Registrar of Trade Unions vs Dum Dum Cantonment Businessmen''s and Traders'' Union

Bijayesh Mukherji, J.—This is a Rule obtained by the Registrar of Trade Unions and another under Article 227 of the Constitution.

It is necessary to recall in brief the facts which have led to this Rule. There is a trade union going by the name of the Dum Dum Cantonment Businessmen''s and Traders'' Union. The annual return which this trade union should have submitted to the Registrar was not submitted in due time provided for in the Trade Unions Act, XVI of 1926. The usual notice bearing date June 15, 1962, was served on the trade union concerned, the opposite party before me. More than the usual notice was there, because it was accompanied by threat to have the registration of the trade union cancelled u/s 10, Clause (b) of the Act. It is hardly necessary to go through all the tortuous proceedings. Suffice it to say that the annual return was submitted in fact on September 19, 1962, and that too with a prayer for condonation of the delay. Without passing any order one way or the other on the prayer made for condonation, the Registrar directed his Inspector to inspect the office of the trade union and, inspection over, to submit a report to him. Notice was given that inspection would be made on March 2, 1963, at 11 a.m. Such notice was duly received by the trade union. On March 2, 1963, the Inspector, as directed by the Registrar, did call-upon the office of the trade union, but in vain. In vain, because none was there in the office. The Inspector''s visit, therefore, proved barren. It is a fact to be remembered.

Only then the Registrar issued a notice on March 7, 1963, directing the trade union to show cause why the certificate for registration should not be cancelled. The trade union then pleaded for one more opportunity. The trade union got what it had pleaded for. A fresh inspection was to be made on July 29, 1963. That day also the Inspector went to the office of the trade union but found none. The whole thing proved barren once more. Only thereafter the order for cancellation of registration was made on August 14, 1963, followed by the usual certificate of cancellation on August 26, following.

The trade union carried the matter on appeal. The District Judge is the appellate authority u/s 11 of the Act. The appellate authority cancelled the order of cancellation entered by the Registrar. Hence, this Rule under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Mr. Sen Gupta, appearing in support of the Rule, and Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the opposite party, have taken me through all the relevant provisions of the Act as well as the relevant dates. If I may say so with due respect, I find one error after another. One charge against the trade union is violation of Section 20 of the Act. But Section 20 provides that the account books of a registered Trade Union and the list of members thereof shall be open to inspection by an officer (since amended and replaced by the word ''office-bearer'') or member of the Trade Union at such times as may be provided for in the rules of the Trade Union. What such section has got to do with the Registrar completely beats me. It is a domestic affair between the trade union and its members and office-bearers. Upon all I hear, both from Mr. Sen Gupta and Mr. Banerjee, sure enough I do not find anything, nor do I see anything on my own on which it can be said that any member or office-bearer of the trade union has been denied inspection of the account books of the union. So, I leave it alone.

Another error I need mention is the finding by the appellate authority that Section 10 does require two notices. I do not find anything of the kind in Section 10. If it pleases the Registrar of Trade Unions, he may issue more than one notice. But that is another matter. If he issues only one notice and that notice is not less than two months from the date of the cancellation, the requirement of Section 10 is well met.

But, nothing hinges on that. What really counts here is infraction of Section 28, Sub-section (4) of the Act, which the appellate authority misses. If upon the whole of the materials I have had put before me I find such infraction, obviously then there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the order recorded by the appellate authority and I shall have to make the Rule absolute. If, however, I find no infraction of Section 28, Sub-section (4), here is an end of the matter and the Rule under Article 227 has to be discharged here and now.

So, what is Section 28, Sub-section (4) Section 28 is the general section on returns. But, merely lodging of returns is not enough. The statutory authority, here the Registrar of Trade Unions, has to satisfy himself that the returns are in order and represent the true state of affairs. That is the reason for enactment of Sub-section (4) which provides that for the purpose of examining the documents referred to in Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the Registrar or any officer authorised by him, by general or special order, may at all reasonable times inspect the certificate of registration, account books, registers and other documents relating to a Trade Union at its registered office.... No more need be quoted from Sub-section (4). Because, what has been quoted already is enough for the case on hand. Keeping this provision of Sub-section (4) in the forefront of one''s consideration, let attention be now called to the refractory behavior on the part of the human agency of the opposite party union, as a result of which the Registrar''s Inspector failed to obtain inspection on March 2, 1963, as also on July 29, 1963. Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the opposite party trade union, invites my attention to the averment made in the memorandum of appeal before the appellate authority that one Shri Matish Roy, Secretary of the trade union, had requested the Inspector to shift the time of his inspection from 5-30 p.m. to 7-30 p.m. What is more, Shri Roy was waiting for the Inspector at that hour, but in vain. It is open to the gravest doubt as to whether in a solemn petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, which is being opposed, this Court should be invited to go by the averment made in the memorandum of appeal before the appellate authority." If the trade union is so sanguine about the averment, why does it not come here and swear an affidavit saying all this ? Not that an affidavit would have been conclusive. But, even then, I would have found a little evidence of earnestness of the trade union of a serious matter as this. Otherwise, a mere averment before the appellate authority, and that too without any affidavit/appears to be beneath my notice, when I find upon the materials before me the outrageous attitude on the part of the trade union in not co-operating with the Registrar and not allowing that officer facilities for inspection, not once but twice.

Now, let me come back to Section 10, the section on cancellation of registration. A certificate of registration of a trade union may be cancelled if the Registrar is satisfied that the trade union has willfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act. The facts that go before can leave no room for doubt in the mind of a prudent man that here is willful contravention by the trade union of Section 28, Sub-section (4), which indeed has been rendered nugatory only because of the obstinacy on the part of the human agency of the trade union. The word ''willfully'' has no doubt a significance all its own. It introduces what is known in the criminal law as mens tea: a blameworthy mind. But, upon the facts I have tabulated above, I see just that: a blameworthy mind, and nothing short of that, on the part of the human agency of the trade union.

Mr. Banerjee seeks to turn the corner by advancing an argument which, with all respect, makes no appeal to me. The argument is that the Registrar is satisfied within the meaning of Section 10, Clause (b) of the Act only when he issues the notification. Here the Registrar issued the notification on July 15, 1963. Now, if that be the date regarded as the starting point of counting two months within the meaning of proviso to Section 10, obviously that limit is not reached when on August 26, 1963, the certificate for registration was cancelled. Or, if time be reckoned from August 14, 1963, the date of the order for cancellation of registration, when only the Registrar can be satisfied, then the two-month time-limit is not reached on August 26, 1963, the date of actual cancellation. The date when the Registrar records the order, is the date which is the culminating point of his satisfaction, his satisfaction having started much earlier, here on March 7, 1963. Unless he were satisfied so, he could not have issued the notification he did that day. And, then, I attach no importance whatever to the second order issued by the Registrar at the importunity of the trade union. To show indulgence to the trade union is not to waive the statutory right which the Registrar obviously has. I am, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Banerjee that the two-month time-limit has not been reached here within the proviso to Section 10.

First and last, I see an error apparent on the face of the record in the order recorded by the appellate authority. This preeminently is a fit case where the Court should intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution.

In the result, the Rule succeeds and be made absolute. The order of the appellate authority be set aside and that of. the Registrar of Trade Unions cancelling the registration of the opposite party be restored.

Upon all I see here, I make no order as to costs.