High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 06 KL CK 1363

S. Anil Kumar vs The State Of Kerala & Ors.

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 9 June 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anil K. Narendran, J · Muralee Krishna S., J
CASE NUMBER
OP(KAT) No. 468 of 2025

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Judgment

41 paragraphs · 3,311 words

Anil K. Narendran, J.

The petitioner-applicant filed O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking an order to set aside Annexure A5 Government order, i.e., G.O.(Rt.)No.2427/2017/ Home dated 14.09.2017, whereby it was ordered that the period from 05.08.2011 to the date of rejoining duty, i.e., 30.10.2011, cannot be regularised as duty as per the existing Rules; and an order directing the 1st respondent State to treat the period from 05.08.2011 to 30.10.2011 as duty for all purposes, since the applicant was compulsorily waiting for posting during the said period. Along with the original application, the applicant produced Annexures A1 to A5.

2.

In the original application, the 1st respondent State filed Ext.P2 reply statement dated 19.01.2019, opposing the reliefs sought for. After considering the rival contentions, the Tribunal by Ext.P3 order dated 29.01.2020, dismissed O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017. Paragraphs 8, 9 and also the last paragraph of Ext.P3 order read thus;

“8.

The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the applicant in State of Kerala v. Joseph Ceasar [1998 (2) KLT 194] and the judgment dated 26.02.2007 in W.P.(C)No.28778 of 2006 (cited supra) are not relevant to the facts at hand. Joseph Ceasar [1998 (2) KLT 194] case related to a Music Teacher, who was kept out of service due to abolition of post. This was found to be wrong and he was subsequently reinstated in service. It was held that the post was wrongly abolished and the Teacher should have worked in the post in question had it not been wrongly abolished by the authorities concerned. The Teacher was prevented from discharging his duties as a Teacher and therefore, it was held that the Teacher was eligible for salary during the period in question. This is not the case at hand.

9.

In W.P.(C)No.28778 of 2006 as well a Police Constable, who was imposed with a punishment of removal from service, was reinstated in service setting aside the order of removal. The above employee, who reported for duly [sic: duty] immediately on issuance of reinstatement orders, had to compulsorily wait for more than eight months. It was only after his filing the writ petition that he was given a posting order. It was in the above facts, that the Hon’ble High Court held that there was fault on the part of the respondents in not permitting the applicant to join duty and in keeping him idle from 06.03.2006 to 21.11.2006, which was to be treated as a case of compulsory waiting and treated as duty. The applicant in the present case was not exonerated of the charges and he was reinstated in service from suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. On issuance of such reinstatement order, the applicant had put forth a request for a posting of his choice, which required administrative sanction. In view of the above, the challenge against Annexure A5 order fails and the Original Application is accordingly dismissed.”

3.

Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P3 order dated 29.01.2020 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, the petitioner-applicant has filed this original petition, on 19.11.2025, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

4.

On 04.12.2025, when this original petition came up for admission, it was noticed that Ext.P3 order, which is under challenge, is one dated 29.01.2020. The petitioner-applicant has sworn to an affidavit dated 16.03.2026, explaining the delay in filing this original petition challenging Ext.P3 order of the Tribunal, producing therewith Ext.P4 O.P. ticket and a discharge card issued from the Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram.

5.

Heard arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant and the learned Senior Government Pleader for the respondents.

6.

The issue that requires consideration in this original petition is as to whether any interference is warranted on Ext.P3 order dated 29.01.2020 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

7.

Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

8.

In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

9.

In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

10.

In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

11.

In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

12.

In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors in the order of the Administrative Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order of the Administrative Tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the Administrative Tribunal has committed a manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the Tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13.

The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant is that while passing Ext.P3 order dated 29.01.2020 in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, the Tribunal has not properly considered the legal and factual contentions raised by the applicant, with specific reference to the relevant provisions under the Kerala Service Rules (KSR) and the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SSR) and also the law on the point. The reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P3 order is perverse and patently illegal, which warrants interference, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

14.

On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader for the respondents would contend that Ext.P3 order passed by the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, after adverting to the legal and factual contentions raised by both sides and also the law on the point, warrants no interference in this original petition filed invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

15.

As noticed by the Tribunal in Ext.P3 order dated 29.01.2020 in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, the question that requires consideration is as to the manner in which the period intervening the order of reinstatement and the date of rejoining duty has to be regularised.

