High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 DEL CK 2963

Rishipal Bansal vs Narender Aggarwal & Anr.

Delhi High Court · Decided on 18 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Manoj Kumar Ohri, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
FAO 48/2024, CM APPL. 7900/2024

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Judgment

30 paragraphs · 2,360 words
1.

The present appeal has been filed assailing the order dated 08.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-02, North-West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi, in CS DJ No. 56/2021, whereby the plaint filed by the appellant/plaintiff seeking specific performance of the Agreement to Sell dated 05.10.2019 (hereinafter the “Agreement to Sell”) was ordered to be returned for presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

2.

Briefly stated, the appellant instituted the underlying suit seeking specific performance of the Agreement to Sell executed between the parties in respect of land measuring 19 (K) and 9 (M) situated at Village Sultanpur, Tehsil and District Sonipat, Haryana (hereinafter the “suit property”). It is the appellant’s case that a total sale consideration of Rs.95,00,000/- was agreed upon, out of which a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- was paid to the respondents/defendants as part consideration money.

3.

The appellant claims that despite the respondents having agreed to execute the sale deed within the stipulated period of 6 months, they failed to do so. Consequently, after issuance of a legal notice dated 08.12.2020, which was served upon the respondents on 09.12.2020 as per the delivery report, the appellant instituted the underlying suit for specific performance before the Trial Court at Delhi.

4.

The Trial Court, while considering the question of territorial jurisdiction, noted that although the parties had agreed upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi in the Agreement to Sell, the suit property was situated in Haryana. It was further noted that the suit was one for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property, along with consequential relief. Holding that the suit was covered by Section 16 CPC and that the proviso thereto was not applicable, the Trial Court directed return of the plaint for presentation before the competent Court.

5.

Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned order has been passed without appreciating the proviso to Section 16 CPC. He contends that both parties are residents of Delhi and that the Agreement to Sell was also executed at Delhi. He further submits that Clause 19 of the Agreement to Sell specifically confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Courts at Delhi in respect of disputes arising out of the agreement. It is also contended that the relief sought in the suit is primarily one of specific performance of the agreement, which can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the respondents. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance on Sidharth Choudhary v. Mahamaya General Finance1; Karan Mahendru & Anr. v. Vatika Plantations (P) Ltd.2; Dr. Ramesh Chander Munjal & Ors. v. Dr. Suraj Munjal & Ors.3; Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulat & Anr.4; and Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.5. He also relies upon Section 39 CPC to contend that a decree passed in respect of immovable property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court can be transferred to the competent Court for execution.

6.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in support of the impugned order, places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd. & Ors.6, and submits that the proviso to Section 16 CPC would not be attracted in a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court concerned, particularly where consequential relief of possession is also sought. It is contended that the parties cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 16 CPC.

7.

This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the record.

8.

The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the Courts at Delhi would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit for specific performance of the Agreement to Sell, when the property forming its subject matter is situated in Haryana.

9.

The Supreme Court, in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr.7, while dealing with a suit for specific performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of a plot situated in Haryana, examined the scope of the proviso to Section 16 CPC. The relevant paragraphs from the said decision are reproduced hereunder:-

“16.

Section 16 thus recognises a well-established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situate. A court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situate has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property. In other words, a court has no jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give an effective judgment. The proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states that though the court cannot, in case of immovable property situate beyond jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit where relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant. The proviso is based on a well-known maxim “equity acts in personam”, recognised by the Chancery Courts in England. The Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain certain suits respecting immovable properties situated abroad through personal obedience of the defendant. The principle on which the maxim was based was that the courts could grant relief in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam i.e. by arrest of the defendant or by attachment of his property. …

18.

The proviso is thus an exception to the main part of the section which in our considered opinion, cannot be interpreted or construed to enlarge the scope of the principal provision. It would apply only if the suit falls within one of the categories specified in the main part of the section and the relief sought could entirely be obtained by personal obedience of the defendant.

19.

In the instant case, the proviso has no application. The relief sought by the plaintiff is for specific performance of agreement respecting immovable property by directing Defendant 1 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and to deliver possession to him. The trial court was, therefore, right in holding that the suit was covered by clause (d) of Section 16 of the Code and the proviso had no application.

20.

In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the parties had agreed that the Delhi Court alone had jurisdiction in the matters arising out of the transaction also has no force. Such a provision, in our opinion, would apply to those cases where two or more courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit and the parties have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of one court.”

10.

It is apposite to refer also to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rohit Kochhar (supra), wherein the Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 16 CPC and the applicability of its proviso in the context of a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning immovable property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court concerned. The Supreme Court, after considering the nature of the relief sought and the requirement of execution and registration of the sale deed, held that the proviso to Section 16 would not be attracted where the relief cannot be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Court. The said decision also reiterates that parties cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction. The relevant paragraphs from the said decision are reproduced hereunder:-

“18.

