Ruknuddin vs The Hon''ble High Court

Harish Tandon, J.—The petitioner has challenged the order dated 18th September, 2014 passed by the Registrar (Judicial Service), High Court, Calcutta, whereby and whereunder the petitioner is put under suspension with effect from 18th September, 2014.

A complaint is lodged against the petitioner for opening a Face Book account of another Judicial Officer without her consent and knowledge by using the Mobile phone number as well as the e-mail id. A First Information Report was also lodged before the police authorities and cognizance of offence was taken under Information Technology Act, 2000. The charge sheet was filed in the criminal proceeding and in course of trial the charges could not be proved beyond reasonable doubts, as a result whereof the criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioner was dropped. Subsequently the High Court intended to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and the petitioner has been put under suspension, which is challenged in this writ petition.

It is not a case where the order of suspension is passed without recording any reasons. The impugned order clearly suggests the imputation of charges against the petitioner with clear intention to proceed departmentally in terms of the applicable rules.

Bearing in mind the settled proposition of law that mere acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not entail an automatic suspension of the disciplinary proceeding, except where there is community in charges, witnesses and documents sought to be relied in the disciplinary proceeding, this Court initially thought that the case is brought within the aforesaid exception. Neither the charge sheet nor the appointment of an Enquiry Officer is assailed in this writ petition, but the same was issued during the pendency of this writ petition, this Court took notice of those as subsequent events.

To buttress the proposition of law that the criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding stands on different pedestal, reliance can be conveniently made to a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta and Others Vs. A. Gopalan, , wherein it is held:

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In that case the Court has rejected the contention that disciplinary proceedings could not be continued in the face of the acquittal in the criminal case and has held that the nature and scope of the criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This is so because in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings the standard of proof for proving the charge is preponderance of probabilities."

In a recent judgment rendered in case of The Divisional Controller, KSRTC Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, , the Apex Court reiterated the proposition of law as laid down in case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta and Others Vs. A. Gopalan, in the following words:

"24. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry."

The ratio, which could be culled out from the above noted decisions, is that the acquittal in a criminal case does not give immunity from the disciplinary proceeding, as in case of former the evidence should be beyond any reasonable doubt, but in the later case it is preponderance of probabilities, on which the departmental/disciplinary proceeding is decided.

My attention is drawn to the charges framed in a criminal proceeding and the article of charges as handed over to the petitioner by this Court, this Court does not find that it is such an exceptional case, where allowing the departmental proceeding to continue would be an idle formalities and result into futility. The list of documents as well as the witnesses appended to the article of charges does not show an absolute similarity or community. Even the charges prima facie appears to be somewhat different allegations, which if prove, may lead the loss of confidence of the employer or tarnish the reputation of the institution in the mind of the citizen of a country, who are the ultimate beneficiaries from the aforesaid system.

The Enquiry Officer though appointed has not in fact shown any progress in the proceeding and this Court, therefore, finds that the proceeding is still at the nascent stage and should not be nipped in the bud.

This Court, therefore, does not find that the disciplinary proceeding should be quashed or set aside at this stage.

However, the petitioner is at liberty to renew his prayer for revocation of the order of suspension before the appropriate authority and such an application is made, it would be open to the issuing authority to review the decision.

With the above observations, the writ petition is disposed of.

There will be no order as to costs.