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Judgment
D. Murugesan, J.—The facts as highlighted in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition are as follows:
The petitioner, after his appointment as Junior Engineer in the respondent Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Company Limited during the year
1963, finally was promoted as General Manager during the year 1991. While he was working as General Manager during the year 1993, in terms
of Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the respondent Company, the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement on 31.3.1993. The said request was
rejected on 8.4.1993. Thereafter he was posted as General Manager Exports on 28.7.1993. The Central Bureau of Investigation registered a case
in Crime No. 115/1993 against the petitioner and others on 13.7.1993. In view of the above, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order
dated 30.7.1993. Two Charge Memos dated 17.2.1994 and 19.8.1994 were issued.
For the disposal of the Writ Petition, the details of the charge Memos are not necessary. At the instance of one P.S. Subramaniam, who was
also issued similar charge memo dated 12.3.1994, this Court had granted injunction on 1.2.1995 in W.M.P. No. 2345/1995 in W.P. No.
1467/1995. The said stay was subsequently modified, permitting the respondent to proceed with the enquiry with a direction not to pass final
orders.
The petitioner, who was under suspension from 30.7.1993, was relieved from duty by order dated 30.9.1997 without prejudice to the right of
the respondent to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. In the above background, the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition, questioning the
two charge memos dated 17.2.1994 and 19.8.1994.
Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned Advocate General appearing for the petitioner would challenge the charge memos on the ground that the order
dated 8.4.1993 rejecting the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement was without any basis and contrary to the scheme, and as such, the
request for voluntary retirement ought to have been favourably considered. In the event of such request is considered, the question of issuance of
two charge memos subsequent to the above order of refusal does not arise.
Secondly, the learned Advocate General submitted that in any case, the petitioner was appointed by the Board of Management and the
appointing authority insofar as the petitioner is concerned is the Board. However, by virtue of the empowerment on the Managing Director as
appointing authority from 17.1.1996, the Managing Director has allowed the petitioner to retire from service, of course, without prejudice to the
right of the respondent Company to continue the disciplinary proceedings. The Managing Director is not competent to issue such order as he is not
the appointing authority of the petitioner. He would further submit that in any case, the order of relieving the petitioner dated 30.9.1997 was issued
by the Managing Director In-charge, who is entitled to perform the day-to-day administration only and not to take a decision in the disciplinary
matters. When once the conditional order of relieving is passed, then the petitioner would be considered as a retired person on the date of
superannuation viz., 30.9.1997. In the event, the petitioner would be entitled to all terminal benefits without reference to the order of relieving
dated 30.9.1997.
Per contra, Mr. Ranganatha Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the order of rejection of the request of the petitioner
for voluntary retirement was passed on the basis of a scheme. Infact, the Board has considered the request of the petitioner and thereafter only
resolved to reject the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement. The learned counsel has further submitted that by Resolution dated
30.6.1995, the Board delegated the power of Managing Director to One P. Vasudevan, who was posted as Managing Director In-charge and he
is empowered to perform the duties of the Managing Director. He would also submit that after 17.1.19976 the appointing authority is the
Managing Director and therefore, no fault can be found in the order of the Managing Director dated 30.9.1997 relieving the petitioner in the
capacity of appointing authority.
I have given my due consideration to the above submissions. Insofar as the argument of the learned Advocate General as to the order dated
8.4.1993 rejecting the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement is concerned, it must be noted that the said order is not challenged in this
Writ Petition. The learned Advocate General would contend that the said order of rejection was arbitrary and in all fairness when the request of the
petitioner for voluntary retirement was considered and reject, the reasons ought to have been adduced. In the absence of such reasons, the order
rejecting the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement suffers from non-application of mind. In that event and in the absence of any
rejection, it must be presumed that the request for voluntary retirement was accepted. This argument cannot be accepted as the voluntary
retirement is governed by the Scheme. Under the Scheme, the option either to accept or reject the request for voluntary retirement is always left
with the Management. But, of course, in the event, the request for voluntary retirement is rejected, the Management is obligated to give reasons.
The learned counsel for the respondent produced the Resolution of the Board dated 6.4.1993. By the said Resolution, the Board has considered
the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement and rejected the same on the ground that two charges are pending against the petitioner. To
find out whether the Board has applied its mind while rejecting the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement, the Resolution as such is
extracted here.
