Sadhu Ram vs State of Punjab

V.K. Jhanji, J.

This is plaintiff''s second appeal.

The land in dispute was acquired by the State Government for quarrying Bajri, stones etc., vide its notification No. 18140BC/822/44 dated 25.51951, for the project namely Harike Pattan Head Works at Harike Pattan, District Ferozepur. The said project was completed in or about in the year 1965. After completion of the project was the land was no more required by the Government. The defendants decided to auction the land for the purpose of cultivation, but none came forward to bid for the same, as the entire land was Banjar Qadim and Choe Burd. The plaintiff approached the Executive Engineer sometimes in the year 1965 for taking the land on long term lease so that he could reclaim the same. Defendant No. 3, Executive Engineer, Harike Division, Ferozepur, leased out the land. The case of the plaintiff is that land was leased out to him for a period of 20 years. The lease was renewed year after year with the understanding that the plaintiff would continue as lessee for 20 years on payment of lease money. Lease money was deposited by the plaintiff in the office of S.D.O. (Public Works Department) every year. Plaintiff after taking the land on lease, reclaimed the same at a cost of Rs. 1,40,000/ and constructed houses for the residence of his servants and Karindas and for his own residence at a cost of Rs. 80,000/. Plaintiff incurred these expenses on an assurance given to him by the defendants that he would continue as lessee for 20 years. In the year 1967, defendant No. 3 with the approval of the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division, decided that the suit land be surrendered to the owners as provided in para 87 of the Financial Commissioner''s Standing Order No. 28 read with paras 493/495 of the Land Administration Manual. In pursuance of the said decision defendant No. 3 wrote many letters to the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, to finalise the action to surrender the land to the original owners. Defendant No. 3 also informed the plaintiff that the land in suit would be surrendered to the owners. Acting on this assurance, the plaintiff purchased the rights of the landowners vide registered saledeeds, details of which have been given in Annexure ''B'' attached to the plaint. Plaintiff further stated in the plaint that he has acquired equitable ownership rights over the suit land and he is in peaceful cultivating possession of the same. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed a decree for declaration to the effect that he being in peaceful cultivating possession as equitable owner of the land is not entitled to be dispossessed from the suit land. He also claimed consequent relief for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his peaceful possession of the suit land.

The suit filed by the plaintiff was contested by the defendants who filed joint written statement. In the written statement, allegations made by the plaintiff were denied. However, it was admitted that the land in suit was leased out to the plaintiff. It was denied that lease was for a period of 20 years. It was however, admitted by the defendants that the suit land has now become Barani. They also claimed that there is no legal bar to dispossess the plaintiff.

The learned Sub judge 1st Class, Hoshiarpur, vide order dated 29.9.1978, on appraisal of evidence brought on record found that the plaintiff has reclaimed the land at a cost of Rs. 80,000/ but negatived the claim for the other relief solely on the ground that the defendants never took a final decision for surrendering the land. Plaintiff being aggrieved of the judgment and decree of the trial Court, filed an appeal before the first appellate Court. The said appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, vide order dated 20.9.1982, but with the observation that the plaintiff can only be dispossessed by the defendants under due process of law. The learned Addl. District Judge also held that State was not bound by any assurance given by any of its officer/official that the land would be surrendered to the original owners. The learned Addl. District Judge, however, affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff has reclaimed the land. In this second appeal, the plaintiff has impugned the judgments and decrees of the Courts below denying him the relief of his entitlement to remain in possession of the suit land as equitable owner.

Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in view of para 87 of the Financial Commissioner''s Standing Order No. 28 read with paras 493/49 of the Land Administration Manual the plaintiff acquired a right to remain in possession of the land after the same was surrendered to the landowners. He further contended that the defendants are only entitled to recover compensation which they had paid to the landowners at the time of acquiring the land.

Undisputedly the purpose for which the land was acquired, has been achieved and the land is no more required by the State Government. The project was completed somewhere in the year 1965 and the same was leased out to the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff has claimed that it was leased out to him for a period of 20 years, yet this fact has been denied by the defendants. Both the Courts below have returned a finding that the land was reclaimed by the plaintiff, who spent a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/ for reclaiming the land and a sum of Rs. 80,000/ for the purpose of constructing houses for the residence of his servants and Karindas and for his own residence. The defendants have filed to bring on record any evidence to controvert the evidence brought on record by the plaintiff for the purpose. The defendants in their written statement have admitted that the land on improvement has become Barani. Therefore, from the pleadings and evidence on record, one thing is clear that the plaintiff spent a huge amount for reclaiming the land. Defendant No. 3 vide letter dated 8.9.1969 asked the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, to take action for surrendering the land to the original landowners under para 87 of the Financial Commissioner''s Standing Order No. 28 read with paras 493/495 of the land Administration Manual. In the said letter (Ex. PW1/D), it was stated that the area of village Uchi Bassi, Jamalpur, was acquired for excavation of Bajri, stones etc. under the provisions of land Acquisition Act. Now, the Harike project has since been completed and the land is no more required by the Department. The Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, was required to take action for surrendering the land to the original landowners. Copy of the letter dated 4th of July, 1973 from the Executive Engineer, Harike Division, Ferozepur to the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur (EXh. PW1H) further reveals that the land was surrendered to the original landowners in the year 1969 and the same was taken into possession by the original landowners with the due consent of the civil authorities. Through this letter, the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, was asked to recover the compensation from the landowners to whom the land was surrendered and given credit of the same to the Department. In the column of ownership in the revenue record name of landowners are shown, whereas in the column of cultivation, Irrigation Department is mentioned. The land which was surrendered to the original landowners was purchased by the plaintiff vide registered sale deeds Exh. P8 to P57. In case, the defendants had not surrendered the land to the original landowners, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to purchase the land from the original landowners. The plaintiff not only reclaimed the land but also spent a huge amount in paying consideration to the original landowners from whom he purchased the land through registered saledeed.

