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Judgment
Ramesh Chander Dimri, J.
This judgment shall dispose of a Criminal Revision Petition filed against the judgment dated 16.07.2009 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, vide which an appeal filed by the petitioner/accused (for brevity ‘petitioner’) against the judgment of conviction dated 03.06.2005 and an order of sentence of that very date passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Rajpura (for brevity ‘Magistrate’) arising out of an FIR No.49 dated 23.03.1999 registered under Sections 279, 304-A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, ‘1860 Code’) at Police Station Dera Bassi, District Patiala [now in District SAS Nagar (Mohali)], thereby convicting and sentencing the petitioner for commission of offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of 1860 Code, was dismissed.
Prosecution case as contained in the statement Ex.PA of PW1 Harmesh Kumar is that on 23.03.1999 at about 05.30 pm, he and his nephew Jagpal Singh @ Pala son of Jasdev Ram, after doing their works of Carpenter and Electrician in Panchkula, were returning to their Village Mathiara. They both were on separate bicycles. At about 06.00 pm, when they were going on Kalka-Zirakpur road in the area of Village Dhakoli in front of Bolder Plant of one Jagjit Singh Gyani and the said Jagpal Singh @ Pala was little ahead of the said PW, from behind, a Haryana Roadways bus came at a very high speed. Its driver was driving it with carelessness. It hit the said Jagpal Singh @ Pala from behind because of which he fell on kachha portion of the road. The bus driver ran over the said Jagpal Singh @ Pala who was lying on kachha portion of the road with its front and rear tyres. When the said PW, after leaving his bicycle, went to rescue his nephew, he saw that he had died at the spot. Driver and conductor of the bus left it at the spot and fled away therefrom. The said PW could identify driver of the bus if he is brought before him. Registration number of the bus was HR-03-7620. Driver of the bus has killed nephew of the said PW by driving the bus at a very high speed, carelessly, rashly and negligently. His head was completely crushed. His bicycle has also been totally broken.
With the said material allegations in the said statement, the said PW prayed for registration of a case against driver of the said bus. After recording the said statement, PW6 ASI Pawan Kumar from Police Post Lohgarh recorded police proceedings thereon and sent the same to Police Station Dera Bassi for registration of a case. On the basis of said complaint/proceedings, an FIR No.49 dated 23.03.1999 under Sections 279, 304-A and 427 of the 1860 Code was registered at Police Station Dera Bassi. PW6 ASI Pawan Kumar inspected the place of occurrence and prepared a rough site plan. He took the said bus and bicycle in police possession. A photographer was called to the spot. He took its photographs from different angles. PW6 ASI Pawan Kumar prepared inquest proceedings at the spot and recorded statements of the witnesses under Section 175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘1973 Code’). Dead body, from the place of occurrence, was then sent to hospital for post-mortem examination. Autopsy on the dead body of the said Jagpal Singh @ Pala was conducted on 24.03.1999. After such autopsy, a report was prepared. On 25.03.1999, Sumer Singh Rana, President of the Haryana Roadways, Chandigarh produced the petitioner before the police. The petitioner was accordingly arrested in the case in question. Registration Certificate of the bus and driving licence of the petitioner were taken into police possession. Mechanical examination of the bus was got conducted. Report in that regard was obtained. Snapped photographs were also taken into police possession. On completion of the investigation, final report under Section 173 of the 1973 Code was prepared and was laid against the petitioner before the concerned Area Magistrate.
On receipt of the said report, the concerned Magistrate complied with Section 207 of the 1973 Code. It then heard the State and the defence on the issue of framing of charges against the petitioner. After such hearing, it charge sheeted him under Sections 279 and 304-A of the 1860 Code. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the said charges and claimed trial.