The Court held that a suit for specific performance and delivery of possession was covered under clause (d) to Section 16 of the CPC and thus the parties, even by agreement, cannot confer territorial jurisdiction on a court within whose territory the subject matter is not situated. …

20.

Thus, even if the suit for specific performance is decreed without a specific decree for transfer of the possession of the suit property, the same can be enforced only when the trial court directs the defendants to convey the suit property to the plaintiff by getting a sale deed registered with respect to the suit property, as it is only after registration that the transfer of title would take place from the defendants to the plaintiff. The registration of the sale deed in the present case would have to take place at Gurugram as the suit property is situated there. The sale deed is not sought to be registered at Delhi and the implication of the grant of specific relief would be that the trial court will have to direct the defendants to move out of Delhi and go to Gurugram to get the sale deed registered. As rightly held by the Division Bench of the High Court, such a relief cannot be obtained entirely by the personal obedience of the defendants as the defendants will have to go to the jurisdiction of another court to get the decree executed.

21.

We agree with the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned order that the proviso to Section 16 would be applicable to a case where the relief sought by plaintiff can be obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, that is, the defendant has not to go out of the jurisdiction of the court at all for the purpose of the grant of relief. However, since the present case would require the defendants to go to Gurugram for the purpose of execution of the sale deed, hence the proviso to Section 16 of the CPC will not be applicable.”

11.

The aforesaid position is required to be considered in the context of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant.

12.

In Sidharth Choudhary (supra), this Court held that the proviso to Section 16 CPC could be invoked where the relief sought was to direct the defendants, who were carrying on business within Delhi, to execute and present the sale deed for registration. The said decision, however, preceded the subsequent authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi (supra), and the decision in Rohit Kochhar (supra). Further, the facts of the present case involve a claim for consequential delivery of possession of the property situated in Haryana. The aforesaid decision, therefore, cannot assist the appellant.

13.

Likewise, in Karan Mahendru (supra), this Court considered the question of territorial jurisdiction in the context of the reliefs claimed therein, including an alternative claim for recovery of money. The said decision, also being prior to Harshad Chiman Lal Modi (supra) and Rohit Kochhar (supra), cannot prevail over the law subsequently declared by the Supreme Court on the scope of Section 16 CPC.

14.

The reliance placed on Dr. Ramesh Chander Munjal (supra) is also misplaced. The said decision dealt with a suit involving multiple immovable properties situated within the territorial jurisdiction of different Courts and examined the applicability of Sections 16 and 17 CPC, including the reliefs capable of being obtained through personal obedience of the defendant. Notably, the said decision was not rendered in a suit for specific performance, and it distinguished the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court, which has since been affirmed in Rohit Kochhar (supra). The present case, on the other hand, concerns a suit in respect of a property situated in Haryana and does not involve properties situated within the jurisdiction of different Courts so as to attract Section 17 CPC.

15.

Insofar as Adcon Electronics (supra) is concerned, the Supreme Court therein considered whether a suit for specific performance simpliciter, without a prayer for possession, would constitute a suit for land for the purposes of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The said judgment was rendered in the context of the Letters Patent and the nature of the relief claimed therein. The present case involves a consequential prayer for delivery of possession of the suit property. In any event, the decision in Adcon Electronics (supra) has been considered in Rohit Kochhar (supra), which examines the question of territorial jurisdiction under Section 16 CPC in the context of a suit for specific performance.

16.

The judgment in Swastik Gases (supra) also does not advance the appellant’s case. The Supreme Court therein held that parties may agree to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon one of two or more Courts which otherwise possess jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The said judgment does not lay down that parties can confer jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise lacks it. Thus, Clause 19 of the Agreement to Sell, providing for exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi, cannot override the mandate of Section 16 CPC.

17.

The appellant’s reliance on Section 39 CPC is equally misplaced. The said provision deals with the transfer of a decree for execution and does not confer territorial jurisdiction upon a Court to entertain a suit in the first instance.

18.

In the present case, the suit property is admittedly situated in Haryana. The reliefs sought includes specific performance of the Agreement to Sell and delivery of possession of the suit property. The execution and registration of the sale deed, as well as the consequential relief of possession, concern the immovable property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi. The reliefs, therefore, cannot be said to be entirely obtainable through the personal obedience of the respondents within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi.

19.

Consequently, merely because the parties reside in Delhi, the Agreement to Sell was executed in Delhi, or Clause 19 thereof provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi, the Courts at Delhi cannot be vested with territorial jurisdiction contrary to Section 16 CPC.

20.

In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rohit Kochhar (supra), this Court finds no infirmity in the impugned order directing return of the plaint for presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

21.

The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.

22.

The pending application is also disposed of in the above terms.

Footnotes

  1. 1.1999 (50) DRJ 479
  2. 2.2004 (74) DRJ 570
  3. 3.CS(COMM) 22/2021, decided on 13.04.2022
  4. 4.(2001) 7 SCC 698
  5. 5.(2013) 9 SCC 32
  6. 6.2024 SCC OnLine SC 3584
  7. 7.(2005) 7 SCC 791