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Judgment
P.K. Bhasin, J.—This petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is for quashing of FIR No. 162/2006 registered on 01.08.2006 at Police Station Tughlak Road under Sections 193/200/420/477 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. Petitioner No. 1 is the accused and petitioner No. 2 is the complainant at whose instance the said FIR was registered and which has now led to the filing of the charge-sheet also in the concerned Court against petitioner No. 1 - accused for the commission of aforesaid offences The complainant has joined the accused in this petition since a settlement has been arrived at between them in respect of the dispute which had led to the lodging of the complaint with the police by the complainant-petitioner No. 2 and that dispute was the non-performance of an agreement to sell executed by petitioner No. 1 and his deceased father in respect of their share in an immovable property in favour of petitioner No. 2.
The relevant facts leading to the registration of the criminal case against petitioner No. 1 are that his father (who is dead now) and his father''s brother (who is also now no more in this world) had inherited one leasehold property situated at Amrita Shergill Marg, New Delhi after the death of their father who had been allotted that property on lease-hold basis by the L&DO. Some built up portion of that property was let out by the two brothers to some tenants and the remaining portion was being enjoyed by the families of the two deceased brothers as per some family arrangement. The father of petitioner No. 1 had made an HUF in respect of his 50% share in the said property. At sometime that HUF was dissolved and after the death of the mother of petitioner No. 1 he and his deceased father became entitled to 1/2 share each in respect of the 50% share and their names were substituted in the records of L&DO in the year 2000 in respect of that 50% share. In respect of the tenanted portion of the share of petitioner No. 1 and his deceased father both of them entered into an agreement to sell with the petitioner No. 2, which a private limited Company, on 28/12/2002. However, before a formal sale deed could be executed in favour of petitioner No. 2 the father of petitioner No. 1 died and petitioner No. 1 became sole owner of the entire 50% share in the aforesaid property and he got mutation done in his name in the records of the L&DO in respect of the share which he had with his deceased father and in respect of which they had already executed an agreement to sell in favour of petitioner No. 2. It appears that petitioner No. 1 refused to perform his part under the agreement to sell in favour of petitioner No. 2 even after having received the entire sale consideration, which according to the complainant was done due to escalation in the value of the property in question during all these years, and that led to the registration of an FIR, referred to already and which is now sought to be quashed through the present petition, against petitioner No. 1 on the complaint of petitioner No. 2 as also to the institution of a suit for specific performance of contract by petitioner No. 2 against petitioner No. 1. In the FIR various kinds of allegations were levelled against petitioner No. 1 which constituted different offences under IPC. One of the allegations against the petitioner No. 1 was that he had furnished a false affidavit in the office of L&DO claiming that his father had died intestate and had accordingly got the entire 50% share mutated in his own when, in fact, he knew that his father had executed a Will in respect of his share in favour of one of the Directors of the complainant Company and thereby he had committed an offence punishable u/s 477 IPC.
While the matter was being investigated by the police and the suit for specific performance of contract was also pending in Court the complainant Company and petitioner No. 1, who was the sole accused as per the FIR, arrived at an amicable settlement terms whereof were reduced into writing in the form a Memorandum of Understanding dated 1st December, 2006 executed by the two petitioners herein and one of the Directors of the complainant Company in whose favour the deceased father of petitioner No. 1 had allegedly executed a Will in respect of his share in the property in question. Copy of that MOU has been annexed with this petition as Annexure P-2. In view of the settlement between the parties the suit for specific performance (being CS(OS) No. 668/2005) has already been disposed off by this Court on 8th December, 2006 in terms of the compromise between the parties. This petition was filed on 5th December, 2006 for quashing of the FIR registered against petitioner No. 1. I was informed during the course of hearing that challan under Sections 200/181/193/420/477 IPC has also been submitted in the concerned Court against petitioner No. 1.
