Reliance General Insurance Company Limited vs Firos & Ors.

This appeal is preferred against the award dated 21.08.2019 in O.P.(M.V.) No. 506 of 2016 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Manjeri.

The brief facts of the case are as follows: On 12.12.2015, while the claimant was riding a motorcycle bearing Registration No. KL-29-2290 from Manjeri towards Chanthakkunnu, and when he reached Chanthakunnu, an autorickshaw bearing Registration No. KL-09/AD-3337, driven by the 1^st respondent, collided with the motorcycle, causing the claimant to sustain serious injuries. It was contended before the Tribunal that the 2^nd respondent was the owner of the autorickshaw, the 3^rd respondent was its insurer, and the 4^th respondent was also arrayed as a party to the proceedings. According to the claimant, the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the autorickshaw by the 1^st respondent, who drove the vehicle in a manner so as to endanger human life.

At the time of the accident, the claimant, who was riding the motorcycle, was 35 years of age. He claimed compensation to the tune of ₹22,00,000/-. Upon considering the pleadings and the evidence on record, the Tribunal passed the impugned award granting a total compensation of ₹15,59,500/-.

The appeal has been preferred by the appellant contending that Ext. A10 policy is a forged document and was never issued by the appellant Insurance Company. It is further contended that, in order to establish the said contention, RW1, the Manager of the Insurance Company, was examined and the relevant documents were marked in evidence. Despite the same, the Tribunal found that there was no bona fides in the denial of the policy by the appellant.

It is further contended that the Tribunal failed to consider the specific contention of the appellant that a complaint had already been lodged before the Manjeri Police Station alleging that the insurance policy purportedly issued in respect of autorickshaw bearing Registration No. KL-09/AD-3337 in the name of the 3rd respondent was a fabricated document. According to the appellant, the policy had been forged by an unknown person with the intention of causing wrongful loss to the appellant Insurance Company. These are the circumstances under which the present appeal has been preferred.

However, a reading of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the impugned award would show that the Tribunal has dealt in detail with the issues relating to the ownership of the vehicle as well as the insurance coverage.

Insofar as the ownership of the vehicle is concerned, the same was seriously disputed. The case before the Tribunal was that the supplementary 4^th respondent was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. However, the supplementary 4^th respondent appeared before the Tribunal and contended that he had already transferred ownership of the vehicle to the 1^st respondent and that the 1^st respondent had taken possession of the vehicle from the Police Station, as evidenced by Ext. X1. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal found that the 1^st respondent was both the owner and the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time. Consequently, the Tribunal absolved respondents 2 and 4 of any liability.

The Tribunal has also discussed in detail regarding Ext. A10 insurance certificate. In that regard, RW2 was examined, who deposed that the said insurance certificate had been produced before the Police to show that the vehicle was covered by a valid insurance policy. However, the 3^rd respondent Insurance Company disputed the genuineness of Ext. A10 and denied that the vehicle was covered under a valid policy.

A reading of the deposition of RW1 would show that, although he deposed that the appellant Insurance Company could not trace any policy corresponding to Ext. A10 in its records, certain material admissions were brought out during his cross-examination. When a specific question was put by the Trial Court as to whether, in terms of the IRDA guidelines, all insurance policies issued after December 2015 were required to contain a QR Code and whether the QR Code in Ext. A10 had been verified, RW1 admitted that no such verification had been conducted. RW1 further deposed that the Insurance Company had an office at Perinthalmanna where the registers relating to the issuance of policies and receipt of premiums were maintained and that there was no impediment to producing those records before the Tribunal. He also admitted that no notice had been issued to the person shown as the insured under Ext. A10 and that the Insurance Company had merely lodged a complaint before the Police. It was further admitted that the particulars contained in Ext. A10 were consistent with those ordinarily found in policies issued by the 3^rd respondent Insurance Company. The Court also put a specific question to RW1 regarding the seal appearing on Ext. A10, which purported to be that of the Malappuram Office of the Insurance Company. RW1 admitted that no enquiry had been conducted with the Malappuram Office to verify the authenticity of the seal.

The Tribunal has considered all these aspects in detail and ultimately concluded that the 3^rd respondent Insurance Company could not be absolved of its liability to indemnify the insured. At the same time, the Tribunal held that the 3^rd respondent would be entitled to recover the amount paid from the 1^st respondent, who was found to be the owner of the vehicle at the relevant time. The dispute in that regard is essentially between respondents 1 and 3. The claimant, being an innocent victim of the accident, cannot be made to suffer on account of the inter se dispute between them.

The learned counsel for the appellant sought a remand of the matter for adducing fresh evidence. However, having regard to the settled legal position laid down by the Apex Court in Sirajudheein v. Zeenath and Others [(2024) 17 SCC 250], such a course cannot be adopted. The Apex Court has held that if the Court finds that any material evidence, which was directly within the control and possession of a party, has not been produced, it is open to the Court to draw the necessary adverse inference in terms of Section 114 illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act. However, merely because certain evidence, which ought to have been adduced, was not adduced before the trial court, the appellate court cannot adopt the easier course of remanding the matter for fresh evidence.

The learned counsel for the appellant also produced a copy of an insurance policy bearing the same policy number as Ext. A10, which, according to the appellant, had been issued by the appellant Insurance Company to a different person, and contended that there are material differences between that policy and Ext. A10. However, merely on the basis of such comparison, this Court cannot undertake an enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of Ext. A10. The question whether Ext. A10 is a genuine or fabricated document is essentially one of fact, and this Court, in the appellate jurisdiction, is not expected to act as an expert to determine the authenticity of the document. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I find no reason to accept the said contention and to remand the matter on that ground.

In the above circumstances, I find no ground to interfere with the impugned award. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed.