Rita & Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh& Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 109, dated 29.06.2023, registered at Police Station Majra, District Sirmour, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323 and 34 of Indian Penal Code. The offences alleged against the petitioners are compoundable. The only question is whether the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be entertained for quashing the F.I.R. based on the compromise effected between the parties when the offences are compoundable.

It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del138, that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was held that this power cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed:-

“8. In order to determine the question under consideration as to what is the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above said three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High Court which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2). Therein examining the scope of section 482 it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in another form the Court observed that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied)

It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was observed:

“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC 47] and it was held as under :

(SCC p. 555, para 8)

The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:

(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545] after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29)

“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.

In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been required to surrender as the bail application could be entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been passed by any court nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, it was held in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana 2003 4 SCC 675, that the High Court can quash the F.I.R. in non-compoundable offences based on compromise suggesting that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in respect offences, which are compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. except in exceptional cases. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Ravi Sharma Vs. State of H.P. & another, 2021: HHC: 7290, wherein this Court held that power under Section 482 of Cr.PC is not inhibited by the provisions of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. and can be exercised when it is necessary to do so to secure the ends of justice and prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.

In the present case, nothing has been said in the petition as to why the powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. should be exercised to quash an F.I.R. which involves the commission of compoundable offences. This power is vested with the Magistrate and there appears to be no reason why this power should be exercised by this Court by invoking the extraordinary power. The petition has been filed simply on the basis that the continuation of the proceedings after the compromise would amount to misuse of the process of law and should be discontinued. Nothing has been mentioned as to why the parties are not prepared to approach the learned Magistrate for the composition of offences rather it has been mentioned that there is no alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy available to the petitioner except to approach this Court. This is factually incorrect as an alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy is available under Section 320 of Cr.P.C.

Keeping in view the nature of the power vested in this Court and that is to be exercised sparingly for meeting the ends of justice when an alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy is not available, there appears to be no reason why the power Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should be invoked to quash the F.I.R. based on compromise effected between the parties. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. The parties are free to approach the learned Magistrate, who shall decide the matter without being influenced in any manner by anything mentioned hereinbefore.