Ravindra Kumar Dhar Dubey vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Heard Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Gagan Tiwari, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for respondents No. 1 to 5.

This appeal is presented against an order dated 16.06.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (Cr.) No. 157 of 2021.

The question that had fallen for consideration before the learned Single Judge was recorded as follows:

"10. In the aforementioned facts of the case, the question for consideration is whether after dismissal of complaint case by CJM, recording a finding that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding which was not disturbed till proceeding before High Court, registration of FIR on the same allegations before another police station will be sustainable or not ?"

The learned Single Judge had taken note of the decisions in Pramatha Nath Taluqqdar vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, reported in AIR 1962 SC 876, Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. Kali Singh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 57 and Mahesh Chand vs. B. Janardhan Reddy & Another, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 734, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, i.e., where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd or unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings.

The present appellant is the respondent No. 6 in the writ petition.

At paragraphs 15 and 17, the learned Single Judge observed as follows:

"15. Perusal of the written report filed before the police station Bhatgaon, district Surajpur on 23.01.2013, complaint case filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Surajpur of not registering FIR on the complaint dated 23.01.2013 and the contents of FIR lodged based on the complaint dated 10.08.2020 would show that allegations and facts are one and the same. There is no mention of additional fact or any exceptional circumstances rising for lodging subsequent FIR before the police station. In fact, bare reading of the contents of FIR in question would show that Respondent No. 6 has not mentioned about lodging of earlier report before police station Bhatgaon, filing the complaint case before the judicial Magistrate and its dismissal, dismissal of revision by Sessions Judge challenging the order of dismissal of complaint case and further the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition filed before High Court challenging order of revision was dismissed as withdrawn. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal reported in (1992) Suppl. (1) SCC 335 has laid down certain principles for quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings wherein the grounds under which the interference can be made has held that, High Courts in the interest of justice can pass such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

As no exceptional circumstances are mentioned in the FIR, contrary Respondent No. 6 has suppressed the earlier proceedings which travelled upto High Court and respondent lost in all forums, was material fact. In the opinion of this Court, lodging of FIR on same facts, and absence of any new material or exceptional circumstance will fall within the category of abuse of process of law. Hence, I am of the considered view that the course adopted by Respondent No.6 of filing report again in the year 2020 before another police station suppressing the material facts of dismissal of criminal complaint case on same allegations in the year 2014 which was maintained upto High Court, is an abuse of process of law."

Mr. Agrawal submits that an application being Cr.M.P. No. 503 of 2015, filed before this Court, was disposed of with liberty to approach appropriate authority in accordance with law, and therefore, the filing of the FIR is justified.

The allegations made by the appellant, in short, is that he was lured by the writ petitioners, who are his near relatives with promise of monetary benefits as well as transfer of land in his name, to donate a kidney to the writ petitioner No. 1 and subsequently, they have resiled from such promise and had sold the land for which a Will was executed in his favour.

Assuming that after dismissal of the complaint, a further complaint before an appropriate authority is maintainable, such complaint has to be filed before the appropriate authority as defined in Section 2(b) of the Transplantation of Human Organ and Tissues Act, 1994 (for short, 'Act of 1994') and it is only the appropriate authority under Section 22(1) of the Act of 1994, who can file a compliant in a Court of law. Section 13 of the Act of 1994 provides for appointment of one or more officers as appropriate authorities.

In view of the above, we find no good ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge and accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.