High CourtsSingle Bench(2012) 09 DEL CK 0373

R.D. Mangat vs Brij Mohan

Delhi High Court · Decided on 27 September 2012

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.L. Mehta, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
RCR No. 277 and 278 of 2012

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Judgment

6 paragraphs · 1,035 words

M.L. Mehta, J.—These two revision petitions filed by the petitioner against the respondent U/S 25-B (8) of Delhi Rent Control Act (for short "Act") are being disposed of by this common order, as the parties are common and same questions of fact and law are involved. Both these petitions are directed against the separate orders dated 02.02.2012 of the Additional Rent Controller (West), whereby leave to defend applications filed by the petitioner, were dismissed. The petitioner is tenant in respect of shop at the ground floor in house No. G-44, Shyam Nagar, Khyala Road, New Delhi since June, 1978. He is also a tenant in respect of one room above this shop since 1985. Both the premises were taken by the petitioner for commercial purposes, where he had been running his business of photography. His eviction is sought from the tenanted premises by the respondent on the ground of bona fide requirement thereof by him for his business of dairy products. It is his case that he is doing the business of dairy products from a rented shop at Arya Samaj Mandir at Sharda Puri, Ramesh Nagar, Delhi, which is about 7-8 kilometres from the suit premises. His case is that he intends to do his business from the suit premises from where he can run the business very comfortably and also seek the assistance of his handicap son. It is averred that since he is also residing with his wife and son in the same premises, and has no other reasonably suitable commercial space, he bona fide requires the suit premises.

2.

The petitioner filed leave to defend applications in both the cases on the grounds that the respondent is not the landlord of the suit premises. In this regard his case is that it was his wife Ms. Usha Rani who is the owner of the suit premises. It is also his plea that the respondent is running his business in a shop at Sharda Puri where he has good number of customers and does not require the suit premises. It is also averred that the respondent has also filed earlier petitions against him for eviction and that in case he is evicted, he shall suffer hardships and other business problems. Learned Addl. Rent Controller vide separate orders dismissed both the applications of leave to defend of the petitioner and consequently passed eviction orders in respect of both the tenanted premises. The petitioner has assailed those orders in the instant petitions.

3.

The grounds on which the impugned order has been assailed, and the submissions have been made by the learned counsel, are the same which were before the Addl. Rent Controller and which had been adequately dealt with by him. In support of the contention that the respondent is not the owner of the suit premises, but his wife Usha Rani is the owner thereof, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to a few rent receipts admittedly signed by Usha Rani as owner of the suit premises. These show Usha Rani to be the owner and her husband as the landlord thereof. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to various other rent receipts of the year 2009 and 2010 duly signed by the petitioner, showing the respondent to be the owner of the suit premises. These are not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is also not disputed that the suit premises was let out to the petitioner by way of rent agreement executed between him and the respondent, wherein respondent has been shown to be the owner/landlord. Further it is also not disputed that the construction of the first floor of the premises was done by the respondent, to the knowledge of the petitioner. The mention of name of Usha Rani on some of the receipts as owner, will not in fact, make her to be the owner thereof. That concept of ownership in the case of eviction petition, on the ground of bona fide requirement, is not absolute like that the one under Transfer of Property Act. In case of Sushil Kanta Vs. Rajeshwar Kumar 1999 RLR 289 it has been held that

An owner U/s 14 (1)(e) need not be an absolute owner requiring registered sale deed in his favour contemplated by the general law in Section 54 TPA. It is enough if he has paid for and built tenancy premises. He may also be owner by virtue of current sale agreement and Power of Attorney in his favour. Restricted meaning cannot be given to the owner for the purpose of this Act. It is further held in Rajender Kumar Sharma and Others Vs. Smt. Leela Wati and Others, that the landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than tenant. Similar proposition has been held in Shri A.K. Nayar Vs. Sh. Mahesh Prasad, .

The plea that the respondent has filed frequent petitions of eviction against the petitioner, is extraneous and without any merit. Likewise, the plea that the respondent would be having good number of customers in the shop at Sharda Puri, is also without any basis. It is undisputed that the respondent is running his shop of dairy products in a tenanted shop at Sharda Puri. It is not in dispute that he does not have any other reasonably suitable commercial space for running his business and that he along with his handicap son and his wife is residing on the first floor of the suit premises. There cannot be any dispute that the present accommodation of one room on the ground floor and one room on the first floor would be the more suitable for the petitioner who is aged and suffering from various ailments. It is settled law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and neither the tenant nor the court can dictate terms upon him.

In view of my above discussion, I do not see any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order of the Learned ADJ. Consequently both the petitions are devoid of any merit and are hereby dismissed.