Ravi Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been instituted by the petitioner assailing the legality, correctness and propriety of the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the learned 25th Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur in Sessions Trial No. 537/2016, whereby the petitioner has been summoned as an additional accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The factual background giving rise to the present petition reveals that a criminal case was registered in relation to diversion and misappropriation of essential commodities under the Public Distribution System. As per the prosecution case, on 09.11.2014, a consignment comprising 100 sacks of wheat weighing approximately 50.63 quintals was shown to have been issued in favour of Government Fair Price Shop No.

However, during inspection and inquiry, the said consignment was found at a location wholly unconnected with the designated distribution channel, thereby clearly indicating that the wheat had been diverted from its intended destination. The prosecution case further discloses that such diversion was not accidental or incidental but was facilitated through preparation of false and fabricated documents because no such order/challan to supply wheat was issued, thereby creating a misleading record of lawful supply while actually enabling unlawful storage and intended black-marketing of essential commodities.

The petitioner, at the relevant time, was functioning as District Manager in the Madhya Pradesh State Civil Supplies Corporation and was responsible for supervision and regulation of the distribution mechanism under the Public Distribution System. Although the petitioner was not initially arrayed as an accused in the charge-sheet filed upon completion of investigation, the evidence that surfaced during trial, including documentary material and statements of prosecution witnesses, led to the filing of an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., which came to be allowed by the learned trial Court, resulting in summoning of the petitioner as an additional accused. The impugned order reflects that the learned trial Court, upon detailed consideration of the evidence on record, found that sufficient material existed indicating the petitioner’s involvement in the alleged offence.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has advanced elaborate submissions assailing the impugned order by contending that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is of an exceptional and extraordinary nature, which cannot be invoked in a routine or casual manner and must be exercised only upon satisfaction of a high evidentiary threshold. It is argued that the petitioner was not charge-sheeted after full-fledged investigation conducted by the competent investigating agency, and therefore, summoning him at a subsequent stage requires evidence of such a compelling and unimpeachable nature that it leaves no room for doubt regarding his involvement, a requirement which, according to the petitioner, remains wholly unfulfilled in the present case.

It is further contended that the material relied upon by the trial Court does not disclose any direct or overt act attributable to the petitioner and that the entire case against him rests upon assumptions arising from his official position as District Manager. The petitioner submits that criminal liability cannot be fastened merely on the basis of administrative responsibility or supervisory control unless there is clear evidence of intentional participation or conscious complicity in the alleged act more than prima facie case. In this regard, it is urged that the evidence relied upon by the trial Court is at best circumstantial and does not form a complete or unbroken chain pointing towards guilt.

In support of these submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Surinderjit Singh Mand and another v. State of Punjab and another (2016) 8 SCC 722, Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab and others (2014) 3 SCC 92, Sagar vs State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2022) 6 SCC 389, N. Manogar and another vs Inspector of Police and others (2024) 16 SCC 706 and S.C. Garg vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 791. It is submitted that these judgments collectively lay down that the satisfaction required for invoking Section 319 Cr.P.C. is more than prima facie and must be based on strong and cogent evidence appearing during trial, and that such power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and only when the evidence is of such quality that it would reasonably lead to conviction if left unrebutted. It is further urged that the inherent powers of this Court ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law where the continuation of proceedings is not supported by legally sustainable material.

7 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the petition by contending that the impugned order has been passed after due consideration of evidence that has emerged during trial and reflects a proper and reasoned exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the material on record, including the inquiry report prepared by the Civil Supplies Corporation and the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, clearly indicate that the diversion of wheat was not an isolated or accidental occurrence but was the result of coordinated actions involving preparation of false documents and manipulation of the distribution process. It is further contended that the petitioner, being the District Manager, played a pivotal role in the issuance of documents and oversight of distribution, and the evidence on record reveals his involvement in the chain of events leading to diversion of essential commodities.

It is also argued that the scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and that this Court ought not to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own satisfaction for that of the trial Court, particularly when the trial Court has recorded its satisfaction on the basis of material which has come on record during trial proceedings.

Upon thoughtful consideration of the rival submissions and meticulous examination of the record, this Court finds that the controversy essentially revolves around the proper application of the principles governing the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The law in this regard has been comprehensively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh (supra), wherein it has been held that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary but is intended to ensure that the real perpetrator of an offence does not escape the process of law merely because he was not named in the charge-sheet. The Apex Court clarified that though the degree of satisfaction required is higher than that at the stage of framing of charge, it does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the Court must assess whether the evidence on record indicates involvement to a degree that warrants trial.

The subsequent pronouncement in Sagar (supra) further reinforces the principle that while the power must be exercised with caution, it cannot be rendered ineffective by an overly restrictive interpretation. The Court emphasized that the criminal justice system must remain responsive to evidence that surfaces during trial, and where such evidence points towards involvement of a person, the Court is under a legal obligation to ensure that such person is brought within the fold of trial.

Similarly, in N. Manogar (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that the satisfaction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. must be based on evidence that has emerged during trial and not on conjectures, but at the same time acknowledged that such evidence may be direct or circumstantial, provided it is credible and capable of supporting the inference of involvement. The judgment does not mandate that only direct evidence can justify summoning; rather, it recognizes that a coherent chain of circumstances, supported by testimony, may suffice.

In S.C. Garg (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court delineated the contours of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and emphasized that such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where there is a clear abuse of process or absence of material justifying continuation of proceedings.

As per the inquiry report conducted by the department, it has been found that on 09.11.2014 the petitioner, along with transporter Ankit Pandey and other co-accused persons, prepared false and fabricated documents showing supply of 100 sacks of wheat weighing 50.63 quintals through Tata-407 bearing registration No. MP-20-GA-3038 to Government Fair Price Shop No. 398, whereas in reality the said stock was diverted for black-marketing and stored at an unauthorized place. The seized wheat, admittedly part of the Public Distribution System, was thus misappropriated by not being delivered to the designated fair price shop and instead an attempt was made to dispose of the same to unauthorized persons. The report further records the active cooperation of co-accused Arpit Jaiswal and Sachin Gupta, and also attributes responsibility to the vehicle owner and driver. It is specifically concluded that the acts of the petitioner constitute clear violations of Clause 6(4) of the Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2001 and Clause 7(2), (7)(9) of the M.P. Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2009, as well as Conditions No. 5, 6, 13 and 14 of the licence, thereby attracting penal consequences under Section 11 of the said Orders and Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

The report also highlights that although the petitioner, in his capacity as District Manager, had issued the allotment order for November 2014 and appointed Ankit Pandey for transportation of food grains, no instructions were given to deliver the consignment to Fair Price Shop No. 398, despite issuance entries being made in its name, and the stock was ultimately recovered from an illegal location, clearly indicating a premeditated conspiracy to siphon off ration wheat from the godown.

It is further noted that the petitioner, being responsible for ensuring proper delivery of food grains under the Public Distribution System, failed to discharge his duty. The findings of the inquiry report stand corroborated by the statements of prosecution witnesses Sanjeev Agarwal (PW-1) and Arun Kumar Jain (PW-2), both of whom have supported the report before the trial Court, and (PW-2 has specifically stated that despite sufficient incriminating material, the petitioner was not charge-sheeted during investigation. The learned trial Court, upon considering the said material, has recorded a reasoned finding that sufficient evidence, exceeding a mere prima facie case, exists for taking cognizance against the petitioner, and that the inquiry report (Exhibit- P/1), duly supported by oral evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, constitutes adequate material to proceed against him.

Upon a meticulous consideration of the record, this Court finds that the foundation of the impugned order rests substantially upon the detailed inquiry report prepared by the Civil Supplies Corporation, which has been exhibited before the learned trial Court as Exhibit- P/1. The evidentiary value of this report cannot be viewed in isolation or as a mere administrative exercise; rather, it constitutes a structured fact-finding document which has subsequently been reinforced by oral evidence led during trial by PW-1 and PW-2. The report, when read conjointly with the depositions of prosecution witnesses, reveals a coherent and consistent narrative that directly implicates the petitioner in a deliberate and coordinated act of diversion of essential commodities under the Public Distribution System.

The findings further disclose that the wheat seized from the unauthorized location was part of the Public Distribution System stock, thereby leaving no ambiguity that the commodities in question were meant for regulated public supply. The preparation of false documents under the conspiracy coupled with the absence of actual delivery, demonstrates a calculated misuse of the distribution mechanism.

The report also highlights the administrative role of the petitioner in the distribution chain. It records that the petitioner had issued the licence for distribution of food grains from the godown to fair price shops within Jabalpur City under the Public Distribution System scheme and had appointed Ankit Pandey as proprietor for transportation of food grains from the Civil Supplies Corporation godown to the fair price shops. This position of authority carried with it a corresponding duty to ensure that the distribution process was conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed norms. The report unequivocally concludes that the petitioner not only failed to discharge this responsibility and instead facilitated or permitted the diversion of essential commodities through manipulation of records.

Insofar as the reliance placed by the petitioner on Surinderjit Singh Mand (supra) is concerned, the said judgment lays down that protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is available only when the act complained of has a reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duty and not where the act is wholly illegal or in abuse of authority. The Supreme Court clarified that such protection cannot be extended to acts which are not part of legitimate official functions. Applying the said principle to the present case, the allegations relating to preparation of fake documents and diversion of Public Distribution System wheat cannot be treated as acts done in discharge of official duty, and therefore, the reliance on the said judgment does not aid the petitioner.

The learned trial Court, while passing the impugned order, has taken into consideration the entirety of this material and has arrived at a conclusion that more than a prima facie case exists against the petitioner for taking cognizance under the relevant statutory provisions. The satisfaction recorded by the trial Court is not perfunctory but is based on a reasoned evaluation of the inquiry report, documentary evidence and oral testimonies. The trial Court has correctly appreciated that the evidence on record is sufficient to indicate the petitioner’s involvement in the alleged offences and warrants his prosecution.

In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law and is supported by sufficient material which is more than prima facie available on record that has emerged during trial. The principles laid down in the judgments relied upon by the petitioner, when applied to the facts of the present case, do not render the impugned order unsustainable rather support the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court. The petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.