In support of the prayer for quashing of the FIR Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior Counsel placed reliance upon one judgment of a Single Bench this Court in G. Udayan Dravid and Ors. v. State and Ors. 2007(I) AD (Del) 376 wherein FIR under Sections 406/420/120B I.P.C. was quashed relying upon the settlement arrived at between the complainant bank and the borrower-accused. It was observed in that judgment that since no public money was involved in the transaction between the parties and the parties had compromised the matter the FIR deserved to be quashed.
Notice of this joint petition was given to the State. Learned APP for the State strongly opposed quashing of the FIR and the charge-sheet on the ground that allegations against the petitioner No. 1 are grave in nature and one of the offences being u/s 477 I.P.C. for which even life imprisonment can be awarded to the accused on conviction are not compoundable u/s 320 Cr.P.C. and this Court by exercising the inherent jurisdiction vested in it u/s 482 Cr.P.C. should not accept the prayer of the petitioners. In support of this submission one judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as 2003 SCC 1238, "Inspector of Police, CBI v. B. Raja Gopal and Ors." was also relied upon by the learned APP.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the aspect of seriousness of the offences under which the petitioner No. 1 - accused has been charged submitted that even in respect of the offences for which even life imprisonment can be awarded like the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 467 I.P.C. not only this Court has in many cases quashed FIRs and the criminal proceedings arising therefrom but even the Apex Court has been quashing FIRs even in respect of such serious offences when the complainant party and the accused arrived at settlement in respect of the controversy between them which had led to the registration of criminal cases against the accused persons which in any case are triable by a Magistrate only and, therefore, have been quashed in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties even in cases where the offences under which the accused was charged were serious in nature. It was also submitted that in the present case government has not been cheated by the mutation of the property in the name of petitioner No. 1. He was already one of the recorded owners and after the death of his father his name came to be recorded as the sole owner thereof and L & DO is not complaining that any fraud had been played with the department by petitioner No. 1.
It is now well settled by many decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court that criminal proceedings even in respect of those offences which are not compoundable u/s 320 Cr.P.C. can be quashed if it is felt by the Court while dealing with a quashing petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. that it would secure the ends of justice if the criminal proceedings are quashed and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law. Reference in this regard can be made to one of the judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court which is reported as B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, wherein it has been so held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Reference can also be made usefully to another judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Nalini Shankaran and Ors. v. Neelkanth Mahadeo Kamble and Ors. 2007 (2) Crimes 329 wherein the criminal proceedings were quashed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in respect of an offence u/s 409 IPC which can attract punishment of life imprisonment also, because of the settlement of the dispute. Even this Court has also been quashing FIRs/criminal proceedings even in respect of the offences which are punishable with imprisonment upto life like offence u/s 467 IPC. One of such judgments of this Court is reported as 2006 (2) JCC 1127, "Sanjay Goel and Ors. v. The State" wherein this Court had quashed the FIR after some settlement between the complainant and the accused. As far as the judgment relied upon by the learned APP is concerned I am of the view that the same does not help him because in that case public money was involved and so it was held in the facts of that case that even if the accused had repaid the bank''s dues criminal proceedings of that case should not have been quashed by the High Court. In the present case, no public money is involved L&DO. As noticed already, has not raised any grievance because of the petitioner No. 1 having got his name substituted in its records in place of his deceased father. Even the beneficiary of the Will executed by the father of petitioner No. 1 has not felt aggrieved by that act of the petitioner No. 1 in getting his name substituted in the records of L&DO in place of his deceased father by representing there that his father had not left behind any Will. So, in these circumstances the State''s opposition to the quashing of the criminal proceedings in the present case does not appear to be justified. In the afore-said circumstances, continuation of the criminal proceedings in respect of FIR No. 162/2006 would definitely amount to abuse of process of law when the dispute arising out of an agreement to sell between the vendor and the vendee stands compromised and even the civil litigation between them stands concluded because of that compromise.
I, therefore, allow this petition and quash the FIR No. 162/2006 registered at Tuglak Road police station as well as the criminal proceedings arising therefrom as a result of filing of the charge-sheet in Court.