Rao Bahadur V. Ranganadham Chetty vs The Corporation of Madras

Pandrang Row, J.—The petitioner in this case, was convicted u/s 380 of the Madras City Municipal Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.

10 and in default of payment to undergo simple imprisonment for one week. The charge against him was that he failed to comply with a certain

notice issued by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Madras u/s 217 of the Madras City Municipal Act. The notice Ex. A-2 is dated 3rd

June, 1936 and it appears to have been served on the petitioner on the 6th July, 1936. It called upon the petitioner to alter a certain street which

had been laid out by him in R.S. No. 828/2 of Mylapore without the orders of the Standing Committee. It is admitted that this notice was not

obeyed and that what was required in that notice was not done by the petitioner either within the time allowed or till now. Disobedience therefore

to the notice is clearly established and as the notice was one which was issued subsequent to the coming into force of the Act amending the

Madras City Municipal Act (X of 1936) the new provision introduced by that Act as Sub-section 3 of Section 380 would apply to the present

case and the conviction would be proper unless as contended on behalf of the petitioner the notice itself was an illegal one and was issued without

any authority. The authority under which the notice was issued is stated to be Section 217 of the Act which says that:

If any person lays out or makes any street referred to in Section 216 without or otherwise than in conformity with the orders of the Standing

Committee the Commissioner may, by notice, require the offender to show sufficient cause why such a street should not be altered to the

satisfaction of the Commissioner

and so on Section 216 requires that:

Any person intending to lay out or make a new private street must send to the Commissioner a written application with plans and sections

showing certain particulars. Admittedly the provisions of this section, that is, Section 216 were not observed by the petitioner in this case, and

indeed it is his contention that he never intended to lay out or make a new private street at all. The question therefore resolves itself into this,

namely, whether, when the petitioner sold his land, that is, R.S. No. 828/2 of Mylapore in 1934to certain persons, he did intend to layout or make

a new private street. There is no doubt from the evidence that the land was parcelled out into as many as 12 plots for building purposes and sold to

four or five purchasers leaving a passage about twelve feet, in width. The petitioner himself in a letter of his dated 20th March, 1935, namely, Ex.

II says that he has sold the lands leaving twelve feet from north to south and eleven feet from east to west and adds that the rest has been sold

away. In his reply to a subsequent letter, namely, Ex. III-C, the petitioner says as follows:

The whole plot has been sold away leaving twelve feet of land in the middle for a lane.

It is therefore clear that the twelve feet passage was left for the purpose of forming a lane. The sale deeds themselves have not been produced

and it has not been shown that this twelve feet wide passage was included in any of the sale deeds. On the other hand from the admissions of D.W.

1 in cross-examination it would appear that the passage is not included in the area purchased by the purchasers and is not included in the pattas

issued in their names. Presumably therefore the title to this particular portion of land which was left to form a lane is still vested in the petitioner. The

learned advocate for the petitioner referred to Robinson v. Local Board for Barton (1882) 21 Ch. D. 621, but in a case of the present nature we

have to look more to the definition of the word ""street"", private or public, found in the Act itself rather than to English decisions as to the meaning

of the word ""street"". The definition in the Act itself is clear and it shows that the passage set apart in the present case for the purpose of a lane

would come under the definition of a street; it is not necessary that there should be rows of buildings on either side actually in existence before a

street comes into existence so far as the provisions of the City Municipal Act are concerned. It is therefore in my opinion impossible to say that

there was no street laid out in this case. It may be that nothing was done to the passage that was left to serve the purpose of a pathway. But

nonetheless what was done would amount to laying down a new private street. In these circumstances, as the other facts are admitted, namely, that

no plans were sent in respect of such a street and the street was laid out without the orders of the Standing Committee, the Commissioner was

entitled in law to issue the notice in question. The disobedience to the notice is admitted and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the

conviction of the petitioner is contrary to law. No complaint has been made about the severity of the sentence. The petition is therefore dismissed.