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Judgment
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned counsel for the respondent.
The present civil revision application has been preferred under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘B.B.C. Act’) for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division-cum-Munsif, Raxaul, Motihari, East Champaran (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’) in Eviction Suit No. 01 of 2014, whereby the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff was decreed on contest and the petitioners/defendants were directed to vacate the disputed premises within a period of sixty days, failing which the plaintiff (respondent herein) was held entitled to obtain possession thereof through due process of law.
The brief facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff instituted Eviction Suit No.01 of 2014 seeking eviction of the petitioners/defendants from three rooms forming part of a house situated over land appertaining to Khata No. 165, Plot No. 1963, measuring 7 Dhur, on the ground of personal necessity under Section 11 (1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act. According to the respondent (plaintiff), the disputed land had been purchased by her husband, Brajkishor Chaubey (brother of petitioner no.1 herein), from her mother, Mostt. Girija Kunwar, by a registered deed dated 07.04.1994 and thereafter her husband executed a registered gift deed (Bakshishnama) dated 27.08.1997 in her favour. The respondent (plaintiff) claimed that she constructed a six-room pucca house over the said land and subsequently, on 07.04.2010, let out three rooms to the petitioners, who were her own sister and her husband, at a monthly rent of Rs.1,800/-, on the understanding that they would vacate the premises upon one month’s oral notice in case of her personal requirement. It was further pleaded that the respondent’s husband, who had been working at Patanjali Hospital, Itanagar, intended to return and resume his medical practice by opening a clinic in the disputed premises so that farming and other affairs may be properly managed and, therefore, the premises was bona fide and reasonably required. But petitioners herein refused to handover the possession of the premises to respondent (plaintiff) despite several request. On the basis of aforesaid claim, respondent (plaintiff) instituted Eviction Suit No.01 of 2014 seeking eviction of the present petitioners.
The petitioners appeared and contested the suit stating that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the disputed property formed part of the joint family property. According to them, the land had been purchased in the name of Brajkishor Chaubey from the joint family income and not from his own income, and the original Bayanama is in the custody of the petitioners/defendants, and the alleged Bakshishnama dated 27.08.1997 was illegal and void. It was further stated that there was no written rent agreement, no rent receipt or other documentary evidence showing payment of rent, and that the plaintiff (respondent herein) had failed to establish the alleged tenancy. The petitioners also disputed the plaintiff’s claim of personal necessity.
Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The plaintiff/ respondent examined nine witnesses, and relied upon, inter alia, various documentary evidences i.e., the registered deed dated 07.04.1994, the Bakshishnama dated 27.08.1997, revenue and electricity documents and other papers. On the other hand, the defendants (petitioners herein) examined eleven witnesses and exhibited two sale deeds in support of their case of joint ownership and possession.
Upon considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and the materials available on record, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:
“i.Whether the suit, as framed, is maintainable?
ii.Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action to institute the suit?
iii.Whether the suit is barred by limitation, waiver and acquiescence?
iv.Whether there existed any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant?
v.Whether the plaintiff had a personal necessity for the land described in Schedule/Item No. 2 of the plaint?
vi.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction in respect of the land described in Schedule/Item No. 2 of the plaint?
vii.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief?”
The learned Trial Court, while considering the issue relating to the relationship of landlord and tenant, held that although no written rent agreement or rent receipts had been produced, the existence of tenancy could be established through oral evidence. Relying upon the oral testimony of the P.Ws. regarding letting of the three rooms at the rate of Rs.500/- per room per month, the learned Trial Court concluded that the defendants (petitioners herein) had entered into possession as tenants. The learned Trial Court further relied upon the registered deed dated 07.04.1994 (Ext.-3) and the registered Bakshishnama dated 27.08.1997 (Ext.-4) to hold that the plaintiff/respondent had a valid and better title over the disputed premises, observing that in an eviction proceeding the Court is primarily concerned with the relationship of landlord and tenant and is not required to finally adjudicate the question of title. On the question of personal necessity, the learned Trial Court accepted the plaintiff’s case that her husband intended to return from Itanagar and resume his medical practice by opening a clinic in the disputed premises. The learned Trial Court also relied upon the evidence indicating that the plaintiff’s husband had earlier practised from the same premises. Holding the requirement to be bona fide and reasonable, the learned Trial Court further concluded that the entire disputed premises was required for the proposed clinic and that partial eviction would not satisfy the plaintiff’s requirement. Consequently, the suit was decreed and the defendants (petitioners herein) were directed to vacate the disputed premises within sixty days.
Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioners have preferred this present civil revision for setting aside the aforesaid judgment and decree.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Trial Court has committed a serious error in recording a finding regarding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant without there being any rent agreement, rent receipt or other documentary evidence whatsoever. It is further submitted that the petitioners had specifically denied the tenancy and asserted that the disputed premises formed part of the joint family property, the land having been acquired in the name of Brakishor Chaubey from the joint family income. Learned counsel further submitted that even the plaintiff/respondent (PW-7) herself, in her cross-examination, admitted that she did not possess any document relating to the alleged tenancy. It is submitted that the evidence of the defendants (petitioners herein), including the evidence regarding the joint nature of the property and the registered sale deeds standing in the names of several members of the family, was not properly appreciated by the learned Trial Court. It is further submitted that the mere production of the registered sale deed and Bakshishnama could not, in the facts of the present case, establish the alleged tenancy, particularly when the petitioners were claiming independent/joint possession over the disputed property.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the finding regarding personal necessity is equally unsustainable, inasmuch as the alleged requirement was projected only on the basis of the intention of the respondent’s husband to return from Itanagar and resume medical practice, without there being sufficient material to establish an immediate and genuine requirement of the entire disputed premises. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the defence evidence and the circumstances surrounding the possession of the petitioners. Learned counsel further submitted that the suit was instituted without any prior notice terminating the alleged tenancy and that the absence of any documentary material regarding payment of rent or creation of tenancy assumes significance in view of the specific denial of the landlord-tenant relationship. It is thus submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are contrary to the evidence on record and suffer from material irregularity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 14(8) of of the B.B.C. Act.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. It is further submitted that the plaintiff (respondent) established her title and possession over the disputed premises through the registered deed dated 07.04.1994 (Ext.-3) and the registered Bakshishnama dated 27.08.1997 (Ext.-4), and the relationship of landlord and tenant was duly proved through consistent oral evidence of the plaintiff and her witnesses. Learned counsel submitted that the absence of a written rent agreement or rent receipts is not fatal, as a tenancy may be created orally and the existence of such relationship can be established by oral evidence. It is further submitted that the respondent’s bona fide and reasonable personal requirement for opening a clinic for her husband was duly established and the learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, rightly found that the entire disputed premises was required for such purpose. It is thus submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any jurisdictional error or material irregularity warranting interference by this Court.
Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and upon perusal of the materials available on the record, the point of determination which arises for consideration in the present appeal is: “whether the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.11.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court suffers from any illegality, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction?”
In the present case, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 14(8) of the B.B.C. Act, it is pertinent to note that the revisional jurisdiction is wider than the ordinary revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it cannot be converted into a jurisdiction of appeal so as to undertake a fresh appraisal of the entire evidence merely for arriving at a different conclusion. In the present case, the learned Trial Court has considered the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has recorded findings with regard to the plaintiff’s (respondent herein) right and interest in the premises, the relationship of landlord and tenant and the bona fide personal necessity. Unless such findings are shown to be perverse, unsupported by evidence, or vitiated by any illegality or material irregularity, interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not warranted.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 78 has observed as herein under:
“31.We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works [Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259] that where both expressions “appeal” and “revision” are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression “appeal”. The use of two expressions “appeal” and “revision” when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an “appeal” and so also of a “revision”. If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant [Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, (1975) 2 SCC 246] that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three rent control statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.
32.Insofar as the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] is concerned, it rightly observes that revisional power is subject to well-known limitations inherent in all the revisional jurisdictions and the matter essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the jurisdiction. We do not think that there can ever be objection to the above statement. The controversy centres round the following observation in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] , “… that jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts also….” It is suggested that by observing so, the three-Judge Bench in Ram Dass has enabled the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact by reappreciating the evidence. We do not think that the three-Judge Bench has gone to that extent in Ram Dass. The observation in Ram Dass that as the expression used conferring revisional jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court has wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of revision vested in the High Court in the statute is wider than the power conferred on it under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it is not confined to the jurisdictional error alone. However, in dealing with the findings of fact, the examination of findings of fact by the High Court is limited to satisfy itself that the decision is “according to law”. This is expressly stated in Ram Dass. Whether or not a finding of fact recorded by the subordinate court/tribunal is according to law, is required to be seen on the touchstone whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence or overlooking and ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers from perversity or any such illegality or such finding has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice. Ram Dass does not lay down as a proposition of law that the revisional power of the High Court under the Rent Control Act is as wide as that of the appellate court or the appellate authority or such power is coextensive with that of the appellate authority or that the concluded finding of fact recorded by the original authority or the appellate authority can be interfered with by the High Court by reappreciating evidence because Revisional Court/authority is not in agreement with the finding of fact recorded by the court/authority below. Ram Dass does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the court/authority below. Rather, it emphasises that while examining the correctness of findings of fact, the Revisional Court is not the second court of first appeal. Ram Dass does not cross the limits of Revisional Court as explained in Dattonpant. xxxx xxxx xxxx
43.We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”
In the present case, the respondent/plaintiff instituted Eviction Suit No.01 of 2014 seeking eviction of the present petitioners from the suit premises on the ground of her bona fide and reasonable personal necessity under Section 11 (1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act. The learned Trial Court, upon consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties, decreed the suit and directed the petitioners to vacate the suit premises.
