Roshan Lal Butail vs The Union of India (UOI) and Others

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—The Petitioner is the owner of a portion of the New Butail Building, Lower Bazar, Simla. A part of that portion was requisitioned on March 1, 1949, under the Punjab Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act. In June, 1967 the Petitioner applied for the release from requisition of that part of the accommodation. Subsequently, after various proceedings had taken place an order was made by the District Magistrate, Simla on December 8, 1970, rejecting the application. That order is now challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In this writ petition, although the Petitioner has sought a number of reliefs, learned Counsel seeks the quashing of the impugned order dated December 8, 1970, alone.

It is not disputed that the release from requisition of the property must be considered now in the light of the provisions of the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Reference may be made in this behalf to Section 23 of the Act.

Three grounds have been raised before me on behalf of the Petitioner. The first ground is that the District Magistrate was not empowered to decide the matter and make the impugned order. Although the ground has not been specifically taken in the writ petition, I have allowed it to be raised. u/s 6 of the Act, it is true, the power to release requisitioned property vests in the Central Government. But Section 17(1) of the Act also empowers the Central Government to delegate the powers exercisable by it under the Act to a subordinate officer. It appears that a notification No. S.O. 1928 dated May 19, 1970, (published in the Gazette of India dated May 30, 1970) has been issued by the Central Government u/s 17(1) of the Act, and thereunder Collectors have been empowered to exercise the powers of the Central Government u/s 6 of the Act. In the context in which the expression "Collectors" has been used it must be taken to mean what it does in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 3(c) of the Act of 1894 defines the expression "Collector" to mean the District Magistrate of a District. It cannot be disputed that the District Magistrate, Simla, who made the impugned order dated December 8, 1970, is the Collector of Simla. Consequently, it must be held that the impugned order was made by an officer empowered to do so. The first contention urged on behalf of the Petitioner is rejected.

The second ground is that the District Magistrate has taken into account irrelevant considerations. He has relied, it is pointed out, on the circumstance that the Petitioner owns other sets in the building which are in the occupation of tenants, and that he has made no serious effort to get any of them vacated for himself. It is contended that that consideration is not valid in law as it is for the landlord to determine which part of the accommodation belonging to him is suitable for his use. In my opinion, this contention loses all importance because the impugned order is also based on another distinct and independent finding. The District Magistrate has found that the present accommodation with the Petitioner is sufficient for his use. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has attempted to show that the finding is perverse, and reference has been made to the material on the record indicating the extent of the accommodation in the actual occupation of the Petitioner. Now, in a writ petition it is not open to the High Court to go into the sufficiency of material for determining whether a finding of the inferior authority is vitiated. That is a question which falls within the realm of fact. The writ jurisdiction must be confined to the correcting of patent errors of law or errors of jurisdiction or for quashing an order passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. The second contention is, therefore, rejected.

The last ground is that the Petitioner was entitled as of right to the release of his property from requisition by virtue of the new Sub-section (1-A) inserted in Section 6 of the Act. The sub-section requires that the property requisitioned or deemed to be requisitioned under the Act before the commencement of the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1970, shall be released from requisition on the expiry often years "from such commencement". The submission is that the period must be computed from the date of the requisition of the property. I am unable to accept the contention. On a plain reading of the provision, the expression ''commencement'' refers to the commencement of the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1970, and not to the commencement of the period of requisitioning.

The writ petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.