Sadhu Ram, Ex-Sarpanch vs State of Punjab

Amarjeet Chaudhary, J.

The petitioner was elected as a Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Shyampur, Tehsil Kharar, District Ropar, in September 1983. Vide order dated 12.12.1986 respondent No. 3 notified the cessation of the petitioner from the office of Sarpanch (copy Annexure P2), for not holding the general meeting of the Gram Sabha, Shyampur, of Hari and Sawani. The petitioner filed appeal in the Court of Joint Director Panchayats, Punjab, Chandigarh, under section 12(1B) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (for short called `the Act'') against the order dated 12.12.1986 pased by respondent No. 2, which was rejected on 24.8.1987 (Annexure P4). Against the said orders of cessation of office of Sarpanch and the order of the appellate authority, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the said orders and also the vires of section 12(1A) of the Act.

So far as the Constitutional validity of the provisions is concerned it may be seen that no foundation has been laid for challenging the provision. The Legislature in its wisdom has provided certain consequences in case the Sarpanch fails to convene two general meetings. There is a purpose behind the provision. The purpose is to keep and control on the activities of the Gram Panchayat in particular and the Sarpanch who is the chief functionary to manage the affair is to the Panchayat in general. There is no claim in the petition that this is a colourable exercise of power by the Legislature. Apart from this it may be seem that all elected offices if not attended to lead to the consequence that the member concerned ceases to be a member. In this regard there is a provision in the Constitution itself which provides for vacation of (sic) in the event of a member failing to attend the meetings of the house for a particular number of days.

Under Article 101 of the Constitution of India a Member of the Parliament is to vacate his seat if for a period of sixty days he is absent from the house without the permission of the house. Similar provision is contained in Article 190 of the Constitution which deals with members of the legislative assemblies in the State. Thus when a provision to this effect exists in the Constitution itself the petitioners cannot contend that the provisions of section 12(1A) are in any way ultra vires of the Constitution of India.

As to whether there was failure to hold two consecutive general meetings of the Sahba or not is again a question of fact which can be legitimately determined by the authorities created under the Act. Under Section 12(1A) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, it is the duty of the Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat to hold the general meeting of the Gram Sabha in the month of June (Hari meeting) and in December (Sawani meeting). In case the Sarpanch fails to hold two consecutive meetings then he is deemed to have ceased his office from the last date of second meeting. But in the present case applicant has admitted that he could not hold the meeting of 12/1983, 6/1984 and 12/1984. The reason for not holding meeting of 6/1985 12/1985 and 6/1986 has been explained by him for lack of quorum. Under Section 12(5) of the Act the quorum for Gram Sabha meeting is one fifth. Quorum for twice adjourned meeting is onetenth of its members. After two adjourned meetings there is no condition of any quorum for holding any meeting. Under this provision it is not difficult to hold the general meeting of the Gram Sabha in case Sarpanch wants to hold them. It is the contention of the petitioners that no appeal has been provided against an order taking effect under Section 12(1A) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act. This contention of the petitioner is without any substance because there is a power vested tin the Government to call for and examine the record of any executive order made under the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality and prosperity of such order and power is vested in the Government to confirm, modify or assail such an order. This power is conferred on the State Government under Section 100(2) of the Act. In this regard it would be pertinent to refer to the decision given in the case of Kiran Cinema v. S.D.O., 1986(1) Punjab Legal Reports and Statutes 472 wherein the provisions contained in the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 came up for consideration. Dealing with similar provisions as contained in section 235 of the Punjab Municipal Act it was held by this Court that residuary power can be exercised by the State Government with regard to seeing the legality and prosperity of any order passed under that Act. Thus it is concluded that sufficient power is available to the State Government to interfere in any matter in which an order of executive nature has been passed. Thus the petitioner can approach the State Government for seeking redress. Incidently it may be mentioned that this power can be exercised at any time. Thus there is no limitation fixed under the statute. The petitioner has an effective alternate remedy for challenging the order and to get adjudication of all disputed questions which may arise in this case.

In view of what has been discussed above this writ petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.