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Judgment
Bakthavatsalam, J.—The writ petitioner challenges an order of the second respondent dated 11.10.1990 by which the order of cancellation
was passed in Anna Nagar Scheme.
Plot No. 3623-G-ll measuring about one ground and 900 sq.ft. which was originally earmarked for the service industries in the lay-out was
allotted to the petitioner herein by the first respondent State by its order in G.O.Ms.No.1904 dated 14.12.1987. Based upon the said order,
allotment was made to the petitioner on 11.4.1988 on payment of 1/3rd cost of the plot on 7.4.1988 by the petitioner. The said plot was handed
over to the petitioner on 22.4.1988 and he executed the lease cum sale agreement on 23.4.1988. At this stage, by order dated 13.11.1989 the
second respondent cancelled the allotment of the petitioner and it was challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No.15779 of 1989 and this court by
order dated 28.11.1989 allowed the said writ petition giving liberty to the second respondent to dispose of the matter afresh giving an opportunity
to the petitioner. In the meantime it seems the petitioner was transferred to Hyderabad and on his transfer back to Madras he applied for ''no
objection certificate'' in the month of February, 1988. No action has been taken on the request of the petitioner and he did not commence his
work. A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 4.5.1990 and he filed his objections on 21.5.1990 and also appeared for personal
enquiry on 11.7.1990. By the impugned order, the allotment made in favour of the petitioner on 11.4.1988 has been cancelled on the ground that
the allotment made was irregular. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the first respondent on 24.10.1990 along with an application praying for
stay. Since no stay has been granted, the petitioner is before me with the above writ petition.
It is alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the conversion was made only on the proposal of the Tamil Nadu Housing
Board, that the same was accepted by the Government as well as by the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as
M.M.D.A"") and as such there is no irregularity in the said conversion. It is further alleged in the affidavit that the third respondent herein has
initiated the proposal for conversion since there was no need for the original proposal for which the plot was earmarked. It is further alleged that no
complaint has been received from the public, that no prejudice was caused to any member of the public and as such the reasons given for
cancellation are unsustainable. It is also stated in the affidavit that the respondents are estopped by the principle of promissory estoppel. It is further
stated in the affidavit that the petitioner has accepted the allotment and acted upon the same, that the order of cancellation at this stage would affect
prejudicially and therefore the cancellation order has to be set aside. It is further stated in the affidavit that in so far as the order of cancellation
issued by the second respondent in pursuance of the order of the first respondent is concerned, no useful purpose was served by the enquiry
conducted by the second respondent.
The first respondent has not filed a counter affidavit.
Acounter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents 2 and 3. The facts are not disputed. It is claimed in the counter affidavit that on
reconsideration the Government felt that certain irregularities were committed in the matter of allotment of plots which were originally earmarked
for the public purpose were allotted to the individual for the residential purpose and as such the Government wanted to put back the plots for the
original use namely the public purpose as per the approved lay out. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the amount paid by the petitioner
was refunded with interest on 30.11.1989 and on 12.11.1990. It is claimed in the counter affidavit that the public interest is more important than
the individual interest and as such the order of cancellation has been made.
Mr. K. Doraisamy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the original order of allotment has been made only on
the proposal submitted by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, since the plots were not used for a long time for the purpose for which they were
originally earmarked. The learned senior counsel points out that in fact the M.M.D.A. has accepted the conversion in all cases and that only after
all the formalities are completed the order of allotment has been made. He further contends that once an order of allotment has been made in
favour of the petitioner and a portion of money has been received by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and lease-cum-sale agreement has also been
executed, it is not Open to the Housing Board to go back merely on the basis of the order of the Government on the ground that there were some
irregularities committed, about which the petitioner has no knowledge. The learned senior counsel further points out that the petitioner was not at all
responsible for the irregularities committed by then Government and as such the order of cancellation is bad in law. He further points out that even
applying the principle of promissory estoppel, the petitioner has to succeed.
Mr. S. Doraisamy, the learned Counsel appearing for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board contends that since it is found that there were some
irregularities in allotting allotments to the allottees, the Government thought it fit to cancel the allotments of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, that the
Housing Board is bound by the orders of the Government and as such, the impugned order has been passed for which sufficient opportunities have
been given to the petitioner in this case.
Though a list of cases had been specifically posted before me twice and insisted upon that the M.M.D.A. records have to be produced"",
unfortunately records have not been produced and I have to proceed with the case on the materials on records on the basis of the affidavit and
counter affidavits filed by respective parties.
I have given my careful consideration to the arguments of Mr. K. Doraisamy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. S.
