Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench(2023) 07 NCLAT CK 3864

Samson T. George vs P.T. Joy, RP of MIR Realtors Pvt. Ltd.

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, CHENNAI Bench · Decided on 17 July 2023

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rakesh Kumar Jain, Member (Judicial) · Shreesha Merla, Member (Technical)
CASE NUMBER
Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No.199/2023

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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 617 words

ORDER

Per: Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain:

This application is filed for condonation of delay of 14 days in filing of the appeal against the order dated 25.01.2023 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Kochi Bench) by which an application i.e. I.A. (IBC)/431/KOB/2022 filed in IBA/11/KOB/2020 by the Appellant/Applicant has been dismissed.

2.

The impugned order was passed on 25.01.2023 and the appeal has been filed on 09.03.2023. The statutory period for filing of an appeal is 30 days. The said period counted from the order dated 25.01.2023 expired on 25.02.2023 and since the appeal has been filed on 09.03.2023, therefore, it is alleged by the Appellant that a delay of 14 days has occurred.

3.

Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that delay has been caused because the erstwhile counsel for the Applicant at Kochi received the impugned order dated 25.01.2023 on the same day but there was some delay in communicating the order to the Applicant who had taken appropriate measures to approach their legal representative at Chennai and received the advice to file the appeal before this Appellate Tribunal.

4.

It is submitted that delay has thus been caused of 14 days beyond the period of 30 days. It is submitted that delay is bonafide and not deliberate.

5.

We have heard Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant and perused the application.

6.

Section 61 of the Code deals with appeals and appellate authority which is reproduced as under: -

“Section 61. Appeals and Appellate Authority.

(1)

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained under the Companies Act 2013 (18 of 2013), any person aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority under this part may prefer an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.

(2)

Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days.”

7.

Section 61(1) provides that any person who is aggrieved by an order of the Adjudicating Authority has a right to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. Whereas Section 61(2) provides that there shall be a period of 30 days for filing such an appeal before the Appellate Authority and proviso to Section 61(2) says that the Appellate Authority may allow the appeal to be filed even after expiry of 30 days if it is satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time but such period shall not exceed 15 days.

8.

The Appellant has admittedly obtained the certified copy of the impugned order on 25.01.2023 and was thus having 30 days statutory period to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal at Chennai but no effort was made during this period rather the appeal has been filed on the last but one day of the extended period of 15 days without giving any sufficient cause for causing such a delay.

9.

The reasons assigned in the application for not filing the appeal within the time is not a sufficient cause on the basis of which the delay could have been condoned. Thus, we do not find any merit in the present application which does not constitute a sufficient cause to our satisfaction and hence, the present application is hereby dismissed.

CA (AT) (Ins) No. 199 of 2023

Since, we have dismissed the application for condonation of delay, therefore, this appeal cannot be treated as duly constituted, therefore, the present appeal is hereby dismissed as such.