the prosecution story, i.e. gathering of appellant and his co-accused for the purpose of planning a robbery, was disbelieved by the learned trial Court and thus, the very foundation of the prosecution story itself was rendered unreliable.

16.

The learned counsel for the respondent/State has controverted the above-mentioned arguments. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent/State that a right view was taken by the learned trial Court on proper appreciation of evidence, and that it was correctly observed by the learned trial Court that in view of evidence adduced by the prosecution a charge for the commission of offence punishable under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’ had been duly proved by the prosecution. As per learned counsel for the respondent/State with the help of five prosecution witnesses the prosecution had proved each and every component for proving a charge under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’ and thus, the impugned judgment deserves to be upheld.

17.

While defending the impugned order, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent/State that in the present case before the learned trial Court five witnesses were examined by the prosecution, who duly proved -

Firstly, that the recovery of .12 bore pistol had taken place from the possession of appellant;

Secondly, that the above-mentioned weapon was tested by the Arms Expert, who found it in working condition; and

Thirdly, that the District Magistrate permitted for the prosecution of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’.

18.

As per learned counsel for the respondent/State, there is no mandate of the law that a fact can be proved by the prosecution with the help of public witnesses only, or that in each and every case the testimonies of official witnesses should be disbelieved. In view of above-mentioned arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent/State has contended that there is no scope for interference in the impugned judgment, and that the present appeal, being devoid of merits, deserves dismissal.

19.

The record has been perused carefully.

20.

As far as the present case was concerned, according to the story set-out by the prosecution on 31.03.2002 when a team of police officials was present at G.T. Road near Petrol Pump, the then SHO of Police Station Mehna, namely ‘Inspector Baldev Singh’ received an information about the assembly of five persons in a tube-well room of ‘Bant Singh’ within the area of village Ghal Kalan. According to prosecution case pursuant to above-mentioned information, the police team was divided in several parties and the place was raided where it was found that the appellant and his co-accused had assembled there and they were preparing to commit dacoity.

21.

It was the case of the prosecution that with regard to above-mentioned incident FIR No. 27 dated 31.03.2002 for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 399 & 402 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was lodged and further investigation taken up. According to prosecution case during the course of investigation of above-mentioned case when search of the person of appellant was conducted, he was found in possession of .12 bore pistol without any permit or license. Thus, it was inferred that the appellant had committed an offence punishable under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’. In such circumstances another FIR, i.e. FIR No. 29 dated 31.03.2002 was lodged, which led to present trial.

22.

As far as the above-mentioned story was concerned, a careful perusal of the same shows that the prime offence, allegedly committed by the appellant, was vide FIR No. 27 dated 31.03.2002 for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 399 & 402 of IPC. However, with regard to above-mentioned offence the appellant has not been convicted, which shows that the very foundation of the above-mentioned story set-out by the prosecution stood demolished.

23.

Be that as it may. Since in the present case the appellant was convicted for being in possession of illegal weapon it is to be seen as to whether the prosecution had been successful in proving charge for the commission of above-mentioned offence or not. With regard to above, it is relevant to mention here that five witnesses were examined by the prosecution.

24.

Amongst them the testimonies of PW-2 to PW-5 were formal in nature. The PW-2 had deposed that being an Expert in the field of testing of fire arm, the pistol recovered in the present case was tested by him and that the above said pistol was found to be in working order. According to PW-2 qua above-mentioned aspect he had prepared. However, with regard to testimony of PW-2, it was relevant to note here that the PW-2 had not testified that he had test fired the pistol allegedly recovered from the possession of appellant.

25.

The next witness examined by the prosecution was PW-3 ‘Satnam Singh’, a Clerk in the office of District Magistrate. The PW-3 had proved the sanction order Ex.PF issued by the then District Magistrate. However, the PW-3, in his deposition, nowhere mentioned that at the time of seeking sanction for the prosecution of appellant under Section-25 of the ‘Arms Act’, the weapon was produced before the District Magistrate.

26.

The next formal witness, examined as PW-4, was ‘HC Bhupinder Singh’. The PW-4 had simply deposed that he was posted as MHC in the police station, and that on 31.03.2002 he had lodged the formal FIR of this case, as Ex.PG/1. According to PW-4 the case property of the case, i.e. .12 bore pistol and two live cartridges were also deposited by the Investigating Officer of this case in the malkhana of police station. As per PW-4 on 02.05.2002 he handed over the above-mentioned sealed parcel (containing the case property) to ‘ASI Narinder Singh’ for getting the same tested by the Armourer (Arms Expert).

27.

Rest of the two witnesses examined by the prosecution were the witnesses of recovery. Amongst them PW-1 ‘ASI Dilbagh Singh’ had deposed that after the raid by a joint team of police officials, headed by ‘SI Jasbir Singh’ and ‘Inspector Baldev Singh’, respectively, the appellant was apprehended and from his possession .12 bore pistol and two live cartridges were recovered. The PW-1, during the course of his deposition, had also deposed that he was an Arm Expert trained in Police Training College, Phillaur, for the above said purpose. However, in his cross-examination, the PW-1 had admitted that when the above-mentioned pistol was produced in the Court, it was not in working order.

