Rekha Saxena & Anr. vs Roman Catholic Diocese, Allahabad Pvt. Ltd. Thru. Director General the Bishop & Anr.

Factual Matrix :

“वादी का वाद एकपक्षीय रूप से आश्रित किया जाता है। बेनामा दिनांक 22-9-1987, जो बुक नं.1, जिल्द नं. 839 के पृष्ठ 216/217, क्रम 462 सब-रजिस्ट्रार, रायबरेली के कार्यालय में है, को निरस्त किया जाता है। इस आदेश की एक प्रति सब-रजिस्ट्रार, रायबरेली को अनुपालनार्थ प्रेषित की जाए। प्रतिवादी को स्थायी निषेधाज्ञा द्वारा आडमदपुर नफूल के प्लॉट नं. 10 से इस आशय के साथ निषेधित किया जाता है कि वह उपरोक्त प्लॉट पर कोई तामीलता न करे।”

Submissions of learned counsels for the parties :

6.

... इस संबंध में मेरे द्वारा माननीय सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की विधि व्यवस्थाओं का सादर अवलोकन किया गया। माननीय सर्वोच्च न्यायालय द्वारा दलपत कुमार बनाम प्रह्लाद सिंह 1992 (1) SCC 719 में यह अभिनिर्धारित किया गया है कि "The existence of a prima facie right and its violation is a condition precedent for granting temporary injunction. If the plaintiff has no chance of success in the suit, the interim relief cannot be granted." इसी प्रकार एक अन्य विधि व्यवस्था काशी मठ संस्थान बनाम श्रीमद सुधीन्द्र तीर्थ स्वामी AIR 2010 SC 296 में माननीय सर्वोच्च न्यायालय द्वारा यह अभिनिर्धारित किया गया है कि "If the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree of permanent injunction, he cannot claim temporary injunction."

“ 15. Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 reads as under:

“47. Time from which registered document operates.—A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.”

In view of the above provision of law, we are in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for Respondent 1 that the document registered on a subsequent date, operates from the date of execution, not from the date of registration.” (emphasis supplied)

Analysis :

94.

Supplemental Proceedings. - In order to prevent the ends of justice from being, defeated the Court may, if it is to prescribed-

(a)

issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison;

(b)

direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any property;

(c)

grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold;

(d)

appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property;

(e)

make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient.

“Order XXXIX

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION & INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

1. Cases in which temporary injunction may

be granted.—Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—

(b)

that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or

(c)

that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to [defrauding]^{11.Subs. By Act 104 of 1976, S.86 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).} his creditors,

(d)

[that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,] ^{22.Ins. By Act 104 of 1976, S.86 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).} the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property [or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit]^{33.Ins. By Act 104 of 1976, S.86 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).} as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.

2. Injunction to restrain repetition or

continuance of breach.—(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.

(2)

The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit.

(3)

[* * *]⁴

(4)

[* * *]⁵ “

“The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiff's need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant's favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where “the balance of convenience” lies.” (emphasis added)

“9.

Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated “...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.” The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.” (emphasis added)

“The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the Plaintiff:

(i)

existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the Plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction;

(ii)

when the need for protection of the Plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the Defendant's rights or likely infringement of the Defendant's rights, the balance of convenience titling in favour of the Plaintiff; and

(iii)

clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the Plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted.

In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the Plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands.” (emphasis added)

"30.

Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial (vide Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad [(2001) 5 SCC 568] , and State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha [(2009) 5 SCC 694 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 109] ).

31.

Grant of an interim relief in regard to the nature and extent thereof depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as no straitjacket formula can be laid down. There may be a situation wherein the respondent-defendant may use the suit property in such a manner that the situation becomes irretrievable. In such a fact situation, interim relief should be granted (vide M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan [(2006) 8 SCC 367 : AIR 2006 SC 3275] and Shridevi v. Muralidhar [(2007) 14 SCC 721] ). Grant of temporary injunction is governed by three basic principles i.e. prima facie case; balance of convenience; and irreparable injury, which are required to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. But it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction [vide S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. [(2000) 5 SCC 573 : AIR 2000 SC 2114] and Anand Prasad Agarwalla [(2001) 5 SCC 568] , SCC p. 570, para 6]." (emphasis added)

"47.