16.

Though the nature of the charges levelled against the petitioner-applicant, in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him is not discernible from the statement of facts in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017 or the documents marked as Annexures A1 to A5, a reading of paragraph 3 of Ext.P2 reply statement dated 19.01.2019 filed in that O.A., on behalf of the 1st respondent State would show that the applicant, while working as Assistant Commandant at the Armed Reserve Camp, Kallekad at Palakkad, on 15.08.2010, alleged to have trespassed into the residence of the Farm Superintendent of the Government Orange and Vegetable Farm at Nelliyampathi, and he was placed under suspension as per G.O.(Rt.)No.500/2011/ Home dated 16.02.2011. Later, he was reinstated in service, vide G.O.(Rt.)No.2303/2011/Home dated 05.08.2011, pending disciplinary action. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant was finalised, vide G.O.(Rt.)No.1842/2013/Home dated 03.07.2013, by imposing the punishment of barring of increments for two years, without cumulative effect. By Annexure A2 Government order, i.e., G.O.(Rt.)No.2602/14/Home dated 29.09.2014, whereby the period of suspension from 16.02.2011 to 04.08.2011 was regularised as duty for all purposes, limiting the pay and allowances for that period to the subsistence allowances already drawn. The intervening period from 05.08.2011 till the date of rejoining duty, i.e., 30.10.2011, was regularised as joining time and/or leave due and admissible to the applicant as per Note 2 to Rule 56B(9), Part I, KSR.

17.

As per Rule 56B(1), Part I KSR, when an officer who has been suspended is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, or has retired from service on superannuation before the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against him, the Authority Competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the officer for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement on superannuation, as the case may be; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.

18.

As per Rule 56B(9), Part I KSR, the amount (not being the whole), of such pay and allowances determined under the proviso to sub-rule (3) or under sub-rule (5) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under Rule 55. As per Note 2 to Rule 56B(9), the orders of revocation of suspension or of reinstatement after dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service take effect from the date of the order and the intervening period, i.e., the period from the date of order to the date of joining duty shall be regularised by granting joining time and/or leave due and admissible to the officer concerned. However, cases where there is an abnormal time-lag between the date of such order and the date on which the officer concerned reports for duty shall be decided by the Government, on merits.

19.

The specific stand taken in Ext.P2 reply statement filed in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, on behalf of the 1st respondent State, is that though the applicant was reinstated in service by G.O.(Rt)No.2303/2011/Home dated 05.08.2011, he submitted a representation dated 09.08.2011, requesting for a posting as the Security Officer in Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple, Thiruvananthapuram. While that request was under process in the Police Head Quarters, he was posted as Assistant Commandant at Armed Reserve Camp, Thiruvananthapuram City vide G.O.(Rt.)No.3211/2011/Home dated 28.10.2011. After the said order, the applicant rejoined duty as Assistant Commandant, District Armed Reserve, Thiruvananthapuram, on 31.10.2011 A.N.

20.

The applicant, who retired from service on 31.03.2014, while working as Assistant Commandant in the Armed Reserve, Thiruvananthapuram City, filed O.A.No.1271 of 2015, challenging Annexure A2 Government order dated 29.09.2014, by contending that the direction contained therein to treat the period from 05.08.2011 till 30.10.2011 as admissible leave cannot be sustained and he is entitled to get the entire period treated as duty for all purposes. Along with the reply statement filed by the State Police Chief, the 2nd respondent in O.A.No.1271 of 2015, Annexure R2(b) letter No.A3/77435/2011 dated 04.02.2012 of the State Police Chief, addressed to the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home Department, was placed on record, wherein it is stated that, on reinstatement, the applicant had requested for posting him as the Security Officer in Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple, and that the processing of that request took some time, and that the delay in sending proposal to the Government occurred due to administrative reasons.

21.

Relying on Annexure R2(b) letter, the Tribunal made an observation in Annexure A4 order dated 09.02.2017 in O.A.No.1271 of 2015, that the applicant cannot be blamed for the delay in his actual joining of duty since no posting orders had been issued to him. Before the Tribunal, it was also contended that in the light of the reasons stated in Annexure R2(b) letter, Annexure A2 Government order cannot be sustained. After taking note of the said contention, the Tribunal, by Annexure A4 order dated 09.02.2017, disposed of O.A.No.1271 of 2015, by directing the 1st respondent State to consider the matter afresh and pass a fresh order, after hearing the applicant, as to how the period of service of the applicant during the period from 05.08.2011 to 30.10.2011 has to be regularised. It is thereafter that the 1st respondent State passed Annexure A5 order dated 14.09.2017, which was under challenge in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017.

