Sandeep vs The Child Welfare, Council and Another

Swatanter Kumar, J.—By this order, I propose to dispose of Civil Revision Nos. 1287 to 1292 of 1998 as common question of law based on similar facts arises in these petitions.

The necessary facts are :- that all the plaintiffs-petitioners herein had filed suit for declaration and injunction. They prayed that the action of the defendants in enhancing rate of rent from Rs. 255/- per month to Rs. 15,000/- per month and the notice dated 8.3.1996 issued by the defendants-respondents herein demanding a sum of Rs. 4,903/- as arrears of rent in respect of the shops in question is totality illegal, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice and as such the same is liable to be quashed and consequently prayed for injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the petitioners from the shop in question.

Defendant Child Welfare Council, Sirsa, had auctioned the site for shops in the complex of District Child Welfare Council, Bal Bhawan, Barnala Road, Sirsa, on 6.12.1987. The highest bidders were given the shops as per the terms and conditions of the auction as declared on 6.12.1987 itself. The highest bidder was to construct the shop at his own expenses and was liable to pay monthly rent. The construction was to be completed within three months. The rent was payable immediately after the expiry of the three months. According to the plaintiffs in the suit, they had incurred a sum of Rs. 35,000/- on the construction of shop and verandah. They are verbally told that the rate of rent payable per month would be Rs. 255/-. However, copy of the agreement was not provided to them. The defendants enhanced the rate of rent from Rs. 255/- to 15,000/- per month and thus giving cause for the institution of the suit by the petitioners.

The suit was contested by the defendants-respondents. It was agreed that the monthly rate of rent was Rs. 255/- subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into between the parties. According to them, construction was not completed within three months and thus the plaintiffs have breached the terms and conditions of the agreement. The amount allegedly spent on construction was denied. It was stated that the shop was leased out for a limited period of 4 years 2 months and 5 days and as that period has already been expired the plaintiffs were liable to hand over vacant possession of the shops in question and they have no legal right to continue in occupation of the shops in question. The amount spent on construction is stated to have already been adjusted and thereafter in order to extent the lease and as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, the rate of rent has been enhanced to Rs. 1,500/- which is just valid and legal.

Alongwith the suit, an application u/s 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. was filed. Learned trial Court by a detailed judgment dismissed the injunction application filed by the plaintiffs and vacated the interim injunction granted to them on 11.4.1996 vide order dated 10.6.1997.

Aggrieved against the order of the learned trial Court, the plaintiffs assailed the same before the learned District Judge, Sirsa, who vide order dated 15.11.1997, while giving some relief to the appellants, partly allowed the appeal. The relevant part of the order reads as under :-

"Plaintiff shall not be dispossessed from the shop in dispute on the ground of non-payment of arrears till the decision of the suit on merits, provided he fulfills the following conditions :-

i. He shall deposit the arrears of Rs. 7,900/- with the defendant-council within two months from today;

ii. In addition to above said arrears and uptil decision of the suit plaintiff shall continue depositing with the defendant council Rs. 800/- per month as use and occupation charges (on or before 7th of every month) w.e.f. 1.12.1997).

iii. Apart from condition No. 1 and ii above, plaintiff shall deposit Rs. 16,800/- as arrears from March, 1996 to November, 1997, of the shop in question within four months from today.

In case of breach of any of the aforesaid terms and conditions, plaintiffs application for temporary injunction shall stand dismissed."

It is this order which has been assailed in the present revision.

At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the respondents brought to the notice of this Court that a Civil Revision No. 1368 of 1998 titled Bhoj Raj v. Child Welfare Council Sirsa and Ors., preferred against the same order already stands dismissed by another bench of this Court vide order dated 31.3.1998 and even review application of the aforestated order was also dismissed vide order dated 19.5.1998 by the same bench.

On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the said dismissal in limine does not bind this Court and these cases should be decided on their own merits.

I am unable to see much substance in this contention. It may be true to some extent that order passed in limine necessarily may not be of the binding nature and may not even operate as res judicata in a given circumstances. However, the order passed by the Hon''ble Bench is a detailed order and is not dismissal simplicitor. The order dated 31.3.1998 reads as under :-

"The learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa had not granted any ad interim injunction to the petitioner. He preferred an appeal with the District Judge, Sirsa. The learned District Judge, Sirsa allowed the appeal and directed that the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the shop in dispute on the ground of non-payment of arrears till the decision of the suit subject to following conditions:-

He shall deposit the arrears of Rs. 6,279/- with the defendant-Council within two months from today.

In addition to above said arrears and uptil decision of the suit, plaintiff shall continue depositing with the defendant council Rs. 550/- per month as use and occupation charges (on or before 7th of every month) w.e.f. 1.12.1997.

Apart from condition No. l and 2 above, plaintiff shall deposit Rs. 11,550/- as arrears from March, 1996 to November, 1997 of the shop in question within four months from today.

Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the said conditions imposed by the learned District Judge, Sirsa on the ground that the rent could not be increased and that the amount incorporated in condition, in fact, is not due, particularly with respect to condition No. 3 where the arrears have been asked to be deposited amounting to Rs. 11,550/- within four months. Needless to state that these are conditions imposed by the learned District Judge, which are obviously imposed in exercise of the inherent powers of the Court. At this stage, since these are the conditions imposed for the grant of ad interim injunction, there is no ground to interference in the impugned order. Dismissed.

Furthermore, a detailed review application was filed by the petitioners in that case, which was also dismissed, as already noticed.

Consistency in judicial pronouncement is one of the essential basis of proper administration of justice. These cases are arising from similar facts, out of the same agreement and same enhancement which is being challenged. In these circumstances, I am unable to see any substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, as afore-noticed.

The learned first Appellate Court has exercised its discretion and granted conditional interim order to the petitioneRs. It is settled principle of law that scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court is very limited one. This court should be satisfied that whether the order impugned suffers from jurisdictional or substantial error of law so as to interfere in such proceedings. Balancing equities between the parties subject to certain conditions cannot be termed as error of jurisdiction.

In this regard, reference can be made to the case of Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginning Factory and Another Vs. Yograjsinha Shankarsinha Parihar and Others, , wherein, the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under :-

"......Therefore, we are of the opinion that both the learned Assistant Judge and High Court were not justified in interfering with the order of the trial Court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction on the only ground that a different view on facts elicited was possible. This approach hardly permits interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction."

The agreement provides for enhancement of rent. Its reasonableness or otherwise would have to be gone into during the course of trial. Another factor which must be considered by the Court is that the payment of amounts in question would not completely jeopardise the interest of the petitioners because if the petitioners finally succeed in the suit, the amount paid by them in terms of the interim order can always be adjusted in future as such, the petitioners would not suffer irreparable loss and damages in the facts and circumstances of the case.

I am unable to see any jurisdictional error or any other error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned order vide which the learned first Appellate Court has exercised the jurisdiction legally vested in it. The petitioners have not been able to satisfy the court with regard to the settled precept for granting an injunction i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury.

For the reasons aforestated all the above revisions are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

However, Keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, it would be desirable that the learned trial Court endure its best to dispose of the suits as expeditiously as possible.