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Judgment
The Petitioners, who are the employees in the Judicial Department filed this Writ Petition challenging the punishment order dated November 28, 1990 passed by the 2nd respondent confirmed by the 1st respondent in ROC No. 211/1991/Cspl. (con) dated : August 16, 1991. The Petitioners were appointed in 1981 and were working as Amin in the Sub-Court, Tenali during 1989. A complaint was lodged against the petitioners and another Armin by name S. V. R. K. Raju alleging that the petitioners indulged in corrupt practices in which they demanded money from one Shri. S. Rama Koteshwar Rao of Tenali, thereby they resorted to corruption.
The facts leading to the case are that on March 1, 1989 a complaint was received from Sri S. Rama Koteshwar Rao alleging that the petitioners while executing the order in I.A. No. 102/91 in O.S. No. 802/88 a warrant of attachment of movable properties demanded money. Again they resorted to same misconduct when for the second time the warrant of attachment issued in I.A. No. 4056/88 was sought to be executed. It is also the complaint that they have been pressurising the complainant not to give evidence in departmental enquiry. The District Judge, Guntur who is the disciplinary authority initially ordered an enquiry and appointed Principal Sub-Judge, Tenali as Enquiry Officer. It is averred that the Enquiry Officer found the petitioners not guilty of the charges, but the 2nd Respondent without proceeding further with the matter again ordered a fresh enquiry by appointing another Judge i.e. the II Addl. Judge as an Enquiry Officer, thereupon the learned Enquiry Officer framed three charges by proceedings dated October 6, 1989 against the petitioners and another Amin S. V. R. K. Raju. Out of three charges only charge No. 2 was found established against the petitioners. Based on the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the petitioners were issued with the show cause notice of proposed punishment of dismissal from service. However on explanation having been filed by the petitioners, the matter was considered by the 2nd Respondent and finally by proceedings dated November 28, 1990, the petitioners were imposed with the punishment of stoppage of two annual increments on cumulative effect. Aggrieved by the said order of punishment, the petitioners filed an appeal to the 1st Respondent-Registrar High Court, and the appellate authority, by orders dated August 16, 1991 rejected the appeals filed by the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners assailed the order of the punishment dated November 28, 1990 as confirmed by the 1st Respondent by proceedings dated August 16, 1991.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when once an enquiry was ordered by the disciplinary authority, and the Enquiry Officer having held the petitioners not guilty of the charges, it is not open for the disciplinary authority to order re-enquiry by nominating another Enquiry Officer. The said action of the 2nd Respondent is wholly illegal and contrary to the Rules.
On the other hand, it is the case of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent - High Court, that it is always open for the disciplinary authority to review the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer in conducting the enquiry and if he is found to have committed any irregularity in conducting the enquiry and his findings are not properly recorded, it is always open for the authority for remitting the case for further or de novo enquiry. The petitioners did not approach this Court at the relevant time when the de novo enquiry was ordered. The petitioners having fully participated after the appointment of the second Enquiry Officer who framed the charges afresh and conducted the enquiry, it would not be open for them to challenge the said action in this proceedings. Therefore, I am not inclined to go into that aspect as to whether the action of the 2nd Respondent in ordering the second enquiry by another officer is proper or not at this stage. Accordingly I reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The learned counsel next submits that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer is not in consonance with the C.C.A. Rules and that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are not based on evidence and therefore he submits that the said findings are perverse. For proper appreciation of this contention, it is necessary to extract the charges framed against the petitioners. The following charges are framed by the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Guntur in his proceedings dated October 6, 1989.
"CHARGE NO. 1 : That in pursuance of the orders of the Prl. District Munsif, Tenali in I.A. 1021/88 in O.S. 802/88 a warrant for attachment of movable properties of Sri Sunkara Rama Koteswara Rao s/o. Venkataiah, business, Ramalingeswara Raopet, Tenali was entrusted to Sri S. V. R. K. Raju No. 1 of you for execution of the warrant and instead of you Sri P. Sambasivarao No. 2 of you went to the house of the said Sunkara Rama Koteswara Rao and effected the attachment and at that time demanded a mamool of Rs. 300/- from the said Rama Koteswara Rao and collected Rs. 200/- on that day and Rs. 100/- on the next day by threat and coercion and thereby you Sri S. V. R. K. Raju and Sri P. Sambasivarao, Amins, committed gross misconduct in discharge of your duties and also dereliction in your duties.
CHARGE NO. 2 : That in pursuance of the orders dated February 7, 1988 of the Prl. District Munsiff, Tenali in I.A. 4056/88 in O.S. 802/88 for attachment of immovable properties of the above said Sri Sunkara Rama Koteswara Rao, on February 26, 1989 at 9.00 a.m., the Amin Sri I. S. Varma Rao to whom the warrant was entrusted along with two other Amins Sri S. Nageswara Rao and Sri P. Sambasiva Rao went to the house of said Sunkara Rama Koteswara Rao and the Amin Sri P. Sambasiva Rao demanded a sum of Rs. 300/- towards amool from the said Rama Koteswara Rao and all of you i.e. Nos. 2 to 4 threatened him that if he fails to pay the said amount, you would proclaim attachment on the streets by beat of tom tom and when the said Rama Koteswara Rao pleaded inability to pay the amount as demanded, all of you got proclaimed the attachment by beat of drums and thereby you have committed misconduct and dereliction in discharge of your duties.
