Risal Singh vs Gram Sabha and Others

Ajit Singh Bains, J.—Risal Singh Appellant has filed this regular second appeal against the judgment and decree dated March 8, 1971 passed by the Additional District Judge, Rohtak, whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated August 10, 1970 of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak.

The facts of the case are not disputed. Risal Singh, Plaintiff-Appellant, was the Sarpanch and Chairman of the Gram Sabha, Saidpur, during the relevant period and was suspended on account of certain allegations levelled against him. It is alleged that during his tenure as Sarpanch and Chirman, he leased out some shamlat land, but did not make any attempt to recover the lease money from the lessee. Subsequently, while he was holding office of Sarpanch, some land of the Gram Panchayat was also exchanged with that of one Dhani Ram. The Panchayat thus suffered loss due to neglect and misconduct of the Plaintiff-Appellant in his capacity as its Sarpanch. On the move of the representative of Gram Panchayat, the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, exercising the powers of District Panchayat Officer u/s 105 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was deputed to assess the loss suffered by the Gram Panchayat. The Block Development and Panchayat Officer, after due enquiry and giving an opportunity of explaining to the Appellant, assessed the loss suffered by the Panchayat at Rs. 12,308, vide his order dated September 29, 1966. Thereafter the Appellant filed an appeal before the Assistant Director, Panchayat, who,--vide his order dated August 30, 1968 maintained the assessment of Rs. 2,042 for loss of lease money and Rs. 10,000 for exchange of shamlat land.

Aggrieved by the abovesaid assessment orders, the Appellant filed a civil suit against the Gram Sabha, Gram Panchayat, Block Development and Panchayat Officer, and Assistant Director of Panchayats. In their written statements, the Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat had denied the allegations made in the plaint and pleaded that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. The trial Court framed as many as four issues but the material issue for the purpose of this appeal is issue No. 4, which is in the following words:

Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?

The trial Court decided the issue against the Appellant and held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The first appellate Court affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of both the Courts blow.

Mr. S. C. Kapoor, learned Counsel for the Appellant, has contended that since there is no express bar under the Gram Panchayat Act, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit and that the Courts below have erred in law in dismissing the Plaintiff-Appellant''s suit on this ground alone. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple Vs. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy, and Musamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari Govindhai Ratnabhai and Ors. AIR 1969 S.C. 489. Mr. J. S. Malik, learned Counsel for the Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat, has contended that there is no merit in the arguments of Mr. S, C. Kapoor as the Civil Court''s jurisdiction is expressly and impliedly excluded to adjudicate upon such matter. In his support, he has relied upon Darshana Nand v. The State of Punjab and Ors. 1969 P.L.J. 134.

After giving my careful thought to the entire matter and going through the above authorities cited by learned Counsel for both sides, I find no merit in the arguments advanced by Mr. Kapoor, learned Counsel for the Appellant. Relevant portion of Sub-section (2) of Section 104 of the Act reads as under:

(2) No civil or revenue suit or proceedings shall lie against any Gram Panchayat in respect of any act done in the discharge of any of its duties imposed under this Act.

From the bare reading of this section, it is evident that no suit or other legal proceedings in a civil or criminal court shall lie against any Gram Panchayat in respect of any act done in good faith under this Act. The instant case was initiated at the instance of the Gram Panchayat. The liability of financial loss suffered by the Gram Panchayat was assessed by the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, who, by virtue of Punjab Government Gazette Notification No. BDO (P)-59/13461, dated October 30, 1959, was empowered to perform the powers, duties and functions of the District Panchayat Officer in his block area. Hence the Block Development and Panchayat Officer was competent to make the assessment. Sub-section (2) of Section 105 of the Act provides that an aggrieved person be afforded full opportunity of explaining his case by the District Panchayat Officer before he comes to a certain conclusion. It is further provided under Sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act that the aggrieved person can seek his remedy by way of appeal against the assessment order of the District Panchayat Officer before the Assistant Director of Panchayats. In the present case, the Appellant was given full opportunity of explaining his case by the Block Development and Panchayat Officer with delegated powers of District Panchayat Officer. He also filed an appeal against the order of the Block Development and Panchayat Officer before the Assistant Director of Panchayats, who dismissed the same on merits. The language of the section shows that the order after appeal shall be a conclusive proof of the amount due. Thus the assessment order has become final and cannot be gone into by the Civil Courts. In Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) Represented by Hari Kishan and Others Vs. The Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, , their Lordships of the Supreme have observed as follows:

Under Section 9 of the CPC the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore, expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the remedy could be had.

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Applying the principle stated supra, the party aggrieved can only pursue the remedy provided by the Act and he cannot file a suit in a civil court in that regard.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made the abovesaid observations in a Municipal Committee case, wherein also such remedies, as in the Gram Panchayat Act, were provided. The rulings in Sri Vadagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple''s case (supra) and Musamia Imam Haider Bax Razbi''s case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant do not help him at all. These two authorities also lay down the same principle as enunciated by the earlier Supreme Court authority. The ratio of all these Supreme Court authorities; is that where a remedy is provided under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded and if no remedy is provided, then the matter can be agitated in the Civil Court. Secondly, if the officer passing the impugned order has acted without jurisdiction or has infringed any provision of the Act, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred; but if the officer has acted within his jurisdiction without violating any provision of the statute, then the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction. However, it is well settled that) where the question of title is involved in a dispute, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

In this view of the matter, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.