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Judgment
M.R. Sharma, J.—Vide his order dated May 12, 1978, my learned brother A.D. Koshal, Chief Justice (as be then was), now learned Judge of the Supreme Court, had allowed Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioner to file an affidavit of the petitioner stating:--
(i) The full particulars of all houses owned by the landlady in Dhanaula, and
(ii) the names of occupants of each such house. He shall also furnish certified copies of title-deeds under which the landlady acquired the ownership of such houses. To come up on 21st July 1978.
Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has now filed the affidavit of Sadhu Ram petitioner, which reads as under:--
That Shakuntla Devi respondent resides separately from her daughter Pushpa w/o Birbal Dass at Dhanaula. They have separate ration cards. The particulars of the residence of both of them along with the number of their ration cards are given below:--
ShakuntlaDevi.
Ration Card No. 111.
H. No. B-IV G-5 11
Pushpa with her husband BirbalDas.
Ration Card No. 2772.
H. No. B-IV G-5 8
Even if the affidavit filed by the petitioner is taken on its face value, it does not show that the respondent owns any other house in village Dhanaula, nor the names of each of the occupants of such house has been shown The petitioner had of course earlier filed an affidavit in which he had mentioned that the respondent owned some other building at village Dhanaula also That allegation had been countered by the respondent in an other affidavit in which it had been explained that out of love and affection the son of respondent's daughter had got her name inscribed on a house at Dhanaula with which she had no concern and which had been purchased by her daughter in her own name.
Earlier I had acceded to the prayer of Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the respondent, and had allowed the respondent to file an affidavit on the point that she had neither owned nor had vacated any other house at Barnala. The respondent has filed an affidavit dated November 22, 1978 which reads as under:--
That the deponent never owned any house other than the house in dispute at Barnala and that she never vacated such a house without sufficient cause after the commencement of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, in the urban area of Barnala. In fact, she owns only the house in dispute at Barnala and never owned in his life time any other house at Barnala.
Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioner, objects to the affidavit of the respondent being read in evidence on the ground that where a party is not vigilant enough it should not be allowed to lead additional evidence in revision. I am afraid this objection has come a bit too late. Firstly, such an objection should have been raised where the case came up before the learned Chief Justice on May 12, 1978 and secondly on November 8th, 1978, when I allowed the respondent to lead additional evidence by way of affidavit and granted the same concession to the petitioner The petitioner after having availed of the opportunity of leading additional evidence cannot be allowed to turn round and to say that the evidence produced by the respondent should not be accepted The contention raised by Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioner, is repelled. It was then urged by Mr. Mittal that since the respondent had set up an express case that, she had been Jiving at Dhanaula with her daughter and wanted to live separately in her own house at Barnala, no heed should be paid to the pleas raised by the respondent that she did not own alternate accommodation at Dhanaula and needed the Barnala house for herself I find no force in this plea either.
If a person is sharing an accommodation with a relation, he or she cannot be left at the mercy of that relation for all times to corns. If such a person owns a house at a different place and puts forth a claim that he or she is going to occupy the same, such a plea in the absence of any evidence to the contrary should not be lightly ignored. If the landlord in such a situation putsforth such a plea solely with the intention of getting that house vacated and does not occupy the same, the tenant has ample remedies for re-occupying such a house in accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.
It was then argued by Mr. Mittal that the petitioner had earlier paid rent of the house in dispute to one Kundan Lal who was the attorney of the respondent and when the respondent claimed rent he putforth the same plea whereafter the petitioner filed a criminal complaint against Kundan Lal attorney of the respondent. In that complaint the respondent appeared as a witness and stated that she had received the rent. On this basis it is argued that the statement made by the respondent should not be regarded as bona fide. It has further been suggested that the respondent has no income yielding property at Barnala and since she does have such a property at Dhanaula, this factor should also be taken into consideration for assessing her bona fides.
The respondent is about 65 years old. Even if she has income yielding property in a village like Dhanaula, it might be more convenient for her point of view to spend her last days in comfort at the sub-divisional headquarters of Barnala, where medical facilities and other allied facilities are more easily available. If some property at Dhanaula is yielding some income, that can very well be collected by her daughter and remitted to her at Barnala It may also be mentioned that the distance between Dhanaula and Barnala is about six miles. In any event, the learned appellate Court after going into all the pros and cons of the matter has chosen to accept the plea of personal necessity putforth by the respondent. Finding on such a plea is a finding of fact which has to be accorded due weight by the revisional Court and since I have also come to the same conclusion independently of the learned lower Appellate Court, I find no force in this petition and dismiss the same. No costs. The petitioner is, however, allowed two months time to vacate the premises in dispute.