28.

The last witness examined by the prosecution was ‘SI Jasbir Singh’. He was a material witness being a witness of recovery. The PW-5, in his examination-in-chief, had duly supported the prosecution case and reproduced the facts identical to the contents of FIR, by deposing the fact that pursuant to in information when raid was conducted, the appellant was apprehended by his team and that from the possession of appellant a country-made pistol was recovered.

29.

As far as the above-mentioned evidence adduced by the prosecution was concerned, a careful perusal of the same showed that the link evidence in the present case was missing. As deposed by PW-4, on 02.05.2002 he had handed over the sealed parcel containing fire arm and two cartridges to ‘ASI Narinder Singh’ who produce the same before the Arm Expert (Armourer), who prepared the test report Ex.PE. However, the above-named prosecution witness (‘ASI Narinder Singh’) was not examined by the prosecution. Thus, in the present case the link evidence was missing.

30.

The second relevant component in the present case was that as per Arms Expert, i.e. PW-2 he had not test fired the pistol. It is settled proposition of law that without test firing it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the pistol was in working order or not. Thus, in the present case there was a reasonable doubt with regard to working condition of the weapon allegedly recovered from the possession of appellant.

31.

Another lapse in the present case was that the prosecution had failed to prove that while according sanction for the prosecution of appellant, for the offence under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’, the weapon was produced before the District Magistrate, and he accorded sanction for the prosecution of the appellant after applying its mind. The contents of deposition of PW-3 and the sanction order Ex.PF showed that the weapon was not produced before the District Magistrate, and that the sanction order was passed in a routine manner without application of mind. Thus, in my considered opinion the above-mentioned sanction was defective.

32.

In addition to above-mentioned technical defects it was also relevant to mention here that in the present case the story set-out by the prosecution in itself was unnatural. The contents of FIR itself showed that the appellant was apprehended along with his co-accused when he was preparing to commit dacoity. For the above said purpose FIR No. 27 was lodged in the same police station at the instance of same Investigating Officer. Once the appellant was arrested in the above-mentioned case in every probability, as per usual procedure and practice, search of the person of appellant would have been conducted in that case only and therefore, during the search of person if any weapon was found that was an integral part of investigation pertaining to FIR No. 27 only. But in the instant case a separate FIR was lodged. In my opinion the procedure adopted by the Investigating Officer, wherein the second FIR was lodged was defective.

33.

Since the story set-out by the prosecution with regard to FIR No. 27 had already been disbelieved by the learned trial Court and the appellant & his co-accused had been acquitted, in my considered opinion, the very foundation of the prosecution case with regard to recovery of weapon stood falsified.

34.

In addition to above, it is also relevant to mention here that as per prosecution story the recovery of weapon from the possession of appellant had taken place when pursuant to an information received by the Investigating Officer the raid was conducted. The above-mentioned events showed that before raid the Investigating Officer was having ample opportunity to join an independent witness, but no such independent witness was joined.

35.

Although there is no mandate of law that joining of independent witness is mandatory, but in the given fact-situation it was desirable. For the sake of arguments if it is assumed that any independent witness was not available on record, then at least the other police officials, who were present on the spot at the time of recovery of weapon of offence, should have been examined, but any of such witness was not examined by the prosecution. It shall be relevant to mention here that although the PW-1 had claimed that he was part of the raiding team, but as per deposition of PW-1 the team headed by ‘SI Jassbir Singh’ had apprehended the appellant, whereas the PW-1 and other members of the team had apprehended other accused. Thus, with regard to recovery of weapon from the possession of appellant the testimony of PW-1 was not explicit.

36.

In the above-mentioned circumstances, with regard to recovery of weapon of offence there was solitary statement of PW-5, the Investigating Officer of the case. Since PW-5 was the police official and being the Investigating Officer of the case was an interested witness, without corroboration of his testimony by other evidence, his sole testimony could not have been believed with regard to recovery of weapon from the possession of appellant.

37.

If the cumulative effect of all the above-mentioned factors would have been considered cojointly, it would have transpired that the story set-out by the prosecution with regard to recovery of weapon of offence from the possession of appellant was doubtful and the prosecution had failed to prove beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt that the appellant was found in possession of .12 bore pistol. Thus, it is hereby observed that an error of judgment was committed by the learned trial Court when it returned a finding that charge for the commission of offence punishable under Section 25 of the ‘Arms Act’ had been proved against the appellant. In my considered opinion, in fact the charge could not be proved and the appellant was entitled for acquittal.

38.

As a sequel to above-mentioned observations, it is hereby held that the present appeal has got merits and deserves to be allowed. Thus, the present appeal is hereby allowed. The ‘impugned judgment’ and ‘impugned order’ are hereby set-aside and the appellant is hereby acquitted of the charge framed against him.