High CourtsDivision Bench(1995) 02 MP CK 0001

Regd. Finn Kailash Narayan and Bros. vs Bhagwandas Pawaiya

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 1 February 1995 · Citation: (1996) 1 MPJR 156

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S. Mazumdar, J · S. Mahon, J
CASE NUMBER
C. A. No. 226 of 1992

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Judgment

3 paragraphs · 369 words

Though in this case, the respondent was held to be in arrears in payment; of rent from 1.1.1975 and as such defaulter the High Court by a curious interpretation to section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 held as under:-

It is an undisputed position that the respondent was withdrawing the amount in the trial Court also that was being deposited by the appellant under, sec. 13 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In view of this, this application deserves to be rejected, and is, accordingly, rejected." Be it noted that by the same order, six I. As were disposed of. I. A. No. 4470/84 was for condonation of delay in depositing costs and I. A. No. 4471/84 was for non-disbursal of the rent deposited as entitlement of plaintiff/respondent to receive that was disputed. Interestingly, those applications were made by defendant/appellant but I. A. No. 4460/84 also disposed of by (he same order, was preferred by the plaintiff/respondent. No objection was raised in regard to late deposit of rent in any Court below in that application. By rejecting I. A. No. 4471/84 the Court allowed the prayer of plaintiff/respondent made in I. A. No. 4460/84 for disbursement of the rent deposited. He claimed "benefit of the rent pendente lite." On facts, therefore, it is established beyond doubt that in terms of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the tenant had been depositing rent for the said premises in the Court below and even if, at any stage, there was any delay, that was either waived of or condoned.

All that we can say will he that this reasoning is perverse. The orders in interlocutory applications can have no bearing on the main case nor can that amount to exercise the power u/s 12 (1) (a). The reliance on the decisions of the High Court reported in 1987 MPRCJ 23 as well as in Phool Chand vs. Chhotelal 1990 JLJ 434 seems to be totally out of place. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The decree as passed by the Trial Court confirming the order passed by the lower Court is restored. The appeal is allowed. No costs.