Rt. Reverend Ashoke Biswas vs The Church Of North India

Ravi Krishan Kapur, J:

The appeal is directed against a portion of the judgment and decree dated 23 December 2025 passed in Title Suit no.1119 of 2018 (the impugned decree). Despite notice, the respondent remained unrepresented.

The limited scope of this appeal is directed against the costs awarded under the impugned decree. The appellant is aggrieved by the assessment of costs at Rs.50,000/- while the appellant alleges to have incurred Rs.38,95,099/-as costs for the entire litigation.

It is contended that the costs incurred by the appellant was primarily due to the innumerable applications filed by the respondent during the course of the proceedings. In fact, the respondent had preferred repeated appeals from almost every order passed by the Trial Court and had even approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court. There has been no assessment of costs in passing the impugned decree. The costs awarded does not take into consideration the Court fees, lawyers fees, and all incidental expenses incurred by the appellant. In such circumstances, the assessment of costs is unreasonable and is liable to be re-determined.

As a principle, the question of costs is inevitably a matter falling within the exclusive discretion of the Court. The discretion not only extends to the determination of which party is to bear the costs but also to the extent thereof. In this context, section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provides as follows:

In terms of the above, the costs of and incidental to in all suits is within the exclusive discretion of the Court and the Court has the full power to determine the same. A Court exercises its judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It follows that the quantum of costs cannot ordinarily be regarded as a matter capable of determination by the application of a uniform mathematical formula. The Court seized of the proceedings is in the best position to assess the question of costs. To this extent the Civil Rules and Order of the Calcutta High Court leave a fair amount of discretion in the assessment of costs.

In Tirumalachetti Rajaram v. Tirumalachetti Radhakrishnayya Chetty and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1795 at para 19, it has been held that an order as to costs fell entirety within the discretion of the Court. This position has been reiterated in Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta (2009) 2 SCC 656 at para 6, wherein the Supreme Court held that the award of costs under section 35 is discretionary, though such discretion remains subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by the Code and the Rules framed thereunder.

Ordinarily, the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court is not to be exercised to substitute its own assessment of what would constitute an appropriate award of costs merely because another amount could conceivably have been awarded. If the Trial Court has exercised its discretion within the parameters prescribed by law, an Appellate Court should not to interfere with the same unless is found to be irrational, perverse or contrary to law. In Vishvjeet Kanwarparl and Anr vs. Diljeet Titus 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2584, the Court had while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, treated the quantum of costs as a matter of discretion and declined to interfere with the same. This approach is equally consistent with the statutory mandate.

The question before an Appellate Court is not whether it would have awarded precisely the same amount of costs, but whether the Trial Court has exercised its discretion judiciously, reasonably and within the confines of law. If the answer is in the affirmative, the mere possibility that another amount might also have been appropriate would not be a ground for interference. An Appellate Court, while having jurisdiction to correct an improper exercise of discretion, does not normally substitute its own discretion for that of the Trial Court in the absence of a manifest illegality or an erroneous exercise of discretion. The quantum of costs to be paid is purely discretionary and no case for interference with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court has been made out in this appeal. A more realistic approach towards awarding costs may be the need of the hour but cannot constitute perversity or manifest illegality.

The decision in Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors vs. Nirmala Devi and Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 249 is distinguishable inasmuch as it was found that there was a clear case of abuse of process and frivolous litigation having been initiated. Similarly, in Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik and Anr v Pradnya Prakash Khadkar & Ors (2017) 5 SCC 496 it was found that the sanctity of the judicial process had been eroded and there was abuse of process of the Court.

In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. FAT 239 of 2026 stands disposed of.