RAVINDER SINGH vs Maharishi Dayanand University

1. AS per majority We do not find any illegality or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the State Commission. Hence, this Revision Petition is dismissed.

MINORITY view, I do not agree with above order. In my dissenting order in Chairman, Board of Examinations, Madras v. Mohldeen Abdul Kader, (Revision Petition No. 545 of 1994) I have observed that education is a composite activity consisting of several components such as admission to educational institutions, teaching and instruction, holding of examinations, evaluation of performance of students in the courses they have undergone, declaration of results, issuance of certificates/diplomas of achievements and mark-sheets etc. which require payment of prescribed fees (consideration) by the candidates/students to the designated educational institutions unless specified as ''free'' and that therefore the issue whether any component is a service under the Consumer Protection Act, cannot be delinked from the broader issue whether education is a service under the Consumer Protection Act and also that these two issues should be examined in an integrated way. I have also pointed out in the abovesaid case that so far the National Commission has not made such an integrated analysis of these inseparable set of issues. I have argued there that the definition of ''Consumer'', ''service'' and ''deficiency'' in the Consumer Protection Act has wide scopes of interpretation and that the words "any service for a consideration" in the definition of consumer in the Act point to the generally non-restrictive nature of the said definition in relation to service. Similarly, the words ''avails of" in Section 2(l)(d)(ii) as alternative to ''hires'' in the same section as also the words "has been undertaken to be performed in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service" in Section 2(1)(g) have the effect of bringing under the purview of the Consumer Forum, services rendered by bodies like Universities which are established for rendering specified services and which services are availed of for a consideration, even in the absence of any contract per se to hire such services. In this connection, I have also drawn on the observations of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, 1986-95 Consumer 278 (NC) and in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & Ors., 1986-95 SCC Suppl. 1569 (NS) After pointing out that the definition of ''Service'' in the Consumer Protection Act is in three parts, the Supreme Court observed in the former case.

"The main part is followed by inclusive clause and ends by enclusionary clause. The main clause is itself very wide. It applies to any service made available to potential users. The words ''any'' and ''potential'' are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word ''any'' dictionary means "one or some or all". In Black''s Law Dictionary it is explained thus, "word any" has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate all or ''every'' as well as ''some'' or ''one'' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute". The use of the word any in the context it has been used in Clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all. Referring to the inclusive part of the definition, the Supreme Court observed in the above said case. "The inclusive clause succeeded in widening its scope but not exhausting the services which could be covered in earlier part. So any service except when it is free of charge or under a contract of personal service is included in it". The Supreme Court also made observations in the same case on the larger issue whether the public authorities under different enactments are amenable to jurisdiction under the Act. Referring to the arguments placed before them in that case that the local authorities or Government bodies develop land and construct houses in the discharge of their statutory functions and that therefore they could not be subjected to the provisions of the Act, the Court held: "In fact the Act requires the provider of service to be more objective and care taking. It is still more in public services."

"Any attempt, therefore to exclude services offered by statutory or official bodies to the common man would be against the provisions of the Act and the spirit behind it."

THE Consumer Protection Act is an important social welfare legislation aiming to provide for the better protection of the interests of Consumers. Consumer legislation in India is in a evolutionary stage and it is only in November, 1995 that the Supreme Court has said the final word on the applicability of the Act to consumers of medical services. A positive approach is needed interpreting the provisions of the Act to capture to a maximum extent the spirit underlying the enactment to render natural justice to consumers and also to make those rendering these services accountable. In the result, I have concluded in the adoresaid case that the answer to the basic question whether education is a service under the purview of the Act is in the affirmative and the answer to specific questions such as whether holding of examinations, declaration of results etc. is a service is also in the affirmative, these specific issues being operational aspects of the basic matter. Flowing from the above, I am of the view that in the instant case, the Revision Petitioner is a ''consumer'' and can seek redressal under the Consumer Protection Act.

REVISION dismissed as per majority view. REVISION dismissed. ________________