Sakthivel vs The Commissioner of Police, Chennai and another

Judgement pronounced by S. Jagadeesan, J.—The detenu has impugned the order of detention made against him under the Tamil Nadu Act

14 of 1982. The detenu has been arrested on 6.8.1998 for offences under sections 341, 392, 336 read with section 397 and 506(2) I.P.C., as he

was involved on the said date in the occurrence of committing breach of public order by causing threat to one Kasinathan in the public street and

robbed from him a sum of Rs. 65 and also a wrist watch. Thereafter, he indulged in throwing soda bottles to cause apprehension in the minds of

the public and also brandishing a knife and threatened those who were witnessing the occurrence saying if anyone approached to get hold of him,

they would be stabbed. Ultimately, after satisfying with the report of the sponsoring authority, the detaining authority has passed the impugned

order on 18.8.1998.

The order of detention is impugned by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the mother of the detenu gave a telegram on

3.8.1998 stating that her son Sakthivel was arrested by Ex.1 police station on 24.7.1998 and was in illegal custody. This particular telegram has

not been taken into consideration by the detaining authority and as such, the order of detention is vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind.

On the basis of this telegram, learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to stress that when the detenu was already under illegal detention on

6.8.1998, there is no possibility of his involving on 6.8.1998 in the ground case and hence it is a vital document which ought to have been taken

into consideration by the detaining authority to come to the conclusion with regard to the involvement of the detenu in the ground case.

The learned Public Prosecutor brought to our notice a decision of the Supreme Court in District Magistrate and another v. G. Jothi Sankar, with

District Magistrate and Another Vs. R. Kumara Vel, and contended that the telegram issued prior to the order of detention is not a necessary or

relevant document which the detaining authority has to consider, If the said telegram is not accompanied by any supporting affidavit, the same need

not be taken into consideration and hence, non-consideration of the document, in any manner does not vitiate the impugned order of detention. The

Apex Court while considering the identical argument advanced by the learned counsel for detenu before them has held as follows:

The detenus have based their case solely on the fact that the contents of the telegrams sent on their behalf were not taken into consideration by the

detaining authority. There is nothing on the record to show that before the detention orders were passed any other communication was sent to the

detaining authority or to the police, confirming the contents of the telegrams. A telegram by itself is not an authentic document. It is like an

unsigned/anonymous communication. Unless a telegram is confirmed by a subsequent signed application, representation or an affidavit, the contents

of the telegrams have no authenticity at all and the same cannot be taken into consideration for assessing the value of the other authentic documents

on the record. The detention orders were passed by the District Magistrate on the basis of the material placed before him by the police authorities.

Any material received by the District Magistrate in the shape of telegrams could not be taken into consideration by him in the absence of any

subsequent communication confirming the same. We are, therefore, of the view that the orders of detention could not be challenged on the ground

that some material contained in a telegram simpliciter was not taken into consideration by the detaining authority.

From the above extracted portion of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the telegram simpliciter need not be taken into

consideration by the detaining authority. Basing upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, we find there is no merit or substance in the

argument of the counsel for the petitioner.

The other ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, that in the second adverse case referred to in the order of detention, the

occurrence said to have been taken place on 17.3.1998, whereas in the order of detention as well as in the booklet furnished to the detenu, it has

been mentioned as 17.8.1998 and the non-consideration of this material variation in the date by the detaining authority would also vitiate the order

of detention. We are unable to agree with the ground taken by the learned counsel for the detenu on the simple reason that the adverse cases are

only referred to by the sponsoring authority to bring to the notice of the detaining authority about the previous conduct of the detenu. In this case,

the order of detention has referred to as many as 19 adverse cases and as such, the variation of date in one case has no bearing in the order of

detention, since the variation has not in any way, affected the conclusion of the detaining authority. The detention order, in the aforesaid

circumstances had been passed by the detaining authority. Hence, there is no substance in the second ground of the learned counsel for the

petitioner.

No other grounds were urged before us and for the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the present H.C.P. and the order of

detention is confirmed. Present H.C.P. is dismissed.