AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.—This revision arises out Of proceedings taken by the respondents for evicting the petitioners who ate in occupation
of a house at Guntur as their tenants. The respondents are brothers and it is stated by the petitioners that they (respondents) are members of a joint
undivided Hindu family. The application for eviction was filed u/s 7(3)(a)(i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XXV of 1949,
on the allegation that the only house in which the members of the family were residing was a small one and that one of the brothers who had just
retired from service, the first applicant wanted this house for his own occupation. The Rent Controller dismissed the application on the ground that
the house which was in the occupation of the family ""afforded enough of accommodation for the first applicant, also"". It is conceded that this was
due to a mistake, as the house inspected by the Rent Controller was not the house in the occupation of the family. The Subordinate Judge, on
appeal, confirmed the order of the Rent Controller on a different ground, viz., that the joint family must be taken to be the landlord and as the joint
family was in possession of another residential building in the city, the application was not competent u/s 7 (3)(a)(i) of the Act. Against this order
the respondents preferred a revision to the District Judge, Guntur. He held that there had been a division in status in the family and that, therefore,
the members were entitled to separate possession of the houses. He also held that even on the footing that there was no division, the applicants
were entitled to an order for eviction, as the house was needed by the first applicant for his occupation.
The correctness of this order is challenged before me by Mr. Bhimasankaram. He contends firstly that the finding as to the division in status is
erroneous, and secondly that as the joint family is a juristic person so long as it is in occupation of any one house, an application by its members for
possession of any other house would be barred by the terms of Section 7 (3)(a)(i). He contends that the landlord u/s 7(3)(a) (i) would be the joint
family.
I am unable to agree with this contention. Though it may be possible to regard a Hindu joint family as a juristic person for some purposes, it
cannot, in my opinion, be held to be a landlord for purposes of Section 7(3)(a)(i) of the Act. That section enacts that the landlord may apply for
possession of a residential building, if he requires it for his own occupation, provided he is not occupying a residential building of his own in the
same place. Now, a juristic person cannot, in the context, be aptly described as occupying a residential building; it is only in the case of a natural
person that the question of residence can arise. A joint family regarded as a juristic entity, can, therefore, have, as such, no residence. It is only its
members that can reside in a building. This is further made clear by the use of the word ""he"" in the section; a joint family as juristic person is neither
a ""he"" nor a ""she"". The true position is, that when a building belonging to a joint family is leased, the landlord is not an abstract juristic entity called
joint family"", but the members who constitute that family. When a coparcener, therefore, applies for possession u/s 7(3)(a)(i), he will be entitled to
an order, if he establishes that he requires the house for his own occupation, and he is not disentitled to that relief by reason of the fact that the
family owns another house and members of the family are residing there, if he is himself not in occupation of it. The contention that he must be
deemed to be in constructive possession of that house because other members of the family are in occupation thereof must fail, when once it is held
that the joint family as a juristic person is not the landlord for purposes of Section 7 (3)(a)(i) . The policy of the Act, clearly, is to prevent rack
renting and to secure to tenants possession of the premises on payment of reasonable rent. The Act is therefore concerned with actual and physical
possession and not with natural (notional?) and constructive possession; and it will be foreign to the scheme of the Act to hold that occupation by
one member should be construed as occupation by another when that other is not in fact in occupation.
In this view, the questions for determination are, whether the house is required by the first applicant for his own use and whether he is in actual
occupation of any other house of his own in the same place. Both these questions have been answered by the learned District Judge in favour of
the respondents and on those findings, the order under revision is clearly right. In this view, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether there
was a division in the family and whether the first applicant will be entitled to possession by reason of such division.
The revision fails and is dismissed with costs.