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Judgment
This Writ Petition came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following prayer:
“…to issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari after calling for the records relating to Final Order No. V-15014/CISF/Disc/Maj.16/RK/13/12588 dated 22.1.2014 as confirmed by the 3rd respondent in the appellate order vide No. V-11014 (1)/19/Appeal/Disc/SZ/2014/3112 dated 30.4.2014 and in Order dt. 22.2.2018 made in No.V-15016/CISF/SS/L and R/Rev/RK/10/2018-1754 2nd respondent and to quash all the said orders as being illegal, arbitrary, contrary to the principles of natural justice and violative of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondents to forthwith reinstate the petitioner into service by extending all service/attendant benefits to the petitioner and pass…”
The petitioner joined as a Constable/GD in the 3rd respondent organization – Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) at CISF Unit, Visakhapatnam on 04.04.2012 and has discharged his duties ever since, to the utmost satisfaction of his superiors.
While the matter stood thus, on 14.11.2013 at about 7:00 PM, after completing his general shift duty, he went to the vegetable market in Sector-II, VSP Township, Ukkunagaram; at the vegetable market, the petitioner was eating Pani Puri at a stall; at that juncture, three girls and a boy were also present. It was alleged that the petitioner made a hand and head gesture towards one of the girls and invited her to have Pani Puri. It is the case of the petitioner that while the petitioner was returning, he was caught by friends of the girls and was beat. The petitioner then ran towards the Home Guard personnel who were on duty nearby, who in turn informed the CISF Control Room after coming to know that the petitioner was a CISF employee. Subsequently, the officials of the 3rd respondent reached the Home Guard Office and brought the petitioner back to the CISF Unit lines at about 9:40 PM on the same day.
Thereafter, the respondent authorities issued a charge memorandum to the petitioner on 20.11.2013 under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001, wherein it was alleged that he had gone to the vegetable market without permission and had indulged in eve-teasing by making gestures towards an unknown girl and inviting her to have Pani Puri. Pursuant to such memo, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 02.12.2013, denying the allegations. Subsequently, a departmental enquiry was conducted, wherein, the respondent authorities examined its witnesses and the petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine them and to present his defence. After considering the evidence, the Enquiry Officer held the charge leveled against the petitioner as proven. After completion of enquiry, the enquiry report was also served on the petitioner, pursuant to which the petitioner submitted his explanation on 18.01.2014. After considering the enquiry report and his explanation, the 4th respondent passed an order dated 22.01.2014 imposing the major penalty of removal from service.
The said order dated 22.01.2014 was challenged by the petitioner by filing a departmental appeal before the 3rd respondent – appellate authority which was rejected on 30.04.2014 by holding the punishment imposed on the petitioner of removal from service as just and proper. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Civil Court at Gurdaspur and filed Civil Suit No.349 of 2014 challenging the action taken against him, which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 30.01.2017 by observing that the relevant orders had been communicated to the petitioner at Visakhapatnam and, therefore, the Gurdaspur Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The petitioner thereafter approached the Hon’ble High Court for Punjab and Haryana by filing C.W.P.No.6407 of 2017 wherein it was held that the petitioner should approach the appropriate forum having jurisdiction at Visakhapatnam.
Thereafter, challenging the order of the 3rd respondent dated 30.04.2014, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the 2nd respondent on 23.10.2017, after a lapse of more than three years. Though there was a considerable delay in filing the revision before the 2nd respondent, considering the fact that petitioner had been pursuing remedies before various courts, the 2nd respondent condoned the delay and considered the revision. It was contended by the petitioner before the 2nd respondent that the allegation of eve-teasing had not been established by reliable evidence. The 2nd respondent, basing on the material available before it, found that the departmental enquiry had been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure and that the petitioner had been given adequate opportunity to defend himself. The 2nd respondent found no sufficient grounds to interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or with the punishment imposed by the 4th respondent. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent confirmed the punishment of removal from service imposed by the 4th respondent and rejected the revision filed by the petitioner vide the impugned order dated 22.02.2018. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed.
The respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed a detailed counter affidavit stating that the charges leveled against the petitioner were duly enquired into in accordance with the prescribed procedure and that the charge was found proved on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the supporting documents produced during the departmental enquiry. It is contended that though the petitioner was afforded sufficient and reasonable opportunity by the Enquiry Officer to effectively defend himself, he could not disprove the charge leveled against him. The statements of all the prosecution witnesses were recorded in the presence of the petitioner and copies thereof were supplied to him under proper receipt. The petitioner was also given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. In spite of the same, the petitioner could not elicit anything contra to the charge leveled against him. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that he was deprived of an opportunity to defend his case is therefore incorrect and misleading.
It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the petitioner himself had accepted the charge framed against him during the preliminary enquiry, which statement was produced by HC/GD Jaibir Singh as PW-02/Exh-03. The orders passed by the disciplinary as well as revisional authorities are based upon the material evidence available before the respondent authorities. Hence requested to dismiss the writ petition.
