AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
HARMEET SINGH DEOL, J.
| FIR No. | Dated | Police Station | Sections |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | 26.03.2022 | Bhikhiwind | 22-C of NDPS Act |
Seeking issuance of appropriate directions in the nature of certiorari for quashing of impugned rejection order dated 26.06.2026 (Annexure P-8), whereby the respondent-authorities have rejected the petitioner’s application for parole, the petitioner who has been convicted in the FIR captioned above, has come up before this Court by filing the present petition under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India.
Perusal of the file shows that petitioner has filed an appeal against conviction before this Court bearing number CRA-D-229-2025, which has been admitted by this Court.
Petitioner’s counsel submits that his request for parole was rejected vide order dated 26.06.2026 on the ground that if petitioner is released on parole he may indulge in selling of drugs and weapons from Pakistan and there may be a risk of disruption in State’s security and maintenance of public order.
Petitioner is challenging impugned order dated 26.06.2026 on the grounds that same is non speaking order and not based on valid justification for rejecting the case of the petitioner. It is asserted that his conduct during incarceration has been reported to be good and there is no allegation of mis-conduct while in jail. It is asserted that accused was never involved in any activities, which may cause disturbance to the public peace/order or security. It is asserted that petitioner has been falsely involved in present FIR and his appeal is still pending and, therefore, the impugned order declining parole is liable to be set-aside.
Counsel for the State by making reference to reply dated 10.08.2026 opposes the prayer of parole.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Facts noted above are not in dispute in the present case. The case of petitioner for release of parole has been declined on the ground that if the petitioner is released on parole, he may indulge in selling of drugs and weapons and may disturb public peace/order or security. However, respondents have failed to justify conclusion drawn by the Deputy Commissioner, Tarn Taran, as to on what basis it can be considered that petitioner will indulge in selling of drugs resulting to pose a threat to the State’s security.
In ‘Narinder Singh @ Nindi Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., 2020 (2) DC (Narcotics) 253, provisions of 1962 Act were held to be beneficial in nature and were held to be aimed at reformation and rehabilitation of the prisoners. Parole is granted not only in an emergent situation but also for purpose of socializing with family members. It is necessary for a convict to maintain a contact with society which will facilitate his reformation and absorption in society after his release.
Manner in which authorities are required to record satisfaction of danger to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order is not res integra. In ‘Jassa Singh @ Jassa Vs. State of Punjab’ 2016 (5) RCR (Criminal) 522 a Division Bench of this Court had observed as under:-
“…….For reaching satisfaction of danger to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order there has to be material before the District Magistrate, for consideration as to whether the release of a prisoner would be a threat to either or both of them. Parole cannot be denied and in fact is not liable to be denied on mere generalization by recording that generally it has been seen that prisoners on release generally engage themselves in smuggling activities causing danger to security of the country and contraband are again recovered from them. This can be ensured by asking the petitioner/prisoner to execute necessary bonds that while on parole he would maintain good behavior and will not indulge in any smuggling activities, besides, asking him to furnish heavy surety.”
Similarly in “Bansi Lal Versus State of Punjab and others”, 2016 (4) RCR (Criminal) 1017, this Court had also observed as under: -
15.The term ‘Security of the State’ out of the expressions of ‘law and order’, and ‘public order’ is considered more grave. It may arise from within or outside the State. It is generally understood as an act of aggression from outside, or militant and terrorists operations engineered by foreign agencies. It can also be effected by passing of classified information like documents, secrets, maps etc. to foreign countries or through undesirable foreign links. An act which poses a threat to the State is to be considered as a threat affecting the security of the State. ‘Public order’, however, is synonymous with public safety. It is something more than mere law and order. Every breach of peace does not lead to public disorder. Maintenance of public order is intended to prevent grave public disorder, which is not the same as maintenance of law and order. The latter is comparatively of a lesser gravity and in fact of local significance. An act which does not affect the public at large or has no impact on it, is not to be taken as an act affecting maintenance of public order. The distinction between law and order and public order is one of degree and extent of reach of the act in question on society. In the case of breach of law and order it affects individuals directly involved as distinct from the public at large. This would raise a law and order problem only. The true test is the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect some individuals and local persons while another though of a similar nature may impact the public at large. An act which disturbs the even tempo of life of the public at large affects the maintenance of public order. These aspects are to be considered by the concerned District Magistrates and competent authorities under Act while deciding to recommend or not to recommend the temporary release of a prisoner on parole and/or passing orders for temporary release by the competent authorities under the Act. The exercise is not to be lightly conducted and the concerned District Magistrate and/or the competent authorities are to apply their mind on the basis of inputs received by them for recommending or passing an order as the case may be for temporary release of prisoners on parole.”
On consideration of present case, we find that no such satisfaction has been recorded by Deputy Commissioner, Tarn Taran, as to justify conclusion noted in impugned order dated 26.06.2026. There is no material to indicate that if the petitioner is released on parole, he will indulge in drug and weapon selling activities which can pose a threat to the State’s security. The apprehension expressed by authorities vide impugned order dated 26.06.2026 is without any basis and result of surmises and conjectures. The grounds for rejection of parole are not well founded.
Accordingly, petition is allowed.
Impugned order dated 26.06.2026 (Annexure P-8) is set-aside. The authorities are directed to again consider the application of the petitioner in accordance with rules and if he is entitled to parole, the reasoning given, shall not be made unless it is substantiated by the investigation and other materials. The application be decided within 30 days from today. Pending applications if any, stand disposed of.