In support of its case, the prosecution examined six following witnesses: -
| Sr. No. | Name of the witness | Nature of evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | PW1 Harmesh Kumar | Complainant |
| 2. | PW2 Dr. Harpreet Singh | Post Mortem Examination |
PW3 Bodh Raj Mechanical Examiner
| 4. | PW4 Rajinder Singh | Photographer | |
| 5. | PW5 Balbir Singh | Clerk, office of Registration Authority, Panchkula. | |
| 6. | PW6 ASI Pawan Kumar | Investigating Officer | |
| 6. | In addition to examination of the said witnesses, the prosecution also proved the following documents in support of its case: - | ||
| Sr. No. | Exhibit | Nature of document | |
| 1. | Ex.PA | Statement of PW1 Harmesh Kumar | |
| 2. | Ex.PB/Ex.PW6/A | Police proceedings | |
| 3. | Ex.PW2/A | PMR | |
| 4. | Ex.PW3/A | Report submitted by the Mechanical Examiner | |
| 5. | Ex.PW6/B | Copy of FIR | |
| 6. | Ex.PW6/C | Rough site plan | |
| 7. | Ex.PW6/D | Inquest report | |
| 8. | Ex.PW6/E | Statement of Gurdev Ram under Section 175 of 1973 Code regarding identification of the dead body | |
| 9. | Ex.PW6/F | Statement of Mani Ram under Section 175 of 1973 Code regarding identification of the dead body | |
| 10. | Ex.PW6/G | Farad through which possession of bus was taken by police | |
Ex.PW6/H Farad through which possession of cycle was taken by police
| 12. | Ex.PW6/I | Intimation memo |
| 13. | Ex.PW6/J | Farad through which possession of RC of the bus was taken by police |
| 14. | Ex.PW6/K | Personal search memo |
| 15. | Ex.PW6/L | Bail bond of the petitioner |
| 16. | Ex.PW6/M | Surety bonds furnished by the petitioner |
In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the 1973 Code, the petitioner pleaded innocence and false implication. However, he did not lead any evidence in his defence.
On conclusion of the evidence, the concerned Magistrate heard the parties on merits of the case. After such hearing, it convicted the petitioner under Sections 279 and 304-A of the 1860 Code vide judgment dated 03.06.2005 and through an order of that very date, sentenced him in the following terms: -
| Ranvir Singh | under Section 279 of 1860 Code | Rigorous imprisonment for 03 months with fine of Rs.200/-. In default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for 05 days. |
under Section 304-A of 1860 Code | Rigorous imprisonment for 01 year with fine of Rs.300/-. In default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for 01 month. |
Aggrieved of such conviction and sentence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Sessions Court, Patiala. However, his such appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala vide judgment dated 16.07.2009.
Aggrieved of the said dismissal, the petitioner filed the present revision petition. Sentence of the petitioner was suspended on 26.10.2009. Since then he is stated to be on bail. The revision petition was admitted on 04.12.2009.
I have heard Mr. Bijender Dhankhar, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Gurpreet Kaur Sarabha, learned AAG, Punjab, assisted by Mr. Yuvraj Singh, Advocate for Mr. Vikram Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the complainant, on merits of the petition in question.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that PW1 Harmesh Kumar has simply deposed before the Court that the petitioner was driving the bus at a very high speed; that the said deposition does not prove rash and negligent driving of the petitioner; that in view thereof, conviction and sentence of the petitioner under Sections 279 and 304-A of the 1860 Code are illegal; that if this Court does not find favour with the said argument/s, the petitioner has already undergone a period of 03 months and 12 days in custody and therefore, the sentence imposed upon him may be reduced to the period already undergone. He has accordingly prayed for acceptance of the revision petition. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the reports State of Karnataka Vs. Satish, (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 493; Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (3) RCR (Criminal) 619 and Kandhara Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2007 (4) RCR (Criminal) 679 as well as judgments in CRR-1768-2024 titled as Rajesh @ Rajesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana decided on 28.04.2025 and Crl. A. No.721 of 2003 titled as State Vs. Garibullah decided on 12.12.2025.