22.

As already noticed hereinbefore, as per Note 2 to Rule 56B(9), Part I, KSR, the orders of revocation of suspension or of reinstatement after dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service take effect from the date of the order and the intervening period, i.e., the period from the date of order to the date of joining duty shall be regularised by granting joining time and/or leave due and admissible to the officer concerned. Note 2 to Rule 56B(9) also provides that in cases where there is an abnormal time-lag between the date of such order and the date on which the officer concerned reports for duty shall be decided by the Government, on merits. The second limb of Note 2 to Rule 56B(9), Part I, KSR has no application in the case of the petitioner-applicant, who on receipt of G.O.(Rt)No.2303/2011/ Home dated 05.08.2011, the order of reinstatement, has chosen to submit a representation dated 09.08.2011, requesting for a posting as the Security Officer in Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple, Thiruvananthapuram.

23.

An officer who was placed under suspension, on his reinstatement in service, has no legal right to insist that he should be posted at a station or office of his choice. The petitioner-applicant, who was placed under suspension for a serious misconduct, cannot be posted as the Security Officer in Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple, Thiruvananthapuram. Having failed to rejoin duty till 30.10.2011, immediately on receipt of the order of reinstatement dated 05.08.2011, the intervening period from 05.08.2011 till 30.10.2011, can only be regularised by granting joining time with reference to the order of reinstatement dated 05.08.2011 and or leave due and admissible as per Note 2 Rule 56B(9), Part I KSR, as ordered in Annexure A5. The contentions to the contra raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant are absolutely untenable, which were rightly rejected by the Tribunal in Ext.P3 order dated 29.01.2020, while dismissing O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017.

24.

In paragraphs 8 and 9 of Ext.P3 order, which are extracted hereinbefore at paragraph 2, the Tribunal has dealt with the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the applicant, i.e., Joseph Ceasar [1998 (2) KLT 194], in which there was fault on the part of the respondents therein in preventing a teacher from discharging his duties and the judgment dated 26.02.2007 in W.P.(C)No.28778 of 2006, where there was inordinate delay on the part of the respondents therein in issuing an order of reinstatement to a Police Constable, after the order of removal was set aside. The Tribunal, in paragraph 5 of Ext.P3 order, has also referred to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, placing reliance on the aforesaid decisions, and also the relevant provisions contained in KSR and KS&SSR. The reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P3 order, for declining the reliefs sought for in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting an interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

25.

As already noticed hereinbefore, this original petition is one filed on 09.11.2025, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging an order dated 29.01.2020 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.2125 of 2017, i.e., Ext.P3 order.

26.

During the pendency of this original petition, the petitioner-applicant has sworn to an affidavit dated 16.03.2026, offering explanation for the inordinate delay of around five years in invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P3 order of the Tribunal. The averments in the affidavit dated 16.03.2026 do not make out sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We do not propose to consider that aspect in this judgment, since on merits, we have found that no interference is warranted on Ext.P3 order of the Tribunal.

In the result, this original petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.

APPENDIX OF OP(KAT) NO. 468 OF 2025

PETITIONER ANNEXURES

Annexure A1 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT SHOWING THE LEAVE SALARY DATED 12.06.2014

Annexure A2 TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER G.O (RT) NO. 2602/2014/HOME DATED 29.09.2014

Annexure A3 TRUE COPY OF COMMUNICATION GIVEN BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT DATED 26.11.2014

Annexure A4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 09.02.2017 IN O.A NO. 1271 OF 2015

Annexure A5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER G.O (RT)NO. 2427/2017/HOME DATED 14.09.2017

Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE OA 2125/2017 DATED 26.09.2017

Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY STATEMENT FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN O.A(EKM)NO.2125/2017 DATED 19.01.2019

Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 29.01.2020 IN O.A(EKM)NO.2125/2017 OF THE KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM (CAMP SITTING, ERNAKULAM)

EXHIBIT P4 True copy of the medical documents