Any other item with permission of the Chair"" Managing Director informed the Board that Shri P. Ramaswamy, General Manager (Design and
Develop- ment) has opted for voluntary retirement from the service of the Company. The Board after a detailed discussion felt that his application
for voluntary retirement need not be accepted in view of the circumstances prevailing. The post also cannot be surrendered. The Board also
directed the Company that charge memo may be issued on him placing him under suspension pending enquiry. The Board also noted that in case
he submits his resignation, in the mean time, the same may be accepted without prejudice to the enquiry and without settling his dues to the extent
they can be legally withheld to recover the loss if any, caused by him
A plain reading of the abovesaid Resolution would go to show that the Board has applied its mind and rejected the request of the petitioner for
voluntary retirement. The said resolution also discloses that the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement was rejected on the ground of
pending charges for which it was also resolved to issue charge memo placing the petitioner under suspension. The contention of the learned
Advocate General as to the total non-application of mind as to the rejection of the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement cannot be
accepted in view of the fact that the Board has passed the Resolution rejecting the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement only after a
detailed discussion. That apart, the scheme does not provide a clause containing that in the event the request for voluntary retirement was not
rejected it must be presumed that the request was accepted. In the absence of such Clause, question of ""deeming acceptance"" also does not arise,
even the argument of the learned Advocate General namely the rejection was bad is accepted. Hence, I find no merit in the first submission.
Coming to the next submission as to the power of the Managing Director in relieving the petitioner as he is not the appointing authority of the
petitioner, it is to be noted that though at the time of the petitioner was promoted as General Manager, the appointing authority was the Board, it is
not in dispute that on and from 17.1.1996 the Managing Director In-charge was designated as appointing authority for the post of General
Manager. When once that position is accepted, on and from 17.1.1996 the appointing authority insofar as the General Manager post is concerned,
is the Managing Director. Therefore, the order dated 30.9.1997 relieving the petitioner issued by the Managing Director cannot be said to be
illegal. Further the Board has empowered the Managing Director to take disciplinary proceedings also. Merely because the Board was the
appointing authority on the date when the petitioner was promoted, it cannot be contended that the Board alone is competent to take disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner. The Board has delegated power to the Managing Director to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the power of
appointing authority is vested with the Managing Director on and from 17.1.1996. Hence, this contention of the learned Advocate General also
fails.
Coming to the last submission of the learned Advocate General as to the order of relieving dated 30.9.1997, the learned counsel appearing for
the respondent produced the Resolution of the Board dated 30.6.1995. By the said Resolution, one Mr. P. Vasudevan was entrusted with the
powers of the Managing Director and the said Officer has issued the order of relieving dated 30.9.1997. The said Resolution reads as under:
Delegation of powers to the Chief Executive of the Company:
The Board passed the following Resolution:
Resolved that as per the orders of the Government vide letter No. 1-14(1)/88/PE dated 15.6.1995 Shri P. Vasudevan, Director (Finance) HPF
be and is hereby empowered to discharge the duties of the Managing Director in addition to his own duties with effect from 15.6.1995 until further
orders
The Board authorised Shri P. Vasudevan to exercise the powers as per Annexure-1 till further orders. Meanwhile, the Sub-Committee consisting
of Shri A.K. Gupta, Shjri A.M. Pehgal and Managing Director would go into the matter and submit its recommendations"" 11. It is not in dispute
that the Board is competent to delegate the power and confer the rights to an Officer to perform the duty of the Managing Director. The argument
now sought to be advanced by the learned Advocate General is that Mr. P. Vasudevan, Managing Director In-charge cannot be considered as
Managing Director as the Managing Director In-charge is empowered to perform his duties only with regard to day-to-day administration and not
in the matter of disciplinary proceedings. This argument can be accepted only when the Officer, not entitled to hold the post without proper
authority to pass relieving order. But in this case, the Board has passed the Resolution conferring the power of Managing Director to the said Mr.
P.Vasudevan. The said officer is designated as Managing Director. When once the power is conferred, no exception could be taken in the action
taken by the Managing Director In-charge as has been done by passing the relieving Order dated 30.9.1997. The Resolution clearly shows that
the Managing Director In-charge is vested with the powers of Managing Director which includes, in my view, the power to take disciplinary
proceedings also. Hence, this contention of the learned Advocate General also fails. No other arguments were advanced by the learned Advocate
General in this case. 12. In view of the above, I find no merit in this Writ Petition. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 10721/1995 and 2466/1996 are closed.