On the other hand, learned AAG, Punjab assisted by learned counsel for the complainant, has argued that deposition of PW1 Harmesh Kumar proves that the accident in question resulting into death of the deceased Jagpal Singh @ Pala was caused by rash and negligent driving of the petitioner; that the evidence has to be read in entirety and not in isolation; that if it is read in entirety, it proves rash and negligent driving of the petitioner; that the Courts below, while sentencing the petitioner, have already taken a lenient view by sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 01 year under Section 304-A of the 1860 Code; that the petitioner killed a man of young age and therefore, it does not lie in his mouth that since he has undergone a long period of litigation, the sentence imposed upon him may be reduced to the period already undergone; that if scales are weighed between the two affected parties, the same tilt in favour of the deceased Jagpal Singh @ Pala who lost a young life because of rash and negligent driving of the petitioner; that the petitioner was employed as a driver in Haryana Roadways on 23.03.1999 and was driving the abovestated bus on the said date; that the petitioner was produced before the police on 25.031999 by his co-employee as the person driving the abovestated bus on the abovestated date; that co-employee stood as surety of the petitioner in the present case on 25.03.1999; that the petitioner does not deny that on 23.03.1999, he was driving the abovestated bus; and that therefore, present petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of her arguments, she has relied upon a decision in Criminal Revision No.1748 of 2002 titled as Kapoor Singh Vs. State of Haryana decided on 03.11.2009.
After such hearing and perusal, I may state that revisional powers of this Court can be exercised in terms of Section 401 of 1973 Code. Since the petitioner has filed a revision petition against the impugned judgments and order, it has to be dealt within the parameters prescribed in the said Section. Said section is therefore reproduced as under:-
“401. High Court's powers of revision.—
(1)In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307, and, when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by section 392. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.
(3)Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.
(4)Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.
(5)Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of Justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.”
I may also state that in respect of scope of revisional powers of a High Court, a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the report Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju & others Vs. Bonapalli Peda Appadu & another, (1975) 4 SCC 477, observed as under:-
“3.Section 439 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal. This provision is made expressly subject to sub-section (4) of Section 439 under which nothing contained in the section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Section 439 has been interpreted in several decisions of this Court which have taken the view that the revisional jurisdiction, when invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, ought not to be exercised lightly and that it can be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.(See Satyendra Nath Dutta v. Ram Narain, (1975) 3 SCC 398; Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1974) 1 SCR 130; Changanti Kotaiah v. Goginoni Venkateshwara Rao, (1973) 3 SCR 867. It is clear from these decisions that the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has not appreciated the evidence properly. The High Court has in its judgment referred to the decisions of this Court but in applying those decisions it has transgressed the limits of its revisional powers.”
In respect of scope of revisional powers of a High Court, a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the report Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, (1975) 4 SCC 649, observed as under:-
“4.…... Now, the jurisdiction of the High Court in a Criminal Revision Application is severally restricted and it cannot embark upon reappreciation of the evidence, but even so, the learned single Judge of the High Court who heard the revision application, examined the evidence afresh at the instance of the appellant. This was, however, of no avail, as the learned single Judge found that the conclusion reached by the lower Courts that the appellant was guilty of gross negligence, was correct and there was no reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellant. …..
5.…..The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have been justified in refusing to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact reached by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was correct. But even so, the High Court reviewed the evidence presumably for the purpose of satisfying itself that there was evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the two subordinate courts and that the finding of fact was not unreasonable or perverse. The High Court came to the conclusion that the evidence clearly established that the death of the deceased was caused on account of the negligent driving of the bus by the appellant. …..”.
In respect of such powers, a two Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the report Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305, observed as under:-
“130.The object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 is to confer power upon superior criminal Courts - a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction - in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. The controlling power of the High Court is discretionary and it must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said facts and circumstances which vary greatly from case to case.
131.xxxx xxxx xxxx
132.The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.”
While quoting observations made in Janata Dal’s report (supra) with approval, a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the report T.N. Dhakkal Vs. James Basnett & another, (2001) 10 SCC 419, observed as under:-
“9.We are in agreement with the above exposition of law. We are of the opinion that though the High Court has revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code and can exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to correct miscarriage of justice, but whether or not, there is justification for the exercise of that discretionary jurisdiction would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The controlling power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code being discretionary is required to be exercised only in the interest of justice, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of each particular case and not mechanically.”
In respect of revisional jurisdiction of a High Court, a two Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the report State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452, observed as under:-
“Having examined the impugned Judgment of the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tentamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
Observations made in Duli Chand’s report (supra) and those made in a report State of Orissa Vs. Nakula Sahu, (1979) 1 SCC 328 as well as Puttumana Illath’s report (supra) were approved by a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the report Raj Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2008) 11 SCC 76.
I may also state that the petitioner has been convicted in the present case under Sections 279 and 304-A of the 1860 Code. The said Sections, therefore, are reproduced as under: -
“279. Rash driving or riding on a public way. - Whoever
drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extent to one thousand rupees, or with both.
