R.PURUSHOTAMAN vs Settlement Officer

THE complainants appeal.

THE facts of the case are as follows: THE complainants are the joint owners of about 30 kuzhies of land comprised of in R.S. 243B in T.R. Pattinam village. R.S. 243B is the second part of R.S. No. 140/243. THE property comprised of in R.S. No. 140/243B is wrongly shown in Settlement Registers as Government Purampokku. On 5.4.1993 the complainants applied to the Tahsildar, Settlement, Karaikal for rectification of the mistake. THE same was forwarded by the Tahsildar to the Settlement Officer. But the opposite party namely the Settlement Officer has remained inactive viz. not passed any order. Aggrieved by the lethargic attitude of the Settlement Officer the complainants have come before the District Forum seeking a direction to the opposite party to pay a compensation of Rs. 25,000/- for the loss caused by the deficiency in service. The opposite party contended that the District Forum has no jurisdiction, because the complainants were not consumer. He more specifically advanced the following arguments. Any proceeding before the Director or the Settlement Officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding under Section 4 of the Pondicherry Settlement Act, 1970. There is a provision for appeal against the order of the Settlement Officer in the Act itself under Section 21(1) of the Act. There is a bar for Civil Court proceedings under Section 25(1) of the Act.

The District Forum accepted those pleas, held that it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint.

THE learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the provisions contained in the Pondicherry Settlement Act, 1970 would not be a bar for the jurisdiction of the machinery created under the Consumer Protection Act on account of Section 3 of the latter Act which states that the remedy afforded under the Act is in addition to the other remedies which may in existence. We shall proceed to examine this question of jurisdiction. The existence of a remedy in another Act is not a bar for the jurisdiction of the District Forum as per Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act. Similarly the bar for Civil Court does not also operate because the District Forum is not a Court. It is an institution sui generis, an institution of its own kind, though it is deemed to be a Civil Court for specific purposes indicated in Section 13(5) of the Act. The assimilation is limited to those purposes and does not extend to jurisdiction.

FURTHER it is not. the way of approaching the question of jurisdiction under the Consumer Protection Act which is a self contained Act. In order to determine the jurisdiction of the machinery created under the Consumer Protection Act one has to look only at that Act and not at any other one. That Act itself contains all the inclusive and exclusive clauses. The most important of that clause is under Section 1(4) which provides that "Save as otherwise expressly provided by the Central Government by notification this Act shall apply to all goods and services". Therefore the existence of any provision in any other law will not be a bar for the machinery created under the Consumer Protection Act unless that law is posterior to the Consumer Protection Act and contains a specific provision to the effect that the jurisdiction of the Consumer Protection Act is ousted. In Order to find out the extent of jurisdiction of the machinery one has to first refer to Section 2(1)(c) where "complaint" is defined and the important words contained in that clause are defined in other sub-sections of Section 2(1) of the Act. Those definitions .contain all the inclusive and exclusive clauses for the jurisdiction of the machinery created under the Consumer Protection Act. In respect of this case. Sub-section 2(1)(c) states that "complaint" means any allegation in writing made by a complainant. The word "complainant" is defined under Section 2(1)(b) of the Act. As per that sub-section the complainant has to be a consumer. The word "consumer" is defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. The word "service" referred to therein is defined under Section 2(1)(o) which reads as follows: "Service" means service of any description which is made available to potential user and includes the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, professing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both (housing construction) entertainment, amusement or the purveying a news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service". It is stated, that service will include service of any description and illustrations given are not exhaustive. The word service which has a multitude of meaning is not itself defined to indicate which of the meaning it has in the Act. Such a definition would have been superfluous. In fact while interpreting this clause, we have to have in mind that we are in the realm of consumption, where services stand symmetrically to goods, which would mean that services should be marketable. "Service" contemplated in the Act is a conduct tending to the welfare or the advantage of another as per meaning IV of the word service in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. This becomes evident when the illustrations are perused. It is therefore clean that public service involving the regalion power of the State is involved, it would not be a service within the meaning of the Act. Now turning to the facts of the case, the work which the complainant asked for was to rectify the entries in the Settlement Register. The maintenance of such a register is meant for public peace and good. It is performed as part of the essential duties of the State. It is obviously not a marketable service. It has to be ensured perennially. Further for bringing the matter before the Forum the service should be one for consideration as per Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act. When the party was asked whether any money had been paid at the time of the petition before the Settlement Officer the third complainant has unequivocally stated that he has not paid any money for having the settlement registers rectified. Therefore, the service applied for is not a service and much less a service for consideration; the complainants are not consumers; they cannot approach the machinery created under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

IN the result, the appeal is dismissed. No cost. Appeal dismissed.