Rohtash Kumar vs Financial Commissioner Haryana and others

The petitioner has knocked the door of this Court in the nature

of certiorari for quashing the orders dated 22.03.2017 of the Financial

Commissioner (Annexure P-4), 15.07.2011 of the Commissioner (Annexure

P-3), 05.05.2010 of the Collector (Annexure P-2) and 14.06.2007 of the

Assistant Collector Ist Grade-cum-DRO (Annexure P-1).

Mr. Mani Ram Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the petitioner submits that Shri Surja father of predecessor-in-interest of

petitioner and proforma respondents was tenant on the land in dispute under

Kishan Chand which was allotted to him by the Custodian Department,

which vide sale deed dated 17.11.1980 sold the same to Sh. Ravinder Nath

Gupta. After his death on 12.11.1993, the land was succeeded by his legal

representative.

He further submits that Aakash Gupta, legal representative of

Ravinder Nath Gupta filed an ejectment petition and the ejectment was

ordered by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade on 17.10.1995 on the ground of

subletting. The matter upto the highest hierarchy attained finality but the

decree was not executed. However, the same was sought to be enforced by

filing an execution application by Prem Nath Gupta and Inder Jit Gupta on

the basis of some civil Court decree having obtained from the legal

representatives of Ravinder Nath. The decree was obtained on the basis of

some false plea. The aforementioned execution was objected by the

petitioner on the various grounds including the maintainability of execution

application, much less being time barred etc..

He also submits that though there is no limitation prescribed

under Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as

"1953 Act"), therefore, by applying the provisions of Article 136 and 137 of

the Limitation Act, the ejectment could not have been executed in the year

2004 and thus, the same was barred by law of limitation.

In support of his contention, relies upon the judgment rendered

by the Financial Commissioner in Sardara Singh vs. Guryani Brij

Bhallabh Kaur 1997 (3) RCR (Civil) 682 as it was not a civil Court decree

and thus, all these points have not been pondered upon by the authorities

below and therefore, the orders under challenge are not sustainable in the

eyes of law and liable to be set aside.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, appraised the

paper book, judgment cited at bar and of the view that there is no force and

substance in the submissions of Mr. Mani Ram Verma. The ejectment suits

are being tried as per the procedure prescribed under Section 14-A of 1953

Act and the grounds for eviction are being sought under other provisions of

the Act. Now the question which arises is whether in the absence of any

provision provided under the Act for seeking execution of the decree,

whether general principles of limitation as apply to the civil Court decree,

would apply or provisions of Articles 136 and 137 of the Limitation Act as

referred to by Mr. Verma.

It would be apt to refer the provisions of Articles 136 and 137

Limitation Act read as under:-

For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil Court Twelve years When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place:

Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.

Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division. 3 yrs When the right to apply accrues.

In my view, the provisions of Articles 136 and 137 would

apply, for, though no doubt the decree passed by the revenue Court is not a

civil Court decree but the decree cannot be kept in abeyance on the ground

that other party had not sought the execution but the facts indicated reveal

that in the meantime, the subsequent transferee, Mr. Gupta, had expired and

owing to litigation amongst the legal heirs, by virtue of the decree, cause of

action accrued to the beneficiaries of the decree to seek execution. The ratio

decidendi culled out in the judgment aforementioned rendered by the

Financial Commissioner would not be applicable to the facts and

circumstances of the present case. Even by applying the provisions of

Article 137, limitation of 3 years would begin only when the "Right

Accrues".

In view of the aforementioned provisions, even if the right to

sue accrued, in case of private respondents, who had sought the execution

after accrual of the right in pursuance to the civil Court decree amongst the

legal representatives of Mr. Gupta, thus, such a plea on behalf of the

petitioner qua decree having become un-executable being barred by law of

limitation is wholly misplaced and un-tenable. Rightly so, the authorities

below dismissed the appeal and revision preferred against the order of

Assistant Collector on this ground. It is basically an attempt to tire out the

decree holder and to frustrate the decree of 1995.

Resultantly, I am of the view that the orders under challenge

are perfectly legal and justified and do not call for any interference.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.