In my view, the approach of the Courts below that the State Government was not bound by the decision taken by its officers/officials to surrender the land to the original landowners cannot be sustained. Admittedly, the land was not required any more by the Government as the purpose for which it was acquired, had come to an end. The land was reclaimed by the plaintiff after spending a huge amount, and he purchased the land vide registered sale deed Exh. P8 to P57 for a valuable consideration from the original landowners. The plaintiff purchased the land only after the same was surrendered to the original landowners and an assurance was given by officers/officials of the State Government that the land shall be disposed of in terms of para 493 of the land Administration Manual. The plaintiff having acted to his detriment by spending a huge amount for reclaiming the land, and on raising construction is entitled to protect his possession. Para 87 of the Financial Commissioner''s Standing Order No. 28 provides that where an agricultural land or a pastoral land has been permanently acquired for public purpose by any Government Department and is no longer required for such purpose, disposal of shall be guided by the general consideration for public purpose by any Government Department and is no longer required for such purpose, disposal of its shall be guided by the general considerations mentioned in paras 493/495 of the land Administration Manual. Para 493 of the Land Administration Manual provides that where land in the permanent occupation of any government department is no longer required, then it should be handed over to the Deputy Commissioner of the district who becomes responsible for the disposal of it under the orders of the Commissioner. It further provides that as a matter of grace, Government is usually willing to restore agricultural and pastoral land to the persons from whom, it was acquired or to their heirs on their refunding the amount paid as compensation less the fifteen per cent granted for compulsory acquisition. The price may be lowered, if necessary, on account of deterioration or enhanced in case of land having been improved by the use of which the Government has put it. Under para 494 of the Land Administration Manual, where plots which from their size or shape are practically of no value to any one, but the owners of adjoining fields, Government can consider proposals for giving these owners the option of purchasing at the market value. Para 495 of the Land Administration Manual provides that if the heirs of the original owners cannot be traced, or if they or the proprietors of ad joining land decline to accept the terms approved by the Government, a further reference to Government will be necessary if it is traced to alienate the land permanently in some other way. Thus a combined reading of Para 87 read with paras 493/495 of the Land Administration Manual shows that the Government is competent to dispose of the land to the original landowners by recovering from them the compensation, which was paid to them less the fifteen per cent granted for compulsory acquisition.

Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is evident that defendant No. 3 took a decision to dispose of the land to the original landowners in terms of para 87 read with paras 493/495 of the Land Administration Manual. The Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur was also asked to recover the amount from the original landowners which they had received on account of compensation, and give credit of the same to the Department. Plaintiff purchased the land from the original landowners only after the land was surrendered to the original land owners. Both the Courts below have also returned a finding that the land was reclaimed by the plaintiff by spending a huge amount. In such a situation, now it is not open to the defendants to retract from the stand which they had taken earlier to dispose of the land to the original landowners, and recover the compensation amount from them. The plaintiff, who had been occupying the land as lessee under the defendants and thereafter when the land was surrendered by the defendants to the original landowners, and on the assurance so given, acted to his detriment by spending a huge amount and on raising constructions for the resident of his servants and Karindas and for his own residence. For this, I find support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of U.P. and others, AIR 1979 S.C. 621, wherein it was observed as under :

"The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to rise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any preexisting relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it would be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. It is not necessary in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine or promissory estoppel, that the promise, acting in reliance on the promise should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promises should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean in justice to the promise which would result if the promiser were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promises by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promise, if the promiser were allowed to go back on the promise. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be present in every case of promissory estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the promise would suffer if the promiser were to act differently from his promise, that the Court would consider it inequitable to allow the promiser to go back upon his promise."

Thus, in my view, the only remedy now left with the defendants is to recover the amount from the plaintiff, which the government has paid to the original landowners at the time of acquisition.

Consequently, the appeal is allowed, judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside, and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed to the extent that he shall be entitled to remain in possession of the suit land on payment of amount of compensation which the Government had paid to the original landowners at the time of acquisition. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.