304A. Causing death by negligence. - Whoever causes the
death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
A perusal of said Sections shows that if a person drives any vehicle or rides on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause injury to any other person will be guilty of an offence under Section 279 of the 1860 Code and who causes death of any person by doing rash and negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be guilty of an offence under Section 304-A of the said Code. In none of the said two Sections, the words ‘rash’ and ‘negligent’ have been defined. At the same time, said words are controlling words of the said Sections and true purport and meaning thereof are necessary to be ascertained.
It was way back in the year 1902 that Lord Jenkins in Emperor Vs. Omkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom LR 679 observed as under: -
“To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.”
In the report V.V. Dagholkar Vs. King, AIR (1948) PC 183, the Privy Council, in respect of negligence in a criminal case, observed as under: -
“Their Lordships are of opinion that the Court of Appeal were right in the interpretation put upon s. 222. The negligence charged in that section is not necessarily as grave, either in its nature or its consequences as in the offence of manslaughter. The analogy between this section and section II of the English Road Traffic Act, 1930, is, in their Lordships’ view, a true analogy and just as in the case of Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions[1], the House of Lords explained the different degrees of negligence which the prosecution must prove to establish the offences of manslaughter and dangerous driving, so in the case of section 222 the degree of negligence differs in cases of the felony of manslaughter and in cases of misdemeanour under section 222. The circumstances dealt with in the sub-sections of section 222 are all circumstances which in themselves involve danger and, although the negligence which constitutes the offence in these circumstances must be of a higher degree than the negligence which gives rise to a claim for compensation in a Civil Court, it it not, in their Lordships opinion, of so high a degree as that which is necessary to constitute the offence of manslaughter.”
In the report K.H.M. Rangawalla Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1965) 2 SCR 622, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while relying upon the observations of Lord Jenkins in Omkar Rampratap’s report (supra) observed as under: -
“This view has been generally followed by High Courts in India and is in our opinion the right view to take of the meaning of Section 304-A. It is not necessary to refer to other decisions, for as we have already said this view has been generally accepted. Therefore the mere fact that the fire would not have taken place if the appellant had not allowed burners to be put in the same room in which turpentine and varnish were stored, would not be enough to make him liable under Section 304-A, for the fire would not have taken place, with the result that seven persons were burnt to death, without the negligence of Hatim. The death in this case was therefore in our opinion not directly the result of a rash or negligent act on the part of the appellant and was not the proxinate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. The appellant must therefore be acquitted of the offence under Section 304-A.”
In the report Rustom Sheriar Irani Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1968 SCC OnLine 397, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to the observations of Lord Jenkins in Omkar Rampratap’s report (supra), V.V. Dagholkar’s report (supra) and K.H.M. Rangawalla’s report (supra) observed as under: -
“But on the facts of this case it seems to us that the proximate and efficient cause of the deaths was the negligence of the appellant in choosing a pipe of six inches diameter and asking PW8 to carry out the alterations, and also continuing working at least one oven during the period while the alterations to the chimney were being made. Even if Gunaji Lad was negligent in actually fixing the pipe on the brick masonry, the proximate and efficient cause of the accident was the negligent acts of the appellant mentioned above.”
In the report Bhalachandra Waman Pathe Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 26, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in respect of applicability of Sections 304-A and 337 of the 1860 Code, observed as under: -
“…….The Courts below after a careful examination of the evidence on record have come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty both under Section 304-A and Section 337 Penal Code, 1860. This was evidently on the basis that he was grossly negligent. From the facts established it is clear that the conduct of the appellant was not that of a reasonable or prudent man. He had failed to discharge the duty imposed on him by law, viz. to look out for pedestrians in the pedestrian crossings as a result of which he had caused the death of one person and caused hurt to another. We are satisfied that he was guilty of gross negligence. Therefore, he was rightly convicted under section 304-A Penal Code, 1860.”