Notably, the learned Trial Court, while considering the right and interest of the plaintiff (respondent herein) in the suit premises, relied upon the registered sale deed dated 07.04.1994, the registered Bakshishnama dated 27.08.1997 and other revenue and electricity-related documents produced by the plaintiff (respondent). The said documents were considered for the purpose of examining the plaintiff’s right and interest in the premises and the relationship between the parties; the learned Trial Court did not undertake any final adjudication of title as would be required in a substantive title suit.
Law with respect to question of title in an eviction proceeding has been well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Keshar Bai v. Chhunulal, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 438, has held as herein under:
“15.The High Court has expressed that the respondent was justified in asking the appellant to produce the documents. Implicit in this observation is the High Court's view that the respondent could have in an eviction suit got the title of the appellant finally adjudicated upon. There is a fallacy in this reasoning. In eviction proceedings the question of title to the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally.
16.A similar question fell for consideration of this Court in Bhogadi Kannababu [Bhogadi Kannababu v. Vuggina Pydamma, (2006) 5 SCC 532] . In that case it was argued that the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question and hence could not maintain the application for eviction on the ground of default and sub-letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act. This Court referred to its decision in Tej Bhan Madan v. Addl. District Judge [(1988) 3 SCC 137] in which it was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the landlady on the general principle of estoppel between the landlord and the tenant and that this principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. Section 116 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to such a situation. This Court held that even if the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question, she could still maintain the application for eviction and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below in favour of the landlady, was not liable to be disturbed. The position on law was stated by this Court as under: (Bhogadi Kannababu case [Bhogadi Kannababu v. Vuggina Pydamma, (2006) 5 SCC 532] , SCC p. 538, para 19)
“19.In this connection, we may also point out that in an eviction petition filed on the ground of sub-letting and default, the court needs to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question, which may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally in the eviction proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Now, as regards the relationship of landlord and tenant, although no written rent agreement or rent receipts were produced, the learned Trial Court considered the oral testimonies of PW-1, PW-3, PW-7 and PW-8 and found that the three rooms had been let out to the petitioners on an oral tenancy at an agreed rent. On appreciation of the evidence on record produced by the parties, the learned Trial Court accordingly held that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties stood established.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Som Nath v. Ravinder Kumar (Civil Appeal No.4484 of 2025) vide judgment dated 25.03.2025 has observed in para 11 as under:
“11....……… However, judicial discipline requires that while disturbing a finding of fact returned by the lower court, the appellate court or the revisional court must examine the merit of that finding with reference to the reasons recorded and the evidence on which it is based. Here, while disturbing the finding of the courts below as regards existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, the High Court overlooked that tenancy could be based on oral agreement also, as was the case of the appellant………. In our view, therefore, if, by relying on oral evidence and the circumstances, the courts below returned concurrent finding qua landlord-tenant relationship between parties, no interference was called for by the revisional court for mere lack of written tenancy agreement or rent note.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The learned Trial Court thereafter considered the plea of bona fide personal necessity and, upon appreciation of the evidence regarding the proposed return of the plaintiff’s (respondent) husband and his intention to resume his medical practice from the suit premises, found the requirement to be genuine and reasonable. The learned Trial Court also considered the question of partial eviction and recorded a finding that the entire premises was reasonably required.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has made its stance clear with respect to ‘bona fide need’ of the landlord in the case of Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan and Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 432 has observed as herein under:
“10.The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord is well settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is the best judge to decide which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for eviction.”
It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to Section 14(8) of the B.B.C. Act is directed towards satisfying itself as to whether the order of eviction is in accordance with law. The Supreme Court has time and again held that the High Court has to satisfy itself whether the order of eviction is in accordance with law, while such jurisdiction cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal.
Having considered the impugned judgment and the materials available on record, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has considered the relevant issues, appreciated the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides and recorded findings on the existence of landlord-tenant relationship, the plaintiff’s (respondent herein) right and interest in the premises and her bona fide personal necessity. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence. The grounds urged by the present petitioners essentially seek a re-appreciation of the evidence and substitution of the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. No illegality, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 14(8) of the B.B.C. Act is made out.
Resultantly, the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division-cum-Munsif, Raxaul, Motihari, East Champaran in Eviction Suit No. 01 of 2014 is hereby affirmed.
The present civil revision application is, accordingly, dismissed.
Interim Order(s), if any, shall stand vacated.
The shall be no order as to costs.