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Judgment
S.S. Mishra, J. The present criminal appeal is arising out of the judgment of acquittal dated 26.03.1994 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar in I.C.C. Case No.149 of 1992. The complainant-appellant being aggrieved by the aforementioned acquittal judgment has filed the present appeal.
Along with the present appeal, the appellant had also filed Criminal Misc. Case No.1283 of 1994 seeking leave of this Court to challenge the judgment of acquittal dated 26.03.1994 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar in I.C.C. Case No.149 of 1992. Vide order dated 27.10.1994, this Court granted leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal. Hence, the present appeal has been registered and pending for disposal since 1994.
The present appeal has been pending since 1994. When the matter was called for hearing, consistently none appeared for the appellant-accused. Therefore, this Court requested Mr. Saswat Jena, learned counsel, who was present in Court to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae for the appellant. He has readily accepted the same and after obtaining entire record, assisted the Court very effectively. This Court records appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Jena, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant.
Heard Mr. Saswat Jena, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant-complainant and Ms. Bini Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents-accused.
The prosecution case, as unfolded in the complaint petition, is that on 26.08.1992, while the complainant and his father were absent from their house, accused Sricharan Patra (respondent No.1) and his wife, Bidulata Patra (respondent No.2), came to the house of the complainant and, despite the protest of his mother, took away Sanjukta from the said house. Since then, Sanjukta has been residing with her father. On 19.09.1992, at about 2.00 P.M., the father of the complainant went to the residential quarters of accused Sricharan Patra with a view to bringing back his daughter-in-law. He was allegedly misbehaved with by the accused, who asked him to send his son for taking back Sanjukta. Accordingly, at about 4.00 P.M. on the same day, the complainant went to the quarters of the accused to take back his wife. At the instance of his mother-in-law, he again went there, but was asked to come in the early morning of the following day.
On 20.09.1992 at about 6.30 A.M., when the complainant knocked at the door of the quarters, accused Sricharan Patra opened the door and allegedly slapped him twice on his cheek. He thereafter pushed the complainant three times on his neck, as a result of which the complainant fell into the open space of the staircase and sustained a bleeding injury on his front gums. His shirt was also torn into pieces. It is further alleged that accused Sricharan Patra abused the complainant in obscene language and threatened to get them arrested. When the complainant raised an alarm, the accused Bidulata came to the spot and threw a broomstick at him and also abused him in obscene language. Accused Dali (respondent No.4) and Lilly (respondent No.5) allegedly kicked the complainant on his back. Accused Deepak (respondent No.3), being armed with a ‘farsa’, allegedly threatened to cut the complainant into pieces. With the assistance of witnesses Rashmi Ranjan Pagad and Narendra Bhol, the complainant managed to escape and immediately proceeded to Laxmisagar Police Station, where he submitted a written F.I.R. It is alleged that the concerned police officer, however, refused to receive the same, compelling the complainant to institute the present case.
The accused persons, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., denied the allegations in toto. Accused Sricharan Patra took the plea of alibi. The defence further pleaded that the complainant had subjected his wife to cruelty in connection with a demand for dowry, pursuant to which a police case had been instituted against him. According to the defence, in order to evade the consequences of the said case, the complainant fabricated the present case against the accused persons.
In support of his case, the complainant examined three witnesses, namely, himself as P.W.1, Rashmi Ranjan Pagad as P.W.2 and Narendra Bhol as P.W.3. P.Ws.2 and 3 were examined as independent witnesses. On the other hand, the defence examined one Srinibas Samal as D.W.1 and also relied upon the documents marked as Exts. A and B.