Heard Sri. M. Sai Sundeep, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Krishna Yeseswi, learned counsel representing Sri. Y.V. Anil Kumar, learned Central Government Counsel for the respondents.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the finding of misconduct against the petitioner by the respondent authorities is unsustainable, as the girl to whom the petitioner has allegedly gestured was never examined in the departmental enquiry, nor is there any material to show that she herself made any complaint against him. He further contended that his statement recorded on 14.11.2013 during the preliminary enquiry was not voluntary but was obtained under coercion and pressure, after he had been beaten and taken to the Home Guard office. As such, the said statement should not have been treated as an admission of the charge. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioner requested this Court to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned proceedings dated 22.02.2018 by way of which, the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service was confirmed. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel1, Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India and Ors.2, B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India3, S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India4 and M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt., Ltd., Vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan TIN Works Pvt., Ltd., and ors5. The said judgments would be referred to at a later stage in this judgment.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contend that non-examination of the girl allegedly involved in the incident does not, by itself, render the finding of the enquiry officer unsustainable, as the charge was established on the basis of the entire evidence available on record, including the deposition of departmental witnesses and the surrounding circumstances of the incident. He further contend that the petitioner’s statement recorded during the preliminary enquiry, wherein he accepted the charge, was duly produced in the departmental proceedings and constituted material supporting the finding of guilt. It is contended that though petitioner was afforded due opportunity to challenge the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, no material was brought on record to establish that the said statement was obtained by force or coercion. Having participated in the departmental proceedings, the petitioner cannot now contend that he was no afforded opportunity to defend himself. Hence, requested to dismiss the writ petition.
Perused the entire material available on record. It is not in dispute that the petitioner joined the 3rd respondent organization as a Constable/GD and was posted at CISF Unit, Visakhapatnam on 04.04.2012. On 14.11.2013 at about 7:00 PM, after completing his general shift duty, the petitioner went to the vegetable market at Sector-II, VSP township, Ukkunagaram, where he was having Pani Puri; at that juncture, three girls and a boy were present and it was alleged that the petitioner made hand and head gestures towards one of the girls and invited her to have Pani Puri.
It is the case of the petitioner that, while returning from the market, he was caught and beaten by the friends of the said girls; in order to avoid such assault, the petitioner approached the Home Guard personnel nearby, who informed the CISF Control Room, and subsequently, the petitioner was taken to the CISF Unit. Thereafter, a charge memorandum dated 20.11.2013 was issued to the petitioner alleging that he went to the market without obtaining prior permission and had indulged in eve-teasing. The petitioner denied the allegations in his explanation dated 02.12.2013, pursuant to which a departmental enquiry was conducted. Though the petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and present his defence, he could not succeed in eliciting anything adverse, thus, the Enquiry Officer held the charge proved. After considering the enquiry report and the petitioner’s explanation, the 4th respondent imposed the major penalty of removal from service vide order dated 22.01.2014. The said punishment was also upheld by the 3rd respondent and the 2nd respondent in the appeal and revision preferred by the petitioner.
It is to be noted that the petitioner, during the course of enquiry, submitted his written statement on 14.11.2013. A perusal of the said statement would go to show that the petitioner himself had admitted that on 14.11.2013, while he was eating Pani Puri at a stall in Sector – 2, Vegetable market, three girls and one boy were standing; that one of the girls looked at him and laughed, so he gestured her to eat Pani Puri by showing Pani Puri with his hand and motioning with his neck. Now, it is the contention of the petitioner that he had made a gesture and invited the person approaching from the opposite direction thinking to be his friend to have Pani Poori, however, due to darkness, he had mistaken the said person (girl) and that the girl had misunderstood his gesture. However, the said contention cannot be accepted; it appears that the said plea of the petitioner that he had mistaken the girl for his friend on account of darkness is an afterthought. The petitioner further contends that the charge of eve-teasing was not established by reliable evidence, particularly as the girl allegedly involved in the incident was never examined and no complaint from her was placed on record.
Now the question that arises for consideration is:
“Whether this Court can re-appreciate the evidence recorded by the competent authority which led to removal of the petitioner from service, which was further confirmed in the appeal and revision filed by the petitioner?”
It is well known principle that the power of judicial review discharged by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is distinct from the appellate power or revisional power exercised by a department. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It has to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice or, in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. Time and again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in catena of judgments held that when an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court shall determine whether such enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. While dealing with a similar case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India6 held as under:
"12.Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal concerned is to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/ Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/ Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13.The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at SCR pp. 728-29 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers g from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
27.xxx
28.It is thus well settled that the constitutional courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.”
