AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Per Kavitha Rajagopal, J M:
This appeal is filed by the assessee, challenging the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [‘Ld. CIT(A)’ for short], passed u/s. 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act', for short), pertaining to the Assessment Year (‘A.Y.’ for short) 2024-25.
The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:-
“1.That the order passed by the Learned Joint Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Raipur ['Ld. CIT(A)'] under sec. 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act') is bad in law and is liable to be set aside.
2.That the Ld. CIT(A) has erred In law and on facts in denying condonation of the marginal delay of three days and consequently dismissing the appeal in limine without appreciating the reasons for the delay and merits of the case.
2.1.That the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts by completely overlooking the details substantiating the sufficient cause for the marginal delay.
2.2.That the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law by failing to appreciate the settled judicial precedents wherein it has been consistently held that delay should be liberally condoned when sufficient cause is shown, particularly when the conduct of the Appellant is bona fide and delay is due to the circumstances beyond the control of the Appellant.
2.3.That the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law in placing reliance on judicial precedents involving substantial and inordinate delays, without appreciating that the present case Involves only a marginal delay of three days.
3.That the Income Tax Department, Learned Centralized Processing Centre, Bengaluru ('CPC') erred in law and on facts by not appreciating the provision of sec. 11 of the Act.”
The brief facts are that the assessee Trust had filed its return of income dated 11.11.2024 for the year under consideration declaring the total income at ‘nil’ claiming exemption u/s 11 of the Act. The return was processed u/s 143(1) of the Act and the CPC, vide order dated 29.01.2025, assessed the income at Rs.1,53,11,460/- as against the returned income resulting in demand. The assessee was in appeal before the First Appellate Authority challenging the order passed by the CPC u/s 143(1) of the Act. The Ld. CIT(A), vide order dated 23.01.2026, dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee in limine without condoning the delay of 3 days in filing the first appeal beyond the period of limitation on the ground that the assessee has failed to explain that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for the delay. Aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before us challenging the impugned order of the Ld.CIT(A).
We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The Ld. AR for the assessee Trust contended that due to certain technical issue on the income-tax e-portal, the assessee was unable to file the appeal within the period of limitation and had also raised a grievance on the income-tax e-portal on 28.02.2025 along with the screenshot. Further, the Ld. AR stated that the assessee had filed an application for condonation of delay before the Ld.CIT(A) stating that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for filing the appeal with a delay of three days, but, the same was not considered by the Ld.CIT(A). The Ld. AR prayed that the assessee will be greatly prejudiced if the appeal is not being adjudicated as the merits are in favour of the assessee. The Ld. DR, on the other hand, had nothing to controvert and relied on the order of the Ld.CIT(A).
It is observed that the assessee had challenged the intimation passed u/s 143(1) of the Act by the CPC before the Ld.CIT(A), which appeal was filed with a delay of three days. The Ld.CIT(A) had failed to consider the assessee’s submission explaining the cause for the said delay which was due to the technical glitches in filing the appeal in the income-tax e-portal. Before us, the Ld. AR had filed the screenshot along with the grievance raised by the assessee that it was unable to file Form No.35 within the due date prescribed by law. The Ld.CIT(A) rejected the assessee’s contention that the same amounts to ‘sufficient cause’ and dismissed the appeal in limine without getting into the merits of the case. This approach of the Ld.CIT(A) in dismissing the assessee’s appeal on the sole ground of a marginal delay of merely three days is wholly unjustified, hyper technical and contrary to the settled principles governing the condonation of delay. The assessee had satisfactorily explained that the delay occurred was due to the bona fide technical difficulties in filing the appeal electronically which was neither deliberate inaction or with any mala fide intention to delay the proceedings. The Ld.CIT(A) ought to have adopted a justice-oriented approach in examining whether there was a ‘sufficient cause’ for the delay, but, rather, the Ld.CIT(A) chose to reject the appeal at the threshold, thereby depriving the assessee of valuable statutory right of appeal without adjudicating the issue on merits. It is the settled principle of law that procedural rules are intended to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the substantive rights as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition vs Mst. Katiji, (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), which has categorically held that a liberal approach should be given while considering the application for condonation of delay, so that substantial justice prevails over technical defects. We, therefore, deem it fit to hold that the impugned order of the Ld.CIT(A) refusing to condone an insignificant delay of three days despite a plausible explanation and dismissing the appeal in limine defeats the very objective of the appellate remedy reflecting inconsistency with the principles of natural justice. We, therefore, deem it fit to set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and remand the issue back to the file of the Ld.CIT(A) with the direction to adjudicate the issue denovo on the merits and in accordance with law after duly condoning the delay and giving sufficient opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The grounds raised by the assessee are hereby allowed for statistical purpose.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is hereby allowed for statistical purpose.