In Duli Chand’s report (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a decision on the issue of negligence, observed as under: -
“5.Now it is obvious that the question whether the appellant was guilty of negligence in driving the bus and the death of the deceased was caused on account of his negligent driving is a question of fact which depends for its determination on an appreciation of the evidence. Both the learned Magistrate trying the case at the original stage and the learned Additional Sessions Judge hearing the appeal arrived, on an assessment of the evidence at a concurrent finding of fact that the death of the deceased was caused by negligent driving of the bus by the appellant. The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have been justified in refusing to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact reached by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was correct. But even so, the High Court reviewed the evidence presumably for the purpose of satisfying itself that there was evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the two subordinate courts and that the finding of fact was not unreasonable or perverse. The High Court came to the conclusion that the evidence clearly established that the death of the deceased was caused on account of the negligent driving of the bus by the appellant. When three courts have, on an appreciation of the evidence, arrived at a concurrent finding of fact in regard to the guilt of the appellant, it is difficult to see how this Court can, in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, interfere with such finding of fact. We have had occasion to say before and we may emphasise it once again, that this Court is not a regular Court of appeal to which every judgment of the High Court in a criminal case may be brought up for scrutinising its correctness. It is not the practice of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the High Court and the subordinate Courts is correct or not. It is only in rare and exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice that this Court would interfere with such finding of fact Here, not only is the appreciation of the oral evidence by the learned Magistrate, the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court eminently correct, but there are certain tell tale circumstances which clearly support the finding of fact reached by them.
6.We will assume for the purpose of argument that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed not exceeding 20 miles per hour. That appears to be so, because the site plan Ex. PW 10/B shows that when the bus came to a halt the rear portion of the bus was at a distance of about 42 feet from the point of impact with the deceased and taking the length of the bus at about 18 feet, it would appear that, the bus came to a stop after travelling 60 feet from the point of impact. That accords fairly with a speed about 20 miles per hour Now, a speed of 20 miles per hour on a road like Rohtak Road which is 42, wide, cannot be said to be fast or excessive. But there can be no doubt that the appellant was grossly negligent in that he did not look to his right even though he was approaching a cross-road and failed to notice the deceased who was coming from his right and crossing the road. The statement of the appellant under Section 342 clearly shows that he did not see the deceased crossing the road and it was only when he heard an alarm to the effect: "stop stop" that he stopped the bus. That is also substantially the evidence of the three defence witnesses. It is indeed difficult, to imagine how the appellant could have possibly failed to notice the deceased coming from his right. It was a main road 42 feet wide and if the appellant was reasonably alert and careful he would have seen the deceased coming from his right and trying to cross the road & in that event, he could have immediately applied the brake and brought the bus to a grinding halt. But it was the case of the defence that the appellant did not notice the deceased at all and it was only when the bus struck against the cycle of the deceased and knocked him down and an alarm was raised, that the appellant applied the brake and brought the bus to a stop. This was culpable negligence on the part of the appellant.”
Thereafter, in the year 2005, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the report Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab and another, (2005) 6 SCC 1, while dealing with the issue of rash and negligent act, relied upon the observations of Lord Jenkins in Omkar Rampratap’s report (supra) etc. and then concluded as under: -
“48.We sum up our conclusions as under:-
(1)Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: 'duty', 'breach' and 'resulting damage'.
(2)to (4) xxx xxx
(5)The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution.
(6)The word 'gross' has not been used in Section 304A of IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be 'gross'. The expression 'rash or negligent act' as occurring in Section 304A of the IPC has to be read as qualified by the word 'grossly'.
(7)and (8) xxx xxx”
Applying the said provisions of law and observations made in the abovestated reports to the present case, I may state that when PW1 Harmesh Kumar entered the witness box, he categorically deposed that the bus in question came from behind at a very high speed when the accident in question took place and initially touched bicycle of the said PW slightly because of which he fell down and then the bus hit the deceased who was on his bicycle and was riding it on kaccha path on his left side. He does not stop by deposing so only. He further deposes that the deceased Jagpal Singh @ Pala had expired at the spot because of the accident and he was totally crushed at the spot by the bus. His such deposition cannot at all be restricted to mean that he simply deposed before the Court that the bus was at a very high speed. Deposition of PW6 ASI Pawan Kumar establishes investigation done in the matter which corroborates PW1 Harmesh Kumar who has deposed that driving of the petitioner, when the accident in question took place, was grossly rash and negligent. Despite a lengthy cross-examination of PW1 Harmesh Kumar, nothing could be culled out from him so far as his such deposition is concerned. If the deposition of said witness and other evidence on record is perused in true sense thereof, it comes out that driving of the petitioner is covered by the ingredients of Sections 279 and 304-A of the 1860 Code. Otherwise also, re-appreciation of evidence in a revisional jurisdiction is not permissible. I have referred to the said deposition only to find out as to whether the findings rendered by the learned Courts below are as per law and are not perverse in nature. After referring to the said evidence, I do not at all find that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Courts below are in any manner manifestly illegal or perverse or that the same have caused grave and serious miscarriage of justice or that the same are unreasonable or perverse. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution has not proved rash and negligent driving of the petitioner in causing the accident in question, therefore, has no substance and deserves rejection.
