Reliance BP Mobility Limited vs B.R.L.K. Agency & Ors.

I have considered the pleadings, the documents placed on record and the submissions made by the Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 1 to 4. At this stage, the Petitioner is asking for only a limited relief. It wants that Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 should not disturb its possession of the retail outlet without following due process of law. For deciding this request, this Court is not required to decide whether the sub-lease should be renewed, whether the Petitioner has any permanent right to remain on the property, or what decision should be taken in the proceedings before the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO). These are separate issues and have to be considered separately.

Protecting a person who is in possession and deciding whether that person has a right to continue on the property are not the same thing. A person may say that the agreement gives him a right to remain in possession, while the other side may dispute it. Such dispute has to be decided by the proper Court or authority according to law. But only because there is a dispute about the right to remain on the property, no party can take the law into its own hands and remove the person in possession by force. At the same time, an order protecting possession cannot create a lease, renew a lease which has already expired, or stop the lawful owner from taking steps which are permitted by law.

The documents on record show that the dispute has arisen from the dealership agreement dated 3 August 2005, the sub-lease executed on the same date and the termination of the dealership agreement by the Petitioner on 16 July 2025. The Petitioner says that Respondent No. 1 was not operating the retail outlet properly and was not carrying on the work as required. The Petitioner relies on its letters dated 18 July 2025 and 30 July 2025, by which it asked for renewal of the sub-lease. According to the Petitioner, Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 did not take the required steps for renewal. It is on this ground that the Petitioner asks for protection so that it is not removed from possession without following the procedure provided by law.

The mere existence of the dealership agreement and the sub-lease does not mean that the Petitioner must succeed on every issue raised in this application. The terms of both documents, the capacity in which each respondent signed them and the rights arising from them have to be considered separately. The Petitioner cannot use the dealership agreement to put a duty on a person who had not agreed to be bound by it. On the other hand, a dispute about the rights of the parties does not give anyone a right to forcibly remove a person who is actually in possession. Therefore, for deciding the limited request made now, the main question is whether there is sufficient ground to direct the parties not to disturb the Petitioner’s possession without following due process of law.

The earlier proceedings before the District Munsif Court, Gudiyattam, are relevant. However, the effect of that order has to be understood within its proper limits. In I.A. No. 4 of 2025 in O.S. No. 90 of 2025, the District Munsif, by order dated 24 June 2026, accepted the objection that there was no arbitration agreement between the Petitioner and the owner of the property, who is Respondent No. 4 in the present Petition. In paragraph 6.8 of that order, the Court observed:

The order records that the objection was accepted and the suit was dismissed without costs. This order cannot be ignored while considering the claim against Respondent No. 4. At the same time, the present application is filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the request now made is only for protection against dispossession without following due process of law. The earlier order has to be considered by looking at the parties, the issue decided and the relief now asked for. This Court cannot treat that order as deciding every question relating to possession. But the finding about absence of an arbitration agreement cannot be ignored.

Respondent No. 4 says that he is the owner of the suit property and was only a confirming party to the sub-lease dated 3 August 2005. He says that he was not a party to the dealership agreement and had not accepted any obligation under Clause 60 of that agreement. He says that the sub-lease expired on 2 August 2025 and no renewed registered sub-lease has been executed. According to him, the Petitioner cannot use these proceedings to force him to renew the sub-lease or continue the relationship against his wish. He points out that the Petitioner had asked for specific performance in O.S. No. 90 of 2025 and that the suit was dismissed by the order dated 24 June 2026.

The submissions of Respondent No. 4 have substance so far as the Petitioner wants to enforce a obligation against him. The material presently placed before this Court does not show that Respondent No. 4 had agreed to refer disputes arising under the dealership agreement to arbitration. Merely because he was a confirming party to the sub-lease, it cannot automatically be said that he became a party to every term of the separate dealership agreement. Whether a person who has not signed an arbitration agreement can still be bound by it in a proper case depends on the facts and the legal principles relating to the consent and intention of the parties. Such consent cannot be presumed only because the transactions relate to the same property.

In ASF Buildtech (P) Ltd. v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. (P) Ltd., (2025) 9 SCC 76, the Supreme Court, while considering the group of companies doctrine as explained in Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP (India) (P) Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1, reproduced the following observations from paragraph 153 of Cox & Kings:

This passage shows that the main thing to be considered is the intention of the parties and their consent to arbitration. It does not mean that every person connected with a property or commercial transaction becomes bound by an arbitration clause. In the present case, the material does not provide sufficient ground to hold that Respondent No. 4 had agreed to refer the dispute between the Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 under the dealership agreement to arbitration. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot use the present request for protection to force Respondent No. 4 to renew the sub-lease or to restrain him on the ground that he is bound by Clause 60 of the dealership agreement.

The case against Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is different. The Petitioner’s claim against these respondents arises from the dealership arrangement and the dealings relating to the retail outlet. The Petitioner says that it terminated the dealership agreement on 16 July 2025 and thereafter took over the operation of the outlet. It says that the complaints made by Respondent No. 3 to PESO resulted in show-cause proceedings which may affect the continuation of the explosives licence required for the outlet. The Petitioner apprehends that these steps may be used to disturb its possession of the property.

Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 dispute the Petitioner’s right to the relief claimed. Their counsel says that they will act only according to law and that there is no need to grant an injunction when no actual threat has been established. This submission has to be considered. An injunction cannot be granted only because a party expresses fear, without any material to support it. But the Court must look at the nature of the dispute, the steps already taken by the parties and whether a limited order is needed so that the dispute is dealt with according to law, and not by force or by taking the law into their own hands.

The record shows that the dispute is not only about the meaning of the agreement. The dealership agreement has been terminated, there is a dispute about renewal of the sub-lease, proceedings have taken place before the District Munsif Court, and complaints have been made to PESO followed by show-cause notices. These facts show that the parties are taking steps against each other in relation to the retail outlet. They do not, by themselves, prove that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have already forcibly removed the Petitioner from possession. Still, for the limited purpose of interim protection, the question is whether there is reasonable ground to direct these respondents not to disturb the Petitioner’s existing possession except by following due process of law.

The order dated 24 June 2026 passed by the District Munsif Court does not require this Court to refuse all protection against Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. That order was passed on an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The reasons recorded in paragraphs 6.6 to 6.8 deal, among other things, with the nature of the suit, the dealership agreement and the absence of an arbitration agreement between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 4. The District Munsif noted that the Petitioner was the landowner of the suit property in the context of the dealership and sub-lease dispute and that there was no relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 4. But the present application asks only for limited protection against Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The earlier order does not mean that these respondents can remove the Petitioner from the property by force or without following the procedure provided by law.

The Petitioner’s claim to continue in possession cannot be decided in these proceedings only by looking at the termination letter or the letters seeking renewal. Whether the sub-lease has expired, whether there was a duty to renew it, whether any party committed a breach and what follows from the termination of the dealership agreement are matters which have to be decided in the proper proceedings. Granting limited protection does not mean that this Court is holding that the sub-lease has been renewed or that the Petitioner has a permanent right to remain on the property. It only means that, until the rights of the parties are decided according to law, the Petitioner should not be removed from its existing possession by force or by any method not permitted by law.

The submission of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that they will act only according to law is a relevant matter. If they follow what their counsel has said, there should be no difficulty in granting the limited protection sought by the Petitioner. The order will not stop them from taking any action which they are legally entitled to take. It will only require them to follow the procedure provided by law before disturbing the Petitioner’s existing possession. If Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have a legal right to recover possession, they may approach the competent forum and ask for the relief available to them. They cannot use the dispute about the dealership or sub-lease as a reason to take possession by force or without lawful authority.

The Petitioner has relied on the proceedings before PESO. The record refers to the show-cause notice dated 6 February 2026, the reply filed by the Petitioner on 4 March 2026, the communication dated 24 April 2026 advising the Petitioner to submit documents before the Controller of Explosives, Vellore, and the show-cause notice dated 27 July 2026. These proceedings relate to the rules and requirements for the retail outlet and its explosives licence. This Court cannot decide those proceedings in the present application. An order under Section 9 cannot be used to stop the competent statutory authority from exercising its powers according to law.

Therefore, the position needs to be made clear. The protection of possession being considered here will not stop Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 from placing their case before PESO or any other competent authority. They may continue their complaints and raise any objection available to them under law. In the same way, the Petitioner may submit its reply and documents and defend its rights before the competent authority. Nothing in this order shall be treated as a finding about the validity of the explosives licence, the legality of operating the retail outlet or the merits of the pending PESO proceedings. Those matters must be considered separately by the competent authority on the material before it and according to law.

While granting interim relief, the Court has to consider whether there is a prima facie case, where the balance of convenience lies and whether irreparable injury may be caused. A prima facie case does not mean that the Petitioner must prove its entire claim at this stage. It means that the material should show a real issue which needs protection until the rights of the parties are decided. Here, the documents show a dispute arising from the dealership agreement, the sub-lease, its alleged expiry and the termination of the dealership. There are later proceedings and complaints relating to the retail outlet. These circumstances give sufficient ground to consider limited protection against forcible dispossession by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. This finding does not decide whether the termination was valid or whether the sub-lease must be renewed.

The Court has considered whether the same order should be passed against Respondent No. 4. His case is different from that of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Respondent No. 4 claims to be the owner of the property and disputes that he is bound by the dealership agreement or its arbitration clause. The order dated 24 June 2026 of the District Munsif Court records the finding about the absence of a relationship and an arbitration agreement between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 4. The Petitioner has not placed sufficient material before this Court to show that Respondent No. 4 consented to arbitration of disputes arising under the dealership agreement or that the present interim relief can properly be granted against him under Section 9.

The Petitioner’s request for protection against Respondent No. 4 cannot be decided only because the Petitioner says that it is in possession. The legal relationship between the parties and the earlier finding about the arbitration agreement must be considered. Respondent No. 4 says that the sub-lease has expired and that no renewed registered document has been executed. The Petitioner’s claim for renewal and its right to continue under the sub-lease cannot be decided in this limited application. In these circumstances, granting an injunction against Respondent No. 4 under Section 9 would go beyond what is supported by the material presently available. The relief against him must, therefore, be refused. This does not mean that Respondent No. 4 can take the law into his own hands. It means only that the particular interim relief sought against him has not been established in the present arbitration petition. Any remedy available to the Petitioner before the competent forum according to law is left open.

In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon overall assessment of the material record, the following order is passed:

The Petition stands disposed off in above terms.