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Judgment
Mian Jalal-ud-din, J.—The Petitioner seeks writ of certiorari for quashing the order of State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 22-2-75
passed in revision file No. 3 of 1972.
One Khaliq Bhat, the husband of the Petitioner died leaving behind Respondents 1 and 2 as his daughters and the Petitioner as his widow. The
deceased owned a truck No. JKA-5497 which according to the Petitioner he had given her by way of gift, but the truck and the route permit
stood in his name. After the death of Khaliq Bhat the Petitioner applied to the State Transport Authority for the transfer of route permit and
registration of truck in her name. The State Transport Authority Respondent No. 10 transferred the said truck and the route permit in the name of
the Petitioner vide order No. 8120/TC dated 4-12-1971. Respondent No. 1. thereupon filed a revision petition on 4-10-1972 before the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal praying for the quashing of the order of Respondent No. 10 by virtue of which the truck had been ordered to be
registered in the name of the Petitioner along-with route permit. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal allowed the revision petition and remanded
the case to the State Transport Authority for proper investigation and enquiry and for disposing of the matter according to law. The Petitioner has
assailed this order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called ""the Tribunal"") on the following grounds.
(i) that the tribunal had no power to entertain any revision in the matter alter a lapse of 10 months;
(ii) that the Respondent No. 1 had no right to move the Tribunal inasmuch as she had no right, title or interest in the truck which according to the
Petitioner was her sole property;
(iii) that the Respondent No. 1 had not filed any appeal against the order of the State Transport Authority and as such could not file any revision
(iv) that the Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction which was not vested in it and therefore the order was bad in law;
(v) That the matter was of civil nature and could be decided by a Civil Court. Respondent No. 1 has filed a reply affidavit. Respondent No. 3 has
also filed objections. No one has appeared on behalf of the other Respondents.
In the reply affidavit filed by Respondent No. 1 she affirmed that the Petitioner had suppressed the fact of the existence of the other heirs of
Khaliq Bhat deceased and therefore the order of registration and transfer of the vehicle and the route permit secured by her in her favour was
improper. The State Transport Authority did not give notice to the Respondent No. 1 at the time of making the order. She had no knowledge
about the order of transfer. When she came to know of this, she immediately filed the revision petition. She could not file an appeal as she was not
a party before the State Transport Authority. The Respondent has supported the order of the Tribunal. She has denied that the order passed by
the Tribunal was without jurisdiction. Respondent No. 3 has supported Respondent No. 1 in her objections.
I have heard the learned Counsel to the parties. Appearing for the Petitioner Mr. Choudhry has reiterated all the grounds which the Petitioner
has taken in the petition. He has relied upon Section 64 of the Motor Vehicle Act and has argued that the Tribunal was not competent to entertain
the revision petition when a remedy by way of appeal (sic) available to the Respondent No. 1. He has further urged that the Tribunal could be
extend time u/s 5 of the Limitation Act although it might be said that the petition had no knowledge of the order of the State Transport Authority.
Reliance is placed 1978 JKLR 24 at p. 25.
I am, however, unable to agree with the learned Counsel. Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that any person grieved by the refusal
to transfer the pension to the person succeeding on the death of holder of a permit may within the processed time appeal to the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal.
In the present case this could not a case of refusal to transfer permit in the name of the Respondent No. 1, The Respondent No. 1 could not be
said to be petition aggrieved by the order of refusal to transport permit of the vehicle in her name. In (sic) there was no order of refusal made a(sic)
Respondent No. 1, Therefore she could (sic) file appeal. Moreover right to appeal available to a party in whose favour against whom an order is
passed by a (sic) petent forum or authority. In the present case as there was no order against the Respondent, nor was she a party before State
Transport Authority, nor was (sic) notice given to her of the application by the Petitioner before the said authority she could not therefore have filed
the Appellant against the order of registration of the vehicle and transfer of permit in favour of the Petitioner. Her only remedy was to invoke the
revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal which she did. Therefore, in my view the revision was competent. In that view of the matter it
cannot be said that the Tribunal had acted without jurisdiction.
It is however, true that the revision petition was filed beyond the prescribed time and was belated. The Respondent could not claim the benefit
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for extending the period of limitation. As already observed in 1973 JKLR 24 It p. 25 the court cannot by
process of incorporation make the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to applications for revision when neither the Section
says take that nor does the enactment expressly contention this. But this in my opinion will not (sic)ender the order liable to be quashed as this
Court may not in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction quash an order which satisfies the interests of justice as observed by a full Bench of
this Court in case ""Dina Nath. Maul v. Election Tribunal. J. and K. in AIR 1960 J and K 25 (at p. 27).
The issue of a writ of certiorari is discretionary with the court. The court is not found to issue such a writ even if there be same error of law or
defect of jurisdiction in given case, unless it is satisfied that the interests of justice demand the granting of (sic)
Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the powers of the court to
issue writ of certiorari propounded the following view: at p. 429).
That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there an error of law. The High Courts do not, (sic)d should not act as
courts of appeal under Article 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon the discretion it must be
exercised (sic)ng recognised lines and not arbitrarily; (sic)l one of the limitations imposed by the courts on themselves is that they will not exercise
jurisdiction in a case unless substantial justice has ensued or is likely to ensue.
In the similar principle has been reiteration in Anr. judgment of the Supreme court reported in A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen, . It (sic) observed that
the High Court has power refuse the issue of writs if it is satisfied that (sic)e is no failure of justice. The question Before that falls for consideration
is whether in the present case the quashing of the impugned order is called for and do the dictates of justice require that in my opinion the order
passed by the Tribunal is innocuous and satisfies the requirements of justice. In the case before us, it is admitted that besides the Petitioner the
other two Respondents are also the legal heirs of Khaliq Bhat the deceased. Like the Petitioner these Respondents as legal heirs of the deceased
are entitled and have right to get the vehicle also transferred in their name. The Petitioner's contention is that she is the sole owner of the vehicle by
virtue of some gift made in her favour by the deceased but there is no deed of gift available. Therefore the story of the gift is to be investigated
especially when it is admitted that the permit and the registration of the vehicle stood in the name of the deceased even after the alleged gift and not
in the name of the Petitioner. The order of the Tribunal is for promoting the ends of justice and intends to do substantial justice between the parties.
In my opinion the order of the Tribunal is one which satisfies the judicial conscience. There can be no failure of justice by the said order. On the
other hand if the writ of certiorari is issued., it would result in the perpetuation of injustice and will drive the parties to resort to endless civil
litigations.
For the foregoing reasons I am therefore loath to issue writ of certiorari in favour of the Petitioners. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. The
parties will, however, bear their own costs.