Rinoo Sehgal & others vs State of Punjab and others

Pritpal Singh, J.

The petitioners have sought the quashing of First Information Report No. 64 dated January 28, 1986, recorded against them at Police Station Civil Lines, Ludhiana, as also the charge framed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, on February 6, 1986, in pursuance thereof.

A marriage between the first petitioner Rinoo Sehgal and Smt. Vandana, respondent No. 2. was performed on November 30, 1984, at Ludhiana, were the parents of respondent No. 2 are residing. Rinoo Sehgal was then residing in Germany and was on a visit to Ludhiana at that time where his sister Rekha Trehan, petitioner No. 3, was running a Beauty Parlour. The Second petitioner, Kamla Sehgal, is the mother of the other two petitioners. The respondent, Smt. Vandana, lodged the impugned first information report at Police Station Civil Lines, Ludhiana, on January 28, 1986, alleging that after her marriage with the petitioner Rinoo Sehgal, the latter left for Germany on December 8, 1983 and she joined him later in that country in January 1984. On arrival in Germany, she came to know that her husband was keeping a mistress named Anna Maria Holo Painen. The relations between husband and wife became strained and eventually the respondent Smt. Vandana was compelled to return to India in April 1984. Subsequently, the husband Rinoo Sehgal also came to India in the month of May 1984 and then towards the end of June, 1984 he along with the other petitioners, gathering at Ludhiana, compelled the parents of the respondent to part with Rs. 50,000/. The wife was further compelled to hand over her jewellary to the petitioners which the latter sold for Rs. 75,000/. Later on the respondent was further harassed by the petitioners and they forced her to give him Rs. 52,000/. It is alleged that the petitioners had been continuously harassing the respondent with a view to coerce her and her parents to meet their unlawful demands for money and when ultimately the respondent and her parents were unwilling to oblige them further, they gave her a beating on December 21, 1984. On these allegations a case under section 498A/34, Indian Penal Code, was registered against the petitioners vide the impugned first information report. After the completion of investigation by the Police, the petitioners were challaned and they are facing trial under section 498A, Indian Penal Code, in the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana. The trial Court framed a charge under this section against them on February 6, 1986.

The first information report and the charge framed against the petitioners by the trial Court are sought to be quashed on the grounds that all the allegations contained in the first information report are false and that even otherwise no offence under section 498A Indian Penal Code, is made out from the allegations contained therein.

So far as the first contention is concerned, it is premature because the falsity or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the respondent against the petitioners is yet to be ascertained by the trial Court. It is wellsettled that for the purpose of exercising its power under section 482 of the Cope of Criminal Procedure to quash a first information report this Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made therein. The Court at this stage has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. The only point for consideration presently is whether the allegations in the first information report disclose the commission of an offence under section 498A, Indian Penal Code. This section reads as under :

"498A: HUSBAND OR RELATIVE OF HUSBAND OF A WOMAN SUBJECTING HER TO CRUELTY : Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means :

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her of any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

A plain reading of this section would show that harassment of woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand of any property constitutes an offence under section 498A. In the present case the respondent has alleged in no uncertain terms that the petitioners had been continuously harassing her with a view to coerce her and her parents to meet their unlawful demand of money, that she and her parents had been meeting the demand to a large extent and when ultimately they were unable to pay more money demanded by them, she was actually beaten by them. There can, therefore, be no doubt at all that from the allegations made in the impugned first information report, commission of an offence under section 498A, Indian Penal Code, by the petitioners is disclosed.

It was contended by the learned petitioners'' counsel that no cause of action took place at Ludhiana, therefore, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, has no jurisdiction to try the case. There is no merit in this contention because it is specifically mentioned in the first information report that the respondent and her parents were compelled to part with the money on various occasions by the petitioners at Ludhiana. Thus, from these allegations the Court at Ludhiana have the requisite jurisdiction to try the case.

It was lastly contended by the learned counsel that Kamla Sehgal petitioner is residing at New Delhi and it will cause harassment to her to come to Ludhiana on each date of hearing. This circumstances is entirely irrelevant for the decision of this petition. It may, however, be pointed out that in appropriate cases the trial Court has the discretion to dispense with personal attendance of an accused during the trial. If advised, and application in this respect can be filed by the petitioner Smt. Kamla Sehgal before the trial Court.

For aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in the petition and dismiss the same.