In this context, it would be relevant to mention that in the instant case GBC had approached the High Court for the injunction order, granted earlier, to be vacated. Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings." (emphasis added)

“14.

The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. ” (emphasis added)

“APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER ORDER 43 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

* * *

20.

The law in relation to the scope of an appeal against grant or non-grant of interim injunction was laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727 Antox brought an action of passing off against Wander with respect to the mark Cal-De-Ce. The trial court declined Antox's plea for an interim injunction, however, on appeal the High Court reversed the findings of the trial Judge. This Court, upon due consideration of the matter, took notice of two egregious errors said to have been committed by the High Court:

(a)

First, as regards the scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order; and

(b)

Secondly, the weakness in ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the trade mark on which the passing off action is founded.

21.

With regard to (a), this Court held thus: (Wander case [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727] , SCC p. 733, para 14)

“14.

… In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely, or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. … The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below.… If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.”

22.

This Court, while arriving at the above findings, relied on its earlier judgment in Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 62] , wherein it was held thus: (Printers case [Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 62] , SCC OnLine SC para 9)

“9.

… as has been observed by Viscount Simon LC in Charles Osenton & o. v. Johnston, 1942 AC 130 (HL), the law as to reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a Judge below in the exercise of his/her discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case.”

23.

It is pertinent to note that in Printers [Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 62] this Court had held that ignoring relevant facts is also a ground for interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial court. Furthermore, Viscount Simon LC in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston [Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston, 1942 AC 130 (HL)] , after stating the above, went on to quote Lord Wright's decision in Evans v. Bartlam [Evans v. Bartlam, 1937 AC 473 (HL)] : (Evans case [Evans v. Bartlam, 1937 AC 473 (HL)] , AC p. 486)

“… It is clear that the court of appeal should not interfere with the discretion of a judge acting within his jurisdiction unless the Court is clearly satisfied that he was wrong. But the court is not entitled simply to say that if the judge had jurisdiction and had all the facts before him, the court of appeal cannot review his order unless he is shown to have applied a wrong principle. The court must, if necessary, examine anew the relevant facts and circumstances in order to exercise a discretion by way of review which may reverse or vary the order.”

24.

In Evans case [Evans v. Bartlam, 1937 AC 473 (HL)] , Lord Wright made it clear that while adjudicating upon the discretion exercised by the trial court, the appellate court is obliged to consider the case put forward by the appellant in favour of its argument that the trial court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or incorrectly in the circumstances.

25.

What flows from a plain reading of the decisions in Evans [Evans v. Bartlam, 1937 AC 473 (HL)] and Charles Osenton [Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston, 1942 AC 130 (HL)] is that an appellate court, even while deciding an appeal against a discretionary order granting an interim injunction, has to:

(a)

Examine whether the discretion has been properly exercised i.e. examine whether the discretion exercised is not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the principles of law; and

(b)

In addition to the above, an appellate court may in a given case have to adjudicate on facts even in such discretionary orders.

26.

The principles of law explained by this Court in Wander [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727] have been reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions of this Court. However, over a period of time the test laid down by this Court as regards the scope of interference has been made more stringent. The emphasis is now more on perversity rather than a mere error of fact or law in the order granting injunction pending the final adjudication of the suit.

27.

In Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. [Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 190] , this Court held that the appellate court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. In other words, the Court took the view that to interfere against an order granting or declining to grant a temporary injunction, perversity has to be demonstrated in the finding of the trial court.

28.

In Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221, this Court emphasised on the principles laid down in Wander and observed that while the view taken by the appellate court may be an equally possible view, the mere possibility of taking such a view must not form the basis for setting aside the decision arrived at by the trial court in exercise of its discretion under Order 39CPC. The basis for substituting the view of the trial court should be mala fides, capriciousness, arbitrariness or perversity in the order of the trial court. The relevant observations are extracted below: (SCC p. 230, para 20)

“20.