Doraisamy the learned Counsel appearing for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Mr. A. Chellakumar, the learned Counsel appearing for M.M.D.A.
and of Mrs. N.G. Kalaiselvi, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent State. I am of the view, that the writ petition has
to be allowed purely on the ground of promissory estoppel. It is not denied that when the original purpose for which it was earmarked, the Housing
Board did not use it. No question of doctrine of ultra vires comes here. In such cases, allotments were made by the Government and the actual
order of allotment has been issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board after receiving a portion of sale consideration and also executed a lease cum
sale agreement. In such a situation, taking a different view that all the allotments made earlier were erroneous in law, the successor Government
cannot cancel all the allotments by a single stroke. No material has been placed before me to show that when the original allotments were made
they have acted without authority of law. It is well settled that any executive action is taken under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. So an
executive order has been passed by the Government allotting a particular plot to the petitioner herein and in turn actual allotment order was passed
by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for which the Housing Board is empowered. Even in the order of allotment which, is subject to the approval of
M.M.D.A. it ''a stated that M.M.D.A has approved the conversion. Though Mr. S. Doraisamy, the learned Counsel appearing for the Housing
Board tries to show that only a sub-division is made not a conversion, oh a perusal of the entire records and correspondence it is seen that only a
conversion has been made by M.M.D.A. So, the petitioner has got a plot allotted by the competent authority who has envisaged for allotment and
the purpose for which originally earmarked was changed by re-conversion by M.M.D.A., the authority under the powers of the Town and
Country Planning Act, 1971 who is empowered to pass such an order. As such, it cannot be said that the order of allotment is irregular when it
was made. This court is concerned only with the order of allotment and on facts, I am not able to see any irregular allotment has been made. As I
have already stated, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board has received the sale consideration and also has executed lease cum sale agreement. Only
because he was transferred to Hyderabad he could not apply for ''No Objection Certificate'' and could not be able to start construction, otherwise
he would have started construction work.
The argument based on the principle of promissory estoppel, in my view applies to the facts of the case on hand. I have considered the issue in
extenso in my order in W.P.No.19309 of 1990 dated 19.2.1991 and that has been confirmed by a Division Bench of. this Court in W.A.No.604
of 1991 by order dated 23.4.1991.1 do not see any reason to differ from the view I have taken on the earlier occasion. I think suffice it to refer to
the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., , and in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd.
and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., , the Supreme Court
observed as follows:.
.... The doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the
Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public
authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or
representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel
would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, enquiry would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound
by the promise of representation made by it....
Nothing of that sort has been shown before me by any of the respondents. As I have already stated a valid allotment has been made by the then
Government. When the successor Government came into power it started cancelling such allotments, the case before me is one of such kinds. In a
similar situation, the Supreme Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , observed as follows:
...In my considered opinion the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. having acted upon the grant of permission by Sikandar Bakht, the then Minister for
Works and Housing and constructed the new Express Building with an increased FAR of 360 and a double basement in conformity with the
permission granted by the lessor i.e., the Union of India, Ministry of works and Housing with the Concurrence of the Vice-Chairman, Delhi
Development Authority on the amalgamation of plots Nos. 9 and 10, as ordered by the Vice-Chairman by his order dated 21st October, 1978 as
on ''special appeal'' as envisaged in the Master Plan having been directed, the lessor is clearly precluded from contending that the order of the
Minister was illegal, improper or invalid by application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel....
So also, in this case an executive order being passed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India by the concerned Minister in charge under the
Business Rules it cannot be said that the doctrine of ultra vires is applicable. In that case, the law laid down by Lord Denning with regard to the
applicability of promissory estoppel in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (1949)1 K.B. 227 , has been referred to by the Supreme Court. Certain
passages by Professor H.W.R. Wade in Administrative Law, 5th edition at page 32 had also been referred to by the Supreme Court in the above
mentioned case. Following the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court, in the above mentioned cases, I am of the view that the action of the original
authority allotting plots to the petitioner herein and the consequential order of the Housing Board allotting the building to the petitioner cannot be
said to be ultra vires. In Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the Supreme Court observed as
follows:
In the present case, admittedly the then Minister for Works and Housing acted within the scope of his authority in granting permission of the lessor
i.e, the Union of India. Ministry of Works and Housing to the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. to construct new Express Building with an increased
FAR of 360 within a double basement for installation of a printing press for publication of a Hindi newspaper under the Rules of Business framed
by the President under Article 77(3). Therefore, the doctrine of ultra vires does not come into operation. In view of this respondent No. 1 the
Union of India is precluded by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from questioning the authority of the Minister in granting such permission. In
that view the successor Government was clearly bound by the decision taken by the Minister particularly when it had been acted upon....
As I have already stated, in the case on hand, the then Government has passed the original order of allotment under Article 166 of the Constitution
of India and it is not hit, by the doctrine of ultra vires, In the result, the impugned order of cancellation is set aside and the Writ petition will stand
allowed. No costs.