Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal & Ors. vs Indian Bank & Anr.

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

The present appeal has been preferred against an order whereby, on an application purportedly captioned under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the defendant no.2/respondent, the learned Trial Judge passed an order of stay of operation of a notice dated September 07, 2024 issued by the Secretary, Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal till disposal of the suit.

Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants argues that the said relief was entirely beyond the scope and subject-matter of the suit and, as such, no injunction could have been granted under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The entire plaint case, it is argued, revolves around a Trust by the name of Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal, which was formed in the year 1981.

There is no mention in the plaint of the suit as to there being any other Trust of the year 2018.

The premise of the plaint case is that the defendant no.2, who was at one point of time a Chairman of the Trust, had resigned from the Chairmanship. Even otherwise, his tenure having been over long back, the defendant no.2/respondent is no longer a portfolio holder in the said Trust of 1981.

Learned counsel points out to the affidavit-in-opposition of the defendant no.2/respondent, in paragraph no.10 of which it has been admitted that though the said respondent has not been elected in any post of office bearers, he was, and is, continuing as an ordinary trustee of the said Trust.

Thus, it is argued that the defendant no.2/respondent does not have any locus standi to object to a validly convened meeting of the Trust.

Learned counsel takes the Court through the reliefs sought in the plaint and argues that those are entirely focused around the validity of the election by dint of which the present plaintiffs/appellants have become office bearers of the Trust, that is, the Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal.

The ancillary reliefs in the suit, it is submitted, pertain to a bank account of the Trust, the operation of which by the plaintiffs/appellants is being sought to be interdicted by the defendant/respondent no.2 unlawfully, in view of the said respondent having no locus standi to do the same.

Hence, it is argued that the stay granted by the impugned order is entirely beyond the scope of the suit itself, and the pleading of the purported 2018 Trust finds place for the first time in the application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the defendant/respondent no.2, and is not the subject-matter of the suit at all.

It is further argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the notice, the operation of which has been stayed, was dated September 07, 2024 and merely sought to convene an Annual General Meeting of the Trust, inter alia to consider and pass the accounts of the Trust, to elect/select from among the trustees a new Trust Body formation in terms of the Deed of Trust of September 25, 1981, to elect from amongst the trustees portfolio holders/office bearers and also to take a decision as to whether the entire building of the Trust was to be demolished and a reconstruction of the same was to be undertaken. Thus, it submitted that it is premature at this stage to come to the conclusion that any final decision has been taken regarding such demolition. The application of the respondent no.2, from which the present impugned order emanates, pertained to the alleged apprehension that the demolition would frustrate the rights of the defendant/respondent no.2 in the suit. However, since the subject-matter of the challenge in the application under Section 151 of the Code was the notice dated September 07, 2024 and demolition was merely one of the agenda therein, in view of no case of infraction of the provisions of the trust deed having been made out in issuance of the said notice, the learned Trial Judge, it is submitted, erred in law and in fact in staying the operation of the same.

Learned counsel appearing for the defendant/respondent no.2, the primary contesting respondent, submits that by way of the plaint, the plaintiffs/appellants seek to confuse the Court between the Trust of 1981, pertaining to the “Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal” and that of 2018, which pertains to the “Sahu Samaj Trust” (simpliciter).

It is argued that whereas the plaintiffs/appellants may be trustees and office bearers of the 2018 Trust, the property sought to be demolished does not belong to the said Trust but to the 1981 Trust.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2 argues that the resignation purportedly tendered by the respondent no.2 was in respect of the 2018 Trust and not the 1981 Trust.

It is submitted that unless the Court conclusively decides the dispute regarding the respective rights of the parties to the offices of the two Trusts, and if the building is demolished in the meantime, the defendant/respondent no.2 as well as the Trust shall suffer irreparable injury.

Upon a perusal of the plaint, we find that the same revolves around the 1981 Trust alone and there is no mention of any Trust of 2018.

Going by the plaint, we find that the scope of the suit is whether the plaintiffs/appellants are validly elected office bearers of the said Trust of 1981.

As consequential reliefs, certain injunctions have been sought in respect of the bank account operated by the said Trust.

From the four corners of the plaint, we do not find any mention of any “Sahu Samaj Trust” but only of the “Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal”, which was formed in the year 1981.

Thus, the application filed by the defendant/respondent no.2 under Section 151 of the Code seeks to expand the scope of the suit without the respondent no. 2 filing a separate counter claim and/or a different suit. Within the contemplation of the suit, as framed, there is little or no scope of construing the building-in-question to be the subject-matter of the suit.

Secondly, we find the apprehension of the respondent no.2 to be premature, since no decision to demolish the building-in-question has been taken till date.

We find from the notice dated September 07, 2024 that demolition of the concerned building was only one of the agenda therein. By the said notice, the accounts of the Trust for a particular period were to be considered and passed, a new Trust Body was to be formed by way of election/selection, and portfolio holders were to be selected from the said new Trust Body. By the impugned order, the entire notice has been stayed, thereby paralyzing the valid and regular functioning of the Trust itself.

Insofar as the demolition of the building-in-question is concerned, in terms of the notice, it is only subject to a resolution/decision being taken in the meeting to be convened by dint of the notice. Thus, it would be premature to jump to the conclusion at this stage that such a decision will definitely be taken.

Even otherwise, it has been submitted by the appellants that the defendant/respondent no.2 has been co-opted as a trustee and was at liberty to participate in the meeting to be convened pursuant to the September 07, 2024 notice.

Even otherwise, we find that the scope of the impugned order has already spent itself, in view of the appointed date of the Annual General Meeting as notified by the impugned notice having already passed.

Thus, in any event, little remains to be decided in the present appeal.

Be that as it may, in view of the aforesaid observations, we find that, in principle, there was no substance in the application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the impugned order could not be sustained.

Be that as it may, in view of the present appeal being rendered infructuous, FMA 286 of 2025 is disposed of with the observations that in the event a fresh notice is issued by the plaintiffs/appellants in accordance with the provisions of the trust deed pertaining to the Sahu Samaj Trust, West Bengal, and subject to the plaintiffs/appellants having the authority to do so otherwise, a copy of such notice shall also be served on the defendant/respondent no.2 and the respondent no.2 shall be granted an opportunity to participate in the said meeting, to be convened in terms of such future notice.

We further hold that all the above observations and the findings in the impugned order are tentative in nature, not to be treated as binding at any further stage of the suit or interlocutory application(s).

CAN 2 of 2024 is also disposed of accordingly.

There will be no order as to costs.

Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.

I agree.