S. Kadam Singh vs Union of India

M.S.A. Siddiqui, J.

(1) This appeal is directed against the judgment dated24.10.1994 passed by the M.A.C.T. Delhi, whereby the amount of compensation ofRs. 50,000.00 as claimed by the appellant was awarded to him.

(2) The appellant moved the M.A.C.T. Delhi seeking damages to the tune ofRs. 50,000.00 for the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident. The Tribunal decreed the said claim but did not allow interest on the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned Counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned award on the ground that the learned Tribunal has erroneously exercised his discretion in disallowing interest on amount of compensation.

(3) Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Ramesh Chandra Vs. Randhir Singh and Others, , in support of the said contention .Their Lordships have observed that:

"....The question of award of interest is dependent on the claim being allowed .Should the claim be not allowed, the question of grant of interest would not arise and if awardable, it is in addition to the amount of compensation .The Court or Tribunal in these circumstances, should determine, in the first instance, claim for compensation and in the event of its being allowed can further exercise the discretion to grant simple interest in terms thereof, but as an additive to the amount of compensation. So the addition of interest to the compensation, by judicial discretion, is sequential in the eye of law and no claim in that regard in our view, specifically need be laid in so many words in the claim petition. The grant of interest, in our view ,is not dependent on any plead ings in that regard and can even be orally asked if the contingency arises."

(4) Needless to say that the grant of interest in claim cases filed under the M.V.Act is a discretion vested in the Tribunal . It is however, clear that the discretion vested in the Tribunal must be properly and judicially exercised. It would be difficult and it is indeed inexpedient to lay down any inflexible rules which should govern the exercise of the said discretion. As observed by Bowen L.J. in Gardner v.fay, (1885) 29 Ch.D.50,That discretion, like other judicial discretion, must be exercised according to common sense and according to justice". It is well-settled that in dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the Appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trials tage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. Thus, it is ordinarily not open to the Appellate Court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the Trial Court .

(5) The point that arises in this appeal is whether the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal in disallowing interest is in law wrongful and improper. In para 15 of the impugned judgment, the Tribunal has assigned reasons for disallowing interest. According to the Tribunal, the claim petition was filed on 17.5.1976. The process fee,etc. was not deposited by the appellant for sufficiently long time, which caused considerable delay in summoning the respondents. After respondents, appearance issues were framed on 18.8.1981. Thereafter, the appellant did not take effective steps to procure attendance of his witnesses as a result whereof the case under went unmerited adjournments from 9.10.1981 till 1993. However, on 12.4.1993, the Tribunal closed the appellant''s evidence. This clearly shows that the appellant was responsible for the delay in disposal of this case. Keeping in view of the said conduct of the appellant, it cannot be held that the Tribunal has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has adopted an unjudicial approach in disallowing interest on the amount of compensation.

(6) Having regard to all the circumstances and facts of this case, I am not disposed to hold that a case for interference of this case has been made out by the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.