So far as death of the deceased Jagpal Singh @ Pala is concerned, depositions of PW1 Harmesh Kumar, PW2 Dr. Harpeet Singh and PW6 ASI Pawan Kumar establish that he died because of the injuries caused to him in the abovestated accident caused by the petitioner. The ingredients of Sections 279 and 304-A of the said Code, therefore, are fulfilled in the case in question.
At this stage, I may also observe that the accident in question took place on 23.03.1999 whereas the petitioner was produced before the police by his co-employee on 25.03.1999. A perusal of the bail bond submitted by Sumer Singh Rana, President of the Haryana Roadways, Chandigarh shows that it was he who produced the petitioner before the police on the said date. True it is that there is no Test Identification Parade done by the police in the present case. At the same time, it was the petitioner who appeared before the police on his own and in fact he was produced by his co-employee. This was so as the petitioner was driver of a government bus. If cross-examination of PW1 Harmesh Kumar is perused minutely, the petitioner has not even put to the said witness that he was not driving the bus in question on the abovestated date and time. There is no evidence produced by the petitioner to prove that on the abovestated date and time, he was not driving the said bus. Therefore, the evidence on record establishes that in fact, the petitioner, by implication, has admitted that he was driving the bus in question on the abovestated date and time when the accident in question took place. Once it is so, it comes out that identity of the petitioner as causing the accident in question on the abovestated date and time stands proved in the present case and non-holding of Test Identification Parade by the police, in such view of the matter, pales into insignificance.
Here it deserves to be mentioned that re-appreciation of evidence while exercising revisional jurisdiction is not permissible. At the same time, I have referred to abovestated evidence only to examine as to whether the impugned judgments of conviction and order of sentence are in accordance with law and evidence on record. From depositions of witnesses produced in the matter in question, I, therefore, conclude that the said judgments and order are in consonance with the same.
Further, I have also minutely perused the impugned judgments and order. However, I am of the considered opinion that the same do not show neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment resulting in undeserved hardship to the petitioner. Interest of justice does not require exercise of revisional power in the present case. Such power cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily and rather it should be exercised based on sound principles. The impugned judgments and order have done real and substantial justice in the matter.
Coming to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the sentence imposed on the petitioner may be reduced to the period already undergone by him, I may state that the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 Supreme Court Cases 82 are apt to be reproduced to deal with his such argument: -
“13.Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance think that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.
14.Thus, bestowing our serious consideration on the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant we express our inability to lean to the benevolent provision of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
In the said report, the Hon’ble Supreme Court even declined to grant benefit of probation to a convict under Section 304-A of the 1860 Code. An offence under Section 304-A of the said Code is punishable for a period of 02 years whereas the petitioner has been punished only for a period of one year and has undergone a period of 03 months and 12 days only in custody. Rash and negligent driving of the petitioner has led to loss of a young life and therefore, scales have always to be balanced between two parties to the lis. May be that the petitioner has undergone a long criminal litigation. At the same time, legal heirs of the deceased Jagpal Singh @ Pala must be undergoing loss of their loved one since the date of his accidental death and would be staring at the law enforcement and justice administration mechanisms to get justice. If scales are balanced in such a manner, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner is not at all on higher side or disproportionate to the offences committed by him and does not at all deserve to be reduced to the period already undergone by him in the case in question. Said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, also has no substance and cannot be accepted.
For what has been stated above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no ground to interfere in the impugned judgments and order in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the 1973 Code. In turn, the present revision petition is dismissed.
Interim application/s, if any, stand/s disposed off.