In a situation where the learned trial court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the appellate court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The appellate court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the appellate court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasised is that as long as the view of the trial court was a possible view the appellate court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727] ”

(emphasis supplied)

29.

This Court in Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd. [Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 301] observed that the hierarchy of the trial court and the appellate court exists so that the trial court exercises its discretion upon the settled principles of law. An appellate court, after the findings of the trial court are recorded, has an advantage of appreciating the view taken by the trial Judge and examining the correctness or otherwise thereof within the limited area available. It further observed that if the appellate court itself decides the matters required to be decided by the trial court, there would be no necessity to have the hierarchy of courts.

30.

This Court in Monsanto Technology LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. [Monsanto Technology LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd., (2019) 3 SCC 381 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 158] , observed that the appellate court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the Single Judge to decide as to whether the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are made out in the case or not.

31.

The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the well-settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of the appellate court under Order 43CPC which have been reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and should guide its powers within the contours laid down in Wander case [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727] .

(emphasis added)

“5.

Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”

(emphasis added)

“8.

It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.

9.

It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1968 SC 702 : (1968) 2 SCR 455 : 1968 Cri LJ 806] , Puran Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SCC 518 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 608] and Ram Rattan v. State of U.P. [(1977) 1 SCC 188 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 85] The authorities need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram case [AIR 1968 SC 702 : (1968) 2 SCR 455 : 1968 Cri LJ 806] it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh case [(1975) 4 SCC 518 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 608] the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard-and-fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The Court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of “settled possession” (SCC p. 527, para 12):

(i)

that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;

(ii)

that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;

(iii)

the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and

(iv)

that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner, has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession.”

6.

It would thus be clear that without any decree or order of eviction of the appellant from the demised premises, he has been unlawfully dispossessed from the premises without any due process of law. The question, therefore, is: whether he should be allowed to remain in possession till his application under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99 is adjudicated upon and an order made. Though the learned counsel for the first respondent and also for the third respondent, who is one of the transferees from the sixth respondent, sought to contend that the appellant has no right to remain in possession after the lessee, M/s India Foils Ltd. had admitted by a resolution that the appellant has no right to remain in possession, we are not impressed with the arguments. At this stage, we are only concerned with his admitted possession of the demised premises. What rights would flow from a contract between him and his employer is a matter to be adjudicated in his application filed under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99, CPC. At this stage, it is premature to go into and record any finding in that behalf. The learned counsel for the first respondent also repeatedly sought to bring to our notice that on account of the orders of the Court Officer passed by the High Court the maintenance cost has been mounting up due to the delay in disposal of the proceedings in various courts. Even with regard to that, we are not impressed with the same. Since the letter of the law should strictly be adhered to, we find that high-handed action taken by Respondents 1, 3 and 6 in having the appellant dispossessed without due process of law, cannot be overlooked nor condoned. The court cannot blink at their unlawful conduct to dispossess the appellant from the demised property and would say that the status quo be maintained. If the court gives acceptance to such high-handed action, there will be no respect for rule of law and unlawful elements would take hold of the due process of law for ransom and it would be a field day for anarchy. Due process of law would be put to ridicule in the estimate of the law-abiding citizens and rule of law would remain a mortuary.

“37.

That the contents of paragraph 3 are false, baseless and are not admitted and hence denied. In reply thereof it is submitted that the respondents after the decree of the suit made the application before the Court and District Magistrate for the dispossession of appellants. Since the property comes inside the school premises and every other day the appellants have been causing unnecessary disturbance inside the school. It is further submitted that the allegation made in para 3 insofar as the using of force to disposes the appellants are absolutely false. The respondents have been following the due of law since the beginning.

38.

That the contents of paragraph 4 are wrong, misconceived and hence denied In reply thereof, it is submitted that the appellants despite having the knowledge kept an blind eye towards the order passed against them. They appellants never challenged any order passed against them, instead they have filed a suit for injunction concealing the material facts. It is further submitted that the possession of appellant was never lawful since beginning as the basis of their possession, the sale deed dated 22.9.1987 is void and illegal.”