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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—The petitioner is holding the rank of Sub-Registrar. At the relevant time, he was a Special Officer incharge of more than 13
Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank as the Board of Director was superseded. In one such society where the petitioner was incharge as the
Special Officer, namely Annur Primary Co-operative Bank, Annur, an enquiry was ordered by the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies u/s
18 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act with reference to the functioning of the Society. After enquiry, it was found there was
misappropriation of Rs. 26,33,090/-. Based on the enquriy report, recommendation was made to launch criminal prosecution both against the
Secretary as well as the petitioner who was the Special Officer. Accordingly, an FIR was registered u/s 477A and 408 IPC. After the completion
of the investigation, a criminal case has been filed, pending before the Judicial Magistrate IV, Coimbatore in C.C. No. 1 to 5/2006. During the
relevant time, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the impugned order dated 29.12.2006 and subsequently as he had reached the age of
superannuation, an order was also passed on the same day to retain him in service in terms of Fundamental Rules 56(1)(C) since the age of
superannuation fell on 31.12.2006. The petitioner has now come forward to challenge the order of suspension and the consequential order passed
under Fundamental Rules 56(1)(C) challenging that the criminal case laid against him was not valid and the ingredients of Section 477A and 408
IPC is not attracted. If at all the person who is responsible for misappropriation was the Secretary and the Special Officer has no role to play. He
had also stated that the incident that is referred to was of the year 1996 and at the time of filing of the case, more than 10 years have lapsed. A
further contention was raised that for the offence under the Cooperative Societies Act, the provisions of IPC cannot be attracted as the Tamil
Nadu Cooperative Societies Act is a special law falling under the State list and as it receive the assent of the president, any other law will be
repugnant under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
The writ petition was admitted on 15.03.2007. Pending the writ petition, this Court declined to grant interim relief.
When the matter came up today, the learned Government Advocate produced written instructions issued by the Joint Registrar of Cooperative
Societies, Coimbatore region. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner filed a discharge petition before the Trial Court u/s
239 of Cr.P.C. The learned Judicial Magistrate IV, Coimabtore by his order dated 01.02.2011 dismissed the discharge application. This only
proves that there is a prima facie case for framing charge against the petitioner. The contention that the Co-operative Societies Act is a special law
and therefore, no prosecution can be launched cannot be accepted. In fact such contention raised in other writ petitions have been dismissed by
this Court leaving open the parties to raise all the issues before the appropriate criminal court as and when prosecution is launched. Subsequently,
the Tamil Nadu legislature has amended the Cooperative Societies Act and has introduced Section 164-A whereby, the Act is only in addition to
other legislation and there is no bar in proceeding against the employees working in Cooperative Societies in terms of other criminal law.
The contention that there was a delay cannot be raised as a ground at this juncture. Because the suspension and the consequential retention in
service is based upon the criminal case and unless the criminal case is disposed of one way or other, the petitioner cannot be heard to contend
either there was a delay in taking action or that he has got prima facie case to succeed before criminal court.
The Supreme Court in Government of A.P. and others vs. V. Appala Swamy reported in AIR 2007 SCW 1639 : (2007) 14 SCC 49 held the
parameters of interfering with a charge sheet on the ground of delay. It is necessary to refer to paragraphs 12, 14 and 15, which reads as follows:
So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-
and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed
to be quashed on the ground of delay are:
(1). where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee;
(2). where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.
Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union
of India (UOI) and Others, . That case was decided on its peculiar facts. In that case, even the basic material on which departmental proceedings
could be initiated was absent. The departmental proceedings were initiated after 6 years and continued for a period of 7 years. In that fact
situation, it was held that the appellant therein was prejudiced.
Bijlani, therefore, is not an authority and, in fact, as would appear from the decision in P.D. Agrawa l4 for the proposition that only on the
ground of delay the entire proceedings can be quashed without considering the other relevant factors therefor.
In view of the above, there is no case made out. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
