AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
K.A. Swami, C.J.—This appeal is preferred against the order dated 3.8.1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 14364 of
1993. The petitioner/appellant sought for quashing the order dated 19.1.1992 bearing S.M.R. 1/92 passed by the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E.
(Admn.) Department, on the ground that the Commissioner has passed the aforesaid order in exercise of his suo motu powers after a lapse of 10
years from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Learned single Judge has rejected the contention of the petitioner that the
exercise of suo motu power by the Commissioner is arbitrary and he should not have exercised it after a lapse of 10 years. Learned single Judge
has held that there is no time limit prescribed by Section 69(2) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959
(hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') and as such, it cannot be said that the Commissioner has acted without jurisdiction in exercise of suo motu
jurisdiction u/s 69(2) of the Act. It has also been pointed out by the learned single Judge that the matter has now been remanded without any
condition, and the Deputy Commissioner has been directed to render a fresh finding as to whether the petitioner can be recognised as a hereditary
trustee, no harm or prejudice can be held to have been caused to the petitioner/appellant by reason of the order passed by the Commissioner.
Accordingly, Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition. Hence, the petitioner has come up in appeal.
It is contended before us that the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 9.9.1983 on taking into consideration several documents and the
oral evidence adduced in the case and recognised the petitioner/appellant as the hereditary trustee of the Temple in question, that no person
aggrieved by the order of the Deputy commissioner preferred an appeal against the order dated 9.9.1982, that after a lapse of 9 years, the
Commissioner has chosen to exercise power of Revision suo motu u/s 69(2) of the Act and has passed an order on 19.1.1993, that it is not
permissible for the Commissioner to exercise the power of revision suo motu after a lapse of 10 years. In support of the last contention, learned
Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India (1976) 37 S.T.C. 425.
The suo motu proceedings were started by the Commissioner on 14.3.1992. He issued a notice to the petitioner/appellant and afforded him an
opportunity and considered all the contentions urged before him. In the course of the order dated 19.1.1993, the Commissioner has pointed out
the deficiencies in the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The grounds stated by the Commissioner for exercising the suo motu power in his order
are as follows:
(i) The 7th respondent herein was never holding office as hereditary trustee within the meaning of Section 6(ii) of the Act.
(ii) The 7th respondent herein was only a servant of the temple and was also writing accounts and his father Ayyamperumal was never trustee in
the institution in question,
(iii) The 7th respondent herein did not file the agreement dated 4.12.1921 between the then trustees of the temple in the year with that of the
poojari of the temple. That the document dated 4.12.1921 filed in this case clearly indicates that in the year 1921, the 7th respondent''s family was
not in management as trustees in the temple much less as hereditary trustees so as to attract Sections 6(2) and 63(b) of the Act.
(iv) The Deputy Commissioner without properly analysing Exs. A-1 to 4-16 had erroneously granted the declaration. The petitioner/7th
respondent herein has not established the management of his family for the last 3 generations in an unbroken line of succession from father to son.
(v) The Deputy Commissioner has failed to see that the budget sanction orders produced as exhibits in this case no doubt related to the temple
since the 7th respondent has come into possession as a person writing accounts of the temple in question.
(vi) So also, as an accountant of the temple, the 7th respondent was in possession of contribution receipts which he has filed as documents in that
case and obtained the declaration,
(vii) The Deputy Commissioner has failed to see that the agreement dated 4.3.1915 etc., filed as Exs. A-1 to A-11 do not relate to the institution in
question.
Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the Commissioner has arbitrarily exercised the suo motu power. He has given full opportunity to the
petitioner/appellant and has also given the reasons for interfering with the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The matter relates to a temple. The
question is as to whether the petitioner/appellant should be recognised as a hereditary trustee or not. In the scheme of the act, the hereditary trustee
of a temple plays an important role. Therefore, one of the objects of the Act is to ensure that hereditary trustees are recognised only on due inquiry
and based upon proper and acceptable evidence. In addition to this, in order to ensure that the right of a person claiming to be a hereditary trustee
is not easily taken away, a right to suit has also been given against the order of the Commissioner passed u/s 69(2) of the Act. Therefore, it is open
to the petitioner/appellant even now to file a suit to establish that he is a hereditary trustee of the Temple/or else to appear before the Deputy
Commissioner and establish that he is hereditary trustee. Therefore, there are two courses open to the appellant/petitioner. As such, it cannot be
held that the right of the appellant to establish that he is hereditary trustee, has been taken away by he order passed by the Commissioner.
The next question for consideration is as to whether the Commissioner can be held to have acted without jurisdiction in exercising power of
revision suo motu after a lapse of 9 years. As already pointed out, the Deputy Commissioner passed the order on 9.9.1983. There is no material
placed before us that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was either published or served upon the parties concerned. Section 69(1)
says that the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner within 60 days from the date of the publication of
the order or of the receipt thereof by him. In the absence of any such material placed before us, it is not possible to presume that the other persons
had come to know of this order. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the aggrieved persons were entitled to
prefer an appeal u/s 66(1) within 60 days to the Commissioner and as they have failed to prefer an appeal, the Commissioner could not have
exercised suo motu, the revisional jurisdiction is without merit.
Now, the question is whether the Commissioner could have exercised the revisional power. Section 69(2) reads thus:
Any order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in Sub-section (1)
may be revised by the Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may call for and examine the records of the proceedings to satisfy himself as
to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Any
such Order passed by the Commissioner in respect of an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner shall be deemed to have been passed by the
Commissioner on an appeal referred to him under Sub-section (1).
It does not prescribe any period of limitation. The statute has purposely not prescribed the period of limitation in order to ensure that if the original
authority commits any mistake in the matter of passing an order which touches the public interest, because the temples under the Act are open to
general public as such the public are entitled to visit, such mistake can be corrected by the Revisional authority i.e. the Commissioner. No doubt,
the statute does not prescribe any time limit for exercising suo motu power, but, nevertheless, the Commissioner is expected to exercise the suo
motu power within a reasonable time. The question as to in a given case whether revisional jurisdiction has to be exercised suo motu within a
reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In fact, the very decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the
appellant in Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India (1976) 37 S.T.C. 425 states thus:
What is a reasonable time, however, will depend upon the facts of each case.
As far as the facts of this case are concerned, the various grounds enumerated by the Commissioner for exercising the suo motu revisional
jurisdiction would go to show that he is justified in exercising the suo motu power. The grounds we have already re-produced. However, it is
contended before us that the Deputy Commissioner has also passed a well considered order and therefore, there was no reason for the
Commissioner to interfere with it. The Commissioner has pointed out, how the Deputy Commissioner has erred in the matter. We do not consider
it necessary to go into this question, because the matter has now been remitted to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration. Any
observation made by us in this regard is likely to affect the interests of the petitioner/appellant. Hence, we refrain from going into the merits of the
case. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner is justified and has acted properly in suo motu exercising
the power of revision.
Lastly, it is contended that if the order of the Commissioner passed after a lapse of 9 years is allowed to remain and is approved, the
Commissioner will take up each and every case and exercise suo motu the power of revision even after a lapse of considerable time. We have not
stated that it is open to the Commissioner to exercise the suo motu power in every case after a lapse of considerable time. The exercise of
revisional power suo motu after a lapse of considerable time is reasonable and proper would depend upon the fact and circumstances of each
case. As such no criteria or time limit for suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction can be laid down. Every such case has to be judged on the
facts and circumstances of each such case.
For the reasons stated above, we see no ground to admit the appeal. It is accordingly rejected.