R.C. Samanna Goundar vs V.B. Tiruvengada Mudaliar

Veeraswami, J.—The facts as found by both the Courts below, though the judgment of the appellate Court is a reversing one, ar cthese. The

Plaintiff is a distributor of Petter Fielding E.H. Type Engines used for irrigation purposes in agriculture. At the instance of the Defendant, the Plaintiff

secured the services of Messrs. Parry and Company to supply the Defendant parts of such engine and to effect repairs to it. Messrs. Parry and

Company having supplied the parts and effected repairs sent its invoice, dated March 15, 1954, to the Plaintiff adjusting a sum of Rs. 1,250 in his

account with them. Having thus paid the bill which the Defendant was expected to pay, the Plaintiff brought the suit out of which this second appeal

arises to recover that sum from him. The suit was resisted on the ground that there was no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the

Defendant and that in any case the suit was barred by limitation, instituted as it was on March 14, 1957, beyond three years from the date of the

invoice. The trial Court dismissed the suit accepting the defence on both the points. The lower appellate Court reversed that decree, it being of the

view that privity of contract between the parties was established and that the suit was saved from limitation by Madras Act V of 1954 as amended

by Act I of 1955. The lower appellate Court gave a further finding that even if there was no privity of contract, the Defendant who had taken the

benefit out of the supply of parts and the effecting of repairs, should make good the same to the Plaintiff on the basis of quantum meruit. From the

decree of the lower appellate Court the Defendant has appealed.

On the question of limitation which has been argued for the Appellant, there is no doubt that the lower appellate Court came to the correct

conclusion, though, of course, the reason on which it is based cannot be supported. It took the view that the Plaintiff was, under the provisions of

Madras Act V of 1954 entitled to add on to the period of limitation under the Limitation Act 1 year 6 months and 26 days. It apparently

overlooked that the cause of action for the suit, namely, the invoice and adjustment, dated March 15, 1954 arose subsequent to February 5, 1954,

when the Madras Act v. of 1954 came into force. To such a case the benefit of adding the period to the limitation does not enure. This is the view

taken by a division bench of this Court in Bichal Naidu Vs. S.K. Muthuramalingam and Another, .

All the same the conclusion of the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation can be supported under the provisions of Madras Act 1 of

1955. This Act provided for splitting up in effect the integrity of a debt and payment thereof by four annual instalments the first of such instalment

becoming due on July 1, 1955, and barring the institution of a suit for recovery of each instalment before the date on which it is payable under the

statutory provision. Once the integrity of the debt is so split up, it is then impossible to apply limitation on the basis of the original cause of action

for the debt. In such a case each instalment constitutes a fresh cause of action so that the creditor will have a new start of limitation from the date

from which each of the instalments is made payable. This view is supported by the decision in Bichal Naidu Vs. S.K. Muthuramalingam and

Another, , where the learned Judges held:

But where a special enactment, which is invested with a overriding power with regard so any other law, creates this effect of a liability to pay the

debt only in installments, it is reasonable interpretation to hold that each installment will furnish a distinct cause of action. At least for the purpose of

limitation, and the right to sue, the integrality of the debt must thus be held severed into distinct parts.

Applying this principle, the suit in the instant case was in time.

Nextly it is contended for the Appellant that the lower appellate Court was wrong in holding that there was privity of contract between the

Plaintiff and the Defendant. But on the view I take of the Defendant''s liability, it is unnecessary to deal with either the question of privity of

contract, or to base the demandant''s liability on the doctrine of quantum meruit. On the fact''s, as I mentioned, it was at the request of the

Defendant the Plaintiff secured services of Messrs. Parry and Company to supply the parts to the Defendant and effect repairs to his engine. The

liability for the parts supplied and the repairs done was clearly on the Defendant. But what was payable by the Defendant had been collected by

Parry and Company from the Plaintiff because he also happened to be the distributor. In such circumstances, the Defendant was enriched at the

expense of the Plaintiff. Applying the doctrine of unjustified enrichment, the Defendant should be held liable to make good to the Plaintiff the

amount which Messrs. Parry and Company had recovered from him. On this basis the lower appellate Court''s decree is upheld.

The second appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave.