High CourtsSingle Bench(2002) 07 MAD CK 0101

S. Rajam vs The Chairman, Madras Port Trust, Madras and P. Samuel Arputhanathan

Madras High Court · Decided on 19 July 2002

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.S. Sirpurkar, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 246 of 1995

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Judgment

41 paragraphs · 959 words

V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—The petitioner herein is the wife of the 2nd respondent, who is admittedly an employee of the Port Trust of Madras, the

1st respondent herein. It is her case that she was married to the 2nd respondent on 8.7.1981, but was thereafter deserted and there were divorce

proceedings initiated by the 2nd respondent against her, but those divorce proceedings were dismissed in her favour and that she still continues to

be the wife of the 2nd respondent, though deserted by him. She claims that she was initially given a maintenance of Rs.300/- per month and the

said maintenance was enhanced to Rs.700/- per month with effect from 1.1.1992. She also says that she has a daughter out of this marriage and

that she and her daughter always require medical help. There is a hospital maintained by the 1st respondent Port Trust, wherein free medical

facilities are given to the employees and their family members. Madras Port Trust have passed the Madras Port Trust Employees'' (Medical

Attendance in the Trust''s Hospital and Reimbursement of Hospital Charges) Regulations, 1994, which have been approved by the Government of

India on 1.2.1994. Regulation 2(7) of those Regulations make the members of the family of an employee eligible to receive the medical help and

sub-rule 7(i) of Regulation 2 provides that the wife/husband of an employee must be wholly dependent on the employee and reside with the

employee. The petitioner herein prays that she and her daughter, who are otherwise entitled under Regulation 2(7) for the medical benefits, should

get that benefit. She claims that she had written to the Chairman of the Port Trust in that behalf and had also written to the Minister of State for

Surface Transport, but her requests have not been met so far favourably. It is for this reason that she comes before this Court.

2.

Ms. Radha Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner fervently argues that under Regulation 2(7), the wife and the other

family members like the daughter of the petitioner would be entitled to the medical benefits. She points out further that the employee concerned has

to give the details under the Regulations to the Port Trust authorities and the 2nd respondent has chosen not to give such details, though it cannot

be denied that the petitioner is the wife of the 2nd respondent and that the daughter is born out of that marriage and further, the marriage is still

subsisting. She further points out that merely because the 2nd respondent has driven her out, it would not dis-entitle her from getting the medical

benefits, if she is otherwise entitled to the same. In this behalf, Mr. Jegadeesan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Port Trust also relies on

Regulation 2(7)(i) and points out that in order to be able to get the medical benefits, the family members of the employee must live with the

concerned employee and further, their names must be given by the employee to the authorities and in this case, the 2nd respondent has not chosen

to do so.

3.

The question is, therefore, as to whether, firstly, can the petitioner claim the medical benefits, though technically, she is not living with the

employee and further, where the employee has failed to give the details regarding her name and her daughter''s name, could she still be held to be

entitled to the medical benefits.

4.

On both the questions, I am of the clear opinion that the petitioner must succeed. It will be seen that the Regulations do not take into

consideration, the situation where the employee has, in total breach of his marital duties, chosen to drive out his wife. In this case, it is an admitted

position, since it is not controverted by the 2nd respondent, that the petitioner is getting the maintenance from her husband, who is an employee on

the basis of the Court orders and that the marriage is also still subsisting. Merely because the 2nd respondent has chosen to desert the petitioner,

she would not lose her right to receive the medical treatment, particularly because, she has also been maintained by her husband, the employee.

The only condition in Regulation 2(7)(i) is that the concerned wife / husband of the employee must be wholly dependent on the employee and

reside with the employee. In my view, particularly in view of the circumstances prevailing, it must be held that the term ""reside with the employee

would also include the present case, where the employee has to pay the maintenance to the concerned wife. After all, it is not disputed before me

that the petitioner is wholly dependent upon that maintenance. Merely because the employee has chosen to throw out his wife in total derogation of

his marital duties to maintain his wife, which duties are recognised by law, the wife cannot be denied the facilities which she is entitled to otherwise

under the Regulations. After all, here, the wife and the daughter are both entitled, being the family members of the 2nd respondent, to the medical

facilities contemplated under the Regulations. Merely because the husband chooses to throw them out, would not deprive them of this benefit.

Therefore, the 2nd respondent is directed to supply the details to the 1st respondent and even if he does not choose to do so, the said details may

be given by the petitioner to the 1st respondent, on consideration of which, the 1st respondent shall take the further steps to entitle the petitioner

and her daughter to avail of the medical benefits as contemplated in the Regulations. All this shall be done within two months from the date of

receipt of the order. The petition succeeds and the petition is allowed. No costs.