In the present case, the petitioner has raised substantially the same grounds which were already put forth and considered before the 3rd respondent and the 2nd respondent. The respondent Nos.2 and 3, upon considering the material available on record, have rejected the petitioner’s contentions and have upheld the disciplinary action of removal from service. The material available on record would disclose that the petitioner was afforded due and adequate opportunity to defend himself throughout the course of the departmental enquiry and that the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure and there is no material to show that the same is against the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was supplied with the relevant material, the statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded in his presence, and he was also afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Thus, the petitioner cannot raise a ground that he was denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not based on any extraneous material, but such conclusion was arrived at, considering the evidence and material placed on record during the enquiry, including the testimony of the departmental witnesses and the circumstances surrounding the incident, as well as the statement of the petitioner recorded during the preliminary enquiry.
Once it is found that the enquiry was conducted by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure, that the principles of natural justice were complied with and that the findings are supported by the departmental witness and other material available on record, this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot enter into the adequacy, sufficiency or reliability of the evidence or re-appreciate the same to arrive at a different conclusion. The scope of interference is confined to cases where there is violation of the principles of natural justice or statutory rules, patent error of law, perversity, or a finding based on no evidence, or where no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, as held by the Apex Court in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (referred supra).
Even otherwise, merely because the girl who was allegedly involved in the incident has not been examined, the entire departmental proceedings cannot be said to be vitiated, particularly when the incident in question has been proved with the help of the departmental witnesses, including the personnel who were present at the scene and the Home Guard personnel who intervened immediately after the incident and took the petitioner to the Home Guard Office and thereafter handed over to the CISF authorities. The non-examination of the girl, therefore, cannot by itself render the enquiry defective or establish that the finding of guilt against the petitioner is based on no evidence and thus, the circumstantial evidence available on record, coupled with the evidence of the Home Guard personnel and the petitioner's own statement, would be sufficient for the disciplinary authorities to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner had indulged in the alleged misconduct of eve-teasing.
In Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel (referred supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, observed that if the disciplinary authority's conclusion is based on no evidence, or if the conclusion is so unreasonable, the Court can interfere. It further observed that, the Court is not supposed to re-weigh the evidence merely because another view is possible. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:
23.That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that Charge No. 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance in well founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit is the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.
The said judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand; admittedly, though the girl involved in the accident was not examined, the circumstantial witnesses were examined in detail whose evidence would prove the charge against the petitioner. It is not the case of the petitioner that there is no evidence against him. With regard to the severity of the punishment imposed by the respondent authorities, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India rendered on 15.10.1987 in Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India and Ors., (referred supra), wherein it observed that the punishment/sentence should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:
“25.Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.”
The law laid down in the said judgment is not in dispute, however, this Court is of the considered opinion that the same is not applicable to the present case. In the case on hand, except making a bald assertion that the punishment imposed upon him is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, the petitioner has not placed any convincing or cogent material before this Court to demonstrate as to how or in what manner the punishment is disproportionate. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while contending that the respondent authorities imposed the punishment without examining the fact whether the evidence was sufficient to hold the charge proved, but, have directly assumed proof and affirmed penalty, relied on S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India7 and M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt., Ltd., Vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan TIN Works Pvt., Ltd., and ors, (referred supra). The Court held as under:
36.Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.
37.Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity”. (p. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice”. (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case [(1976) 2 SCC 981 : 1976 Supp SCR 489] this Court has taken the same view when it observed that “the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process”. This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457] wherein it has been held : (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20)
“The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely : (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.”
39.The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underly-ing such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.
It can be observed from the above that the reasons recorded by an appellate or revisional authority need not be as elaborate or exhaustive as the reasoning contained in a judgment of a Court. What is required is that the reasons should be sufficiently clear to demonstrate that the authority has applied its mind to the relevant issues and has considered the contentions raised by the delinquent. Further, where the appellate or revisional authority concurs with the findings and reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority, it is not necessary for such authority to reproduce the entire reasoning afresh, so long as its order reflects due consideration of the matter and the basis for its conclusion. In the case on hand, insofar as this specific ground raised by the petitioner is concerned, this Court finds no error in the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent as stated hereinabove, the 2nd respondent need not reproduce the entire reasoning afresh.
The petitioner, being a member of a disciplined force and holding a responsible position in government service, is expected to maintain a high standard of discipline, decorum and propriety not only while discharging his official duties but also in his conduct in the outside society. A government servant, particularly one belonging to a disciplined force, is expected to conduct himself with restraint, dignity and good manners in public, as his conduct outside the workplace may also reflect upon the image and reputation of the organization to which he belongs. In the present case, the petitioner failed to maintain the requisite standard of conduct and decorum in the public place in question and, therefore, erred in discharging the responsibility expected of him as a member of the Force.
In view of the aforesaid detailed discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the 2nd respondent passed the impugned order dated 22.02.2018 in accordance with the prescribed procedure and by following the principles of natural justice and such findings are supported by the departmental witness and other material available on record. Hence, this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, need not interfere with the decision of the respondent authorities, as an appellate authority so as to arrive at a different conclusion. As such, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Consequently, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Petition shall stand closed.