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Judgment
Sashikanta Mishra,J.
The order dated 05.12.2025 passed by Sub-Collector, Boudh in R.M.A. (Mutation) Case No.1/2024 is under challenge in the present Writ Petition whereby the application filed by the learned Addl. Tahasildar for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was allowed.
Though the parties have pleaded extensively with regard to the merits of the rival claims involved in the appeal, but in view of the short question involved, this Court deems it proper to refer only to the relevant facts for its determination.
The petitioner claims to have purchased the land vide RSD dated 09.7.2014 from the legal heirs of the recorded owner, Banamali Vyas. The land was mutated in her favour by correcting the ROR on 22.10.1982. Several other mutation cases emanated thereafter in respect of the land and also conversion under Section 8-A of the O.L.R. Act. The Addl. Tahasildar, Boudh filed an appeal on 20.4.2024 for setting aside the order passed by the then Tahasildar, Boudh being contrary to the orders passed by Member, Board of Revenue in O.L.R. Revision Case No.24/1994. The memorandum of appeal was accompanied by a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The petitioner filed objection to the petition stating that the appeal was grossly time-barred and the delay was not explained at all. Initially, the appellate authority passed order allowing the application for condonation of delay by order dtd.25.4.2025 on the ground that the appeal is meant for general interest of the public as the case land was erroneously recorded in the name of the present petitioner. Said order was challenged before this Court in W.P.(C) No.16838/2025. This Court, by judgment dated 9.10.2025 set aside the same and remitted the matter to the appellate authority to decide the delay condonation application afresh by considering the cause and reason of delay. As such, the matter was heard afresh and by order dtd.05.12.2025, the application was allowed by condoning the delay. Said order, as already stated, is impugned.
Counter affidavit has been filed by the Sub-Collector (Opp. Party No.3). It is stated that the ROR in question was corrected on the basis of a non-speaking order passed on 27.8.2011 by the then Tahasildar without indicating the ground on the basis of which correction of ROR was made in a matter involving fundamental illegalities, suppression of facts and irregular recording of Government land. The limitation period does not commence from the date of the original order but from the date of knowledge of the fraud or illegality. The suppression of ceiling surplus status flowing from O.L.R Case No.830/1975 was detected only on 4.4.2024 during a proactive verification of old revenue records. Following such detection, the Addl. Tahasildar filed the appeal on 20.4.2024, i.e. after a 16-day interval. It is further stated that the record reveals that the then Tahasildar never initiated any valid mutation proceeding to change the land from its ceiling surplus status to the name of the petitioner. The order of correction passed on 27.8.2011 was an administrative overreach. It is also stated that the order of the appellate authority in condoning the delay was a valid exercise of quasi-judicial discretion aimed at delivering substantial justice and protecting valuable ceiling surplus land of the State situated in the heart of Boudhgarh from being grabbed by private parties through irregular means, which is in the highest public interest. The counter further contains detailed averments touching upon the merits of the claim, which this Court does not deem it proper to refer as the petition for condonation of delay was disposed of referring only to the cause shown for the delay.
Heard Mr. D.P.Dhal, learned Senior counsel with Mr. P.K.Mallick, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Gyanalok Mohanty, learned Standing Counsel for the State.
Mr. Dhal, would argue that the revenue entries, which have remained challenged for decades attain finality and cannot be disturbed without a compelling reason such as proved fraud. In the instant case, the Addl. Tahasildar filed the appeal after a delay of 53 years without even a semblance of explanation. If the 1972 mutation is taken into consideration, the delay is more than 52 years. If the 1982 mutation case is considered, the delay is more than 42 years. If the other orders and administrative actions are considered as the starting point, even then, the delay will be between 10 to 30 years. Since there have been repeated mutations of the property between 1972 to 2014, it cannot be believed that the authorities were unaware of the so-called irregularity as claimed by them. In any case, a long-settled position cannot be reopened unless compelling reasons exist. Mr. Dhal further submits that the State cannot be given preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of delay rather, the same principles as are applicable to an ordinary litigant, are also applicable to it.
Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, learned Standing Counsel for the State would argue that in course of a proactive verification of old revenue records, certain fundamental illegalities and irregularities in the matter of recording of Government land were detected. Prompt steps were taken thereafter and the appeal was preferred within 16 days. Therefore, delay, if any, can only be treated as 16 days. That apart, it came to light that serious irregularities were committed to record ceiling surplus land in favour of Banamali Vyas during the settlement operation in the year 1994. The same being without sanction as provided under Section 39(b) of the O.L.R. Act, was a void transaction. The foundation being void, all subsequent transactions are automatically rendered void. Mr. Mohanty further submits that the settled position of law is that a justice-oriented approach is to be taken into consideration for condonation of delay especially when public interest is involved. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ ought to be considered with pragmatism rather than technically. Even otherwise, the delay was adequately explained in the petition for condonation of delay, considering which the appellate authority rightly allowed the same and therefore, no interference by this Court is warranted.
The facts being as narrated above, this Court would like to keep in perspective the basic principle to be followed by Courts while considering an application seeking condonation of delay. One of the fundamental principles is that merits of the case are not required to be gone into while condoning the delay. In this regard, reference can be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA)1. It is equally well settled (as per Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra)) that while a liberal approach is to be adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact, dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer2, the Supreme Court held that while liberal interpretation is to be given to the expression ‘substantial cause’ to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides cannot be attributed to the party concerned. The following observations of the Supreme Court are noteworthy:-
“11.The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535: AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195: AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12.It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13.The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605.Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .”
As regards the cases of the Government, the Supreme Court in the case of CWT v. Amateur Riders Club3,observed as follows:-
“3.This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.”
Keeping the basic principles in the background, the impugned order therefore, now needs to be considered. Turning first to the petition for condonation of delay, copy of which is enclosed as Annexure-1, it is seen that the following has been stated as explanation for the delay:
“That, the then Tahasildar committed several illegalities and violated mandatory provisions of law while allowing the mutation case in favour of the respondents. The said illegal mutation proceedings in the entire process came to light on 04.04.2024 when the appellant verified the concerned case record on 12.04 2024 when verification of the case record was done.
That, the appeal could not be solicited in time due to suppression of facts by errant revenue officials since many years from date of order and delay has also been caused in official process and the delay caused in filling of the appeal was never intentional rather circumstantial.
That, the State will be highly prejudiced in the event delay in filing of the appeal is not condoned since valuable government lands have been mutated illegally in favour of respondents.”
Even accounting for a non-personal and institutional approach of the concerned functionaries of the State, the above explanation is as vague as it could be. It is simply stated that the illegal mutation proceeding came to light on 4.4.2024 when the appellant verified the concerned case record on 12.4.2024. Now, what prompted such verification of the old records has not been spelt out. That apart, the fact that there have been multiple mutation proceedings (which according to the petitioner are 105 in number) with litigation travelling even to this Court as well as the Board of Revenue, it can hardly be accepted that the so-called irregularity or illegality committed by the then Tahasildar remained undetected for all these years. Even otherwise, it would only be reasonable to suppose that while there have been many persons holding the post of Tahasildar, yet none could detect the illegality despite dealing with the record time and again. Turning to the impugned order, it is seen that the appellate authority has reproduced the very same paragraphs of the petition in the order and thereafter referred to some judgments of the Supreme Court to hold that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate and that it occurred because the illegality remained unnoticed till 4.4.2024. He even proceeds to record that “it is an admitted fact that the illegalities in the mutation order dated 27.8.2011 were detected on 4.4.2024 and verification of records undertaken by the Addl. Tahasildar, Boudh on 12.4.2024”. He further observed that the appeal is meant for the greater interest of the public and that as per settled position of law a liberal and not pedantic approach should be adopted. Basically, on such grounds the application was allowed by condoning the delay.
For the reasons already indicated referring to the settled position of law, this Court is unable to concur with the reasoning of the appellate Court in view of the fact that the records have been changed multiple times with litigations coming to this Court as well as the Bord of Revenue. It cannot be accepted that the so-called irregularity remained undetected till 4.4.2024. That apart, merits of the case could not have been considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay. It is obligatory for the appellant, whether the Government or private litigant to show sufficient cause for not approaching the Court within the prescribed time. While a liberal approach can be taken, but the same, on the face of decades of inaction and negligence on the part of the concerned functionaries, would be uncalled for. Of course, had a case of fraud being pleaded or prima facie made out, the matter would have received a different consideration but the appeal was filed not alleging fraud but by simply alleging irregularity in the matter of recording of the land in favour of the petitioner’s vendor. This is therefore, not a case where the delay can be said to have been adequately or properly explained. Consequently, the appellate authority must be held to have committed manifest error of law in condoning the delay for the reasons indicated in the impugned order.
For the foregoing reasons therefore, the writ application is allowed. This Court holds that the impugned order is unsustainable in the eye of law. The same is therefore, quashed.