CHARGE NO. 3 : You Sri S. V. R. K. Raju, Sri P. Sambasiva Rao, Sri I. S. Varma and Sri S. Nageswara Rao, Amins are pressurising and thereatening the complainant Sunkara Rama Koteswara Rao and preventing him from giving evidence and thereby you have committed misconduct."
Three witnesses wore examined on behalf of the Department, while nine witnesses were examined on behalf of the employees. The 1st charge was only against two employees and the same was not established. The third charge was also not found proved against the petitioners. However charge No. 2 held proved. Therefore, the concentration has to be made in respect of charge No. 2, and it has to be considered whether the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer in respect of the said charge are legal and valid. To sustain the charge, department examined three witnesses i.e. the complainant, who made a complaint against the petitioners and also his wife and daughter, who categorically deposed that the petitioners demanded money, and threatened that otherwise they would proclaim attachment by beating Tom Tom and when petitioners were not paid money as demanded, they got the attachment proclaimed by beating of drums. Though, there is a variation in the complaint and the evidence inasmuch as in the complaint it was alleged that the petitioners demanded Rs. 500/-, while in evidence they stated it as Rs. 300/-, I do not consider such an irregularity would vitiate the finding.
Though the learned counsel for the petitioners submit that there were number of other contradictions and the findings of the Enquiry Officer are one sided, he was not able to identify particular portions to establish that the finding is either based on no evidence or perversity has crept in. Sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not open for this Court to reappraise the entire evidence in the enquiry and come to a different conclusion. Suffice to say that findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer based on the evidence available before him are such findings which could have been arrived at by a person of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances, then the finding cannot be said to be perverse. In the instant case, I do not find any illegality in the finding. It also cannot be said that there is no evidence to support finding. Under those circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that there is no evidence to sustain the findings cannot be accepted and accordingly I hold that the findings cannot be said to be perverse.
The learned counsel also submits that the punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. Therefore, a minor punishment ought to have been given. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel. The proportionality of the punishment has been considered by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in State Bank of India and Others Vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow and Another, and concluded that it might be that the punishment of removal imposed upon the Respondent was harsh, but that was a matter which the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should consider and not the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal.
The Division Bench of this Hon''ble High Court after the judgment of Supreme Court reduced the following principles on the question of interference of punishment under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in State Bank of Hyderabad, Gunfoundry, Hyderabad and Others Vs. V.K. Gadgil, of the judgment is extracted below :
"From the above discussion, the following principles can be reduced :
(1) In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power of the High Court while considering the question of proportionality of punishment in service matters, is one of judicial review which is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. If the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is one, which, having regard to the rules, could be imposed for the proved misconduct, the Court will not go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the punishment awarded by the authority. However, there are three exceptions to this rule :
i) Where the, punishment imposed is mala fide or so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court;
(ii) Where the punishment imposed falls under clause (a) of the Second proviso to Article is 311 of the Constitution, and
(iii) Where the punishment imposed was passed u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(2) Whether the impugned punishment is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court, is a question of fact, which has to be decided on the facts of each case, having regard to the gravity of the misconduct, nature of the duties discharged by the delinquent officer, the position held by him and the nexus between the official position and the misconduct. It is neither practicable nor desirable to lay down as to when a punishment can be said to be shocking the judicial conscience;
Whether the proved misconduct is a substantial misconduct or a trivial misconduct, is a matter which can be examined by the High Court, and where the disciplinary authority proceeded on the assumption that the misconduct was a substantial misconduct whereas in fact it was found to be only a trivial misconduct, the High Court will be well within its bounds to quash the impugned punishment as one not authorised by law.
In a case to which exception (1) to rule (1) or rule (2), mentioned above, is applicable, the appropriate course for the Court will be to remit the matter to the disciplinary or the appellate authority, as the case may be, for passing fresh order of punishment commensurate with the gravity of the charges proved but not to substitute a lesser punishment which in its opinion, is just and proper".
In the instant case, the punishment awarded to the petitioners is deferment of two annual increments with cumulative effect for proved charge of indulging in corrupt practices. Therefore, I hold that the punishment is not disproportionate.
Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order of the High Court in the Appeal is cryptic and does not contain any reasons. The Appellate order only says that "What was held to be proved is an act of misconduct and the punishment awarded is in proportion to the gravity of the delinquency and that the Appeals are therefore liable to be dismissed". I have also perused the concerned file where the appeal was dealt by the High Court and I am satisfied that the Appeals were considered in proper perspective. Hence, I do not find any illegality in the order of the appellate authority. Accordingly, I reject this contention also as having no substance.
In view of the foregoing discussions, I find no merits in the Writ Petition and the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.