Sakshi Tamrakar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Per: Justice B.P. Sharma:-

The batch of writ appeals has been preferred under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petitions concerning the same recruitment process for appointment of teachers under the School Education Department and the Tribal Welfare Department. Since the controversy involved in all these appeals is substantially identical and arises from the same selection process therefore, all the appeals are being heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.

The background facts, are that the Professional Examination Board issued a common advertisement for conducting the Teachers Eligibility Test, 2018, for appointment to teaching posts in the Director of Public Instruction/School Education Department as well as the Tribal Welfare Department. The selection process contemplated preparation of a merit list of the candidates who qualified in the examination, followed by counselling and allocation of available posts/schools on the basis of merit and the options exercised by the candidates. The total number of posts involved in the recruitment process was substantial and the vacancies of both departments were brought within the common selection framework. The candidates were required to participate in the counselling process and, depending upon their merit position and availability of vacancies, were to be allotted schools in accordance with the choices exercised by them.

The controversy arose because several candidates belonging to reserved categories secured marks higher than the candidates falling in the unreserved category. Consequently, on the basis of their merit, such candidates were treated as candidates selected on merit and were adjusted against the unreserved/general vacancies. However, in the course of allocation, several of them were allotted schools under the Tribal Welfare Department, whereas schools under the School Education Department, which according to the appellants had been included in their preferences, were allotted to candidates lower in merit. The respondents subsequently issued instructions/orders dated 02.11.2022 and 21.12.2022 whereby candidates who had already secured appointment in either the School Education Department or the Tribal Welfare Department were not permitted to register themselves for counselling against the remaining/vacant posts. The appellants challenge this restriction as being contrary to the original selection process. According to them, neither the advertisement nor the governing recruitment framework contained any stipulation that a candidate who had secured appointment in one of the two departments would permanently lose the opportunity to participate in the selection/counselling process for the other department.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the action of the respondents is contrary to the original selection procedure and principles of merit. It is contended that there was no condition in the advertisement debarring a candidate, merely because he/she had been appointed in the Tribal Welfare Department, from participating in the subsequent counselling for the School Education Department. According to the appellants, such restriction was introduced subsequently and could not be applied so as to alter the conditions of selection midway. It is further submitted that the respondents themselves permitted the appellants to participate in the selection process, verify their documents and, in some cases, place their names in the School Choice Filling List, and subsequently deny them the opportunity of choice filling. The appellants also contend that candidates lower in merit have been permitted to obtain appointment in the School Education Department, whereas the more meritorious appellants have been deprived of the same opportunity, resulting in violation of policy as well as Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon two Division Bench decisions in the case of Richa Tamrakar and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, W.A. No.1333 of 2023, decided on 12.11.2024 and Hansraj Kumhar and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, W.A. No.562 of 2023, decided on 19.02.2025.

6 . Per contra, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that once the appellants were selected and appointed in the Tribal Welfare Department, their recruitment process stood concluded and they could not claim a second opportunity to participate in counselling for the School Education Department. It is submitted that permitting such candidates to participate again would result in the posts already allotted to them in the Tribal Welfare Department becoming vacant and would unsettle the appointments already made. The respondents, therefore, submit that the impugned restriction is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and that the writ appeals deserve to be dismissed.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.

The recruitment was undertaken pursuant to a common selection process for the School Education Department and the Tribal Welfare Department, and the scheme contemplated consideration of the candidates according to their merit and the preferences submitted by them. Clause 15.6 specifically contemplated choice of schools under both departments and provided for allocation on the basis of merit. The appellants contend, and the record supports, that candidates lower in merit were permitted to participate in the School Education Department counselling, whereas the appellants, despite being higher in merit, were denied such opportunity merely because they had already secured appointment in the Tribal Welfare Department. Such an arrangement cannot be accepted if the consequence is to place a more meritorious candidate in a position inferior to that of a less meritorious candidate.

The material concerning appellant Sakshi Tamrakar is particularly illustrative: after her selection, the School Education Department called her for document verification, verified her documents and thereafter included her in the School Choice Filling List, but she was denied the actual choice-filling facility only because an appointment letter had already been issued to her by the Tribal Welfare Department. The condition that a candidate already appointed in one department would not be permitted to seek appointment in the other department was not contained in the original advertisement and was introduced subsequently. In our view, the respondents cannot be permitted to change the rules of the game in the middle of the selection process. Such action is contrary to the basic requirement of fairness in State action and, where similarly situated candidates are treated differently without a rational basis, also attracts the constitutional guarantee of equality before law and equal opportunity.

This view is fortified by the Division Bench judgment in the case of Richa Tamrakar (supra) wherein the Division Bench held that the choice be allotted in accordance with the choice filling and merit and, in the absence of vacancy in the first-choice district, the candidate be accommodated in another chosen district under the School Education Department. In Hansraj Kumhar (supra ) the Division Bench, relying upon Richa Tamrakar (supra), allowed the appeal and directed allotment according to choice filling in order of merit. The appellants submit that the controversy in the present appeals is squarely covered by these decisions and that the learned Single Judge ought to have followed the binding view of the Division Benches. The ratio is that merit cannot operate to the disadvantage of a more meritorious candidate and the choice-filling mechanism must be implemented consistently with merit.

The aforesaid judgment, therefore, lays down two significant principles relevant to the present controversy. First, allocation after selection must remain consistent with merit and the notified choice-filling mechanism/policy. Secondly, the administrative manner of implementing the selection policy cannot be permitted to place a more meritorious candidate at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a less meritorious candidate. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge committed error in passing the impugned order.

For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeals are allowed and the order passed in all the Writ Petitions are hereby set aside. The orders passed by the learned Single Judge, to the extent they deny the appellants consideration in the School Choice Filling process on the ground of their prior appointment in the Tribal Welfare Department, are set aside.

The respondents are directed to provide the appellants an opportunity to exercise their preferences in accordance with the applicable School Choice Filling Policy. If the appellants have secured appointment on the basis of their merit, their placement shall be considered strictly on the basis of their merit position and the preferences submitted by them. At the same time, the teachers who have already joined pursuant to the selection process but, upon implementation of the aforesaid exercise, do not fall within the corresponding merit position they shall be absorbed against available vacancies in the respective department if available and, in the absence of such vacancies, shall be adjusted in other department in accordance with the applicable School Choice Filling Policy within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.