S. Chandrasekaran vs The Secretary to Government, Revenue Department and The Revenue Divisional Officer

K. Ravichandrabaabu, J.—This writ petition is the transferred O.A. No. 4735/2002 filed on the file of the Tamilnadu Administrative

Tribunal challenging the order of the first respondent passed in G.O.Ms. No. 557, Revenue Department dated 31.10.2000. Short facts of the case

are as follows:

The petitioner was working as Village Administrative Officer. He was arrested on 03.03.1989 and produced before the learned Special Judge

cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri by the Vigilance and Anticorruption Department in C.C. No. 17/90 for an offence said to have been

committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act. However, by the judgment dated 26.07.1995, the Criminal Court acquitted the petitioner. On

16.07.1996, the first respondent Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 185, Revenue Department, directing the initiation of departmental proceedings

for the same set of charges. Consequently, a charge memo was issued on 28.11.1997. An enquiry was conducted and after completion of the

enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 22.05.1998, holding that the charges as not proved. Consequently, the second respondent

through his order dated 24.06.1998 dropped the charges against the petitioner and directed him to submit a separate application for full wages for

the period of suspension and for treating the same as on duty. However, after a period of 1 = years from the date of the said order, the first

respondent Government issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 08.02.2000 under Rule 36 of the Tamilnadu Civil Services (Discipline and

Appeal) Rules by exercising its suo moto power of review for holding the charges to prove and impose penalty of stoppage of increment for one

year without cumulative effect. The petitioner submitted his reply on 19.06.2000.

Thereafter, the first respondent Government passed the impugned G.O. on 31.10.2000 imposing a penalty of stoppage of increment for one year

without cumulative effect. Thus, the said order of the first respondent is challenged in this writ petition.

The respondent filed counter affidavit and supported the order passed by the first respondent.

Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents.

In this case, the petitioner was issued with a charge memo on 28.11.1997. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 22.05.1998, holding the

charges as not proved. Consequently, the second respondent passed an order on 24.06.1998, dropping the charges. Only the said order of the

second respondent was sought to be reviewed by the first respondent Government by exercising its power under Rule 36 of the said Rules.

Before considering as to whether the exercise of such power by the first respondent Government was in accordance with rules, let me extract

the relevant Rule of the Tamilnadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as referred hereunder:

Revision-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rule-

(i) the State Government; or

(ii) the head of the department directly under the State Government, in the case of a Government servant serving in a department or office under

the control of such head of the department, or department, or

(iii) the appellate authority, other than the State Government, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be revised; or

(G.O.Ms. No. 63, P & A. R(N), dated 2.2.96)

(iv) any other authority specified in this behalf by the State Government by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in

such general or special order; may at any time, either on their or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and after

consultation with the Tamilnadu public Service Commission, where such consultation is necessary and revise any order made under these rules,

may.

(a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or

(b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or

(c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may

consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or

(d) pass such other orders as they or it may deem fit.

Thus, a perusal of the Rule 36 would show that the State Government can exercise the power of revision as against the order passed by the

second respondent herein only within six months from the date of the said order. Clause (iii) of Rule 36 (1) makes it abundantly clear that such

exercise of confirmation, modification or setting aside of the order shall be done by the State Government or the head of the Department directly

under the State Government or the Appellate Authority other than the State Government, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be

revised.

Admittedly, in this case, the order which is sought to be revised by the first respondent came to be passed on 24.06.1998. But the show cause

notice itself was issued by the first respondent Government under Rule 36(1) of the said Rules only on 08.02.2000. Therefore, it is clear that the

very initiation of the review proceedings under Rule 36 was made only after a period of nearly 1 = years. In my considered view, the very issuance

of notice on 08.02.2000, is undoubtedly barred under Rule 36(1)(iii) of the said Rules. In fact, the said Rule contemplates that the confirmation or

modification or setting aside the order sought to be revised has to be made within a period of six months. In this case, not only the show cause

notice was issued after a period of nearly 1 = years and the very order impugned in this writ petition also came to be made after a period of eight

months from the date of issuance of the said show cause notice. Therefore, on this sole ground, I am of the view that the writ petitioner is entitled

to succeed and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the first respondent

is set aside. Consequently, the respondents are directed to disburse all the services benefits available to the petitioner within a period of eight

weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.