The learned trial Court, upon thorough appreciation of the evidence on record, found the prosecution case doubtful, inter alia, on the ground that the alleged assault by all the accused persons, except accused Deepak, was difficult to believe; the blood-stained shirt was not produced and no medical examination of the complainant was proved; no neighbours examined; and the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 suffered from material discrepancies and contradictions. Accordingly, the learned trial Court held that the complainant had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the respondents. For convenience of ready reference, relevant part of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-
“The complainant has admitted in his evidence that, he married Sanjukta on 25.1.92. Further, it has been spelt out in the complaint petition that, on 26.8.92 while the complainant and his father were absent from house, the accused Sricharan Patra and his wife took away Sanjukta. Sanjukta carried the gold ornaments with her. Since then, no information was given to the complainant regarding his wife. On 19.9.92 at about 2 P.M., father of the complainant had been to the quarters of the accused persons in order to bring back the wife of the complainant. He was misbehaved by the accused Sricharan Patra. On the same day, the complainant had been to the quarters of the accused persons twice at 4 P.M. and 7 P.M. When, father of the complainant was misbehaved by the accused Sricharan Patra and when the complainant was refused to take back his wife twice, I found it difficult to believe that the complainant alone had been to the spot on the date of occurrence. Furthermore, I found it difficult to believe that, all the accused persons except the accused Deepak have assaulted the complainant. Prosecution witnesses have evidence that, being assaulted the complainant sustained bleeding injury on his gum, and his wearing shirt became stained with blood. That blood stained shirt has not been produced in the Court during course of trial. If it is believed that, being assaulted, the complainant sustained bleeding injury, as a result of which, the shirt became stained with blood, then in that case, he must have received some medical treatment. No where, the complainant has stated to have been medically examined in this case. Furthermore, no person of that flat, where the accused persons are residing have been examined. I have already discussed that, the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 are full of discrepancies and contradictions and the same are not trust worthy. In this circumstance, the prosecution case is bound to fail.”
Mr. Jena, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the complainant-appellant, assailing the aforesaid findings which culminated in the acquittal of the respondents and submitted that the learned trial Court erred in discarding the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of minor discrepancies. He contended that, when the evidence of the witnesses is read as a whole, it presents a clear, cogent and consistent account of the occurrence. Placing particular reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3, he submitted that their testimony was credible and trustworthy and ought not to have been discarded by the learned trial Court. He further submitted that the mere absence of medical examination of the complainant could not, by itself, render his testimony unreliable, particularly when his oral evidence was corroborated by the other materials on record. He accordingly contended that the learned trial Court committed errors both of fact and law in granting acquittal in favour of the respondents.
Ms. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment and drew the attention of the Court to the material discrepancies appearing in the prosecution evidence.
I have carefully gone through the record and analysed the evidence in the light of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both parties. The findings recorded by the trial Court is the culmination of the appreciation of evidence brought on record by the complainant, which could be a possible view. Though the submissions advanced by the learned Amicus Curiae may, in the given circumstances, lead to another possible view, it is a settled principle of law that where two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. It appears that the learned trial Court has rightly applied the said principle while recording the acquittal. At this belated stage, interference with the well-considered judgment of acquittal, in the absence of any compelling or substantial ground, would not be justified, particularly when the view taken by the trial Court is a possible, plausible one and suffers from no perversity.
It is apt to note that interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in 2026 INSC 67, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record, the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29.From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a)whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
(b)whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;
(c)an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.
(d)the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
(e)if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and
(f)the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
The aforesaid principle has also been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ballu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2024) 12 SCC 202, wherein it has been observed that suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt and that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with reversal of an acquittal, further held that interference by the appellate Court would not be warranted unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible. Even where two views are possible and the trial Court has adopted one of them, the appellate Court would not be justified in interfering unless the view taken by the trial Court is shown to be perverse or impossible. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
“12.It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
13.Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the appellate court is very well crystallised. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment [State of M.P. v. Ballu, 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1924] , which are as reproduced below: (Ballu case [State of M.P. v. Ballu, 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1924] , SCC OnLine MP paras 13-14)
“13.In Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. [Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 357 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 275] , the Supreme Court has held that: (SCC pp. 365-66, paras 20-21)
„20. … In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, …
21.… has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded.‟
14.Similarly, in Harijan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat [Harijan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 12 SCC 665 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 84] , the Supreme Court has held that: (SCC p. 668, para 12)
„12. No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open for the appellate court to express the right conclusion after reappreciating the evidence if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused.”
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34.The High Court could have interfered in the criminal appeal only if it came to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Judge were either perverse or impossible. As already discussed hereinbefore, no perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge.
35.In any case, even if two views are possible and the trial Judge found the other view to be more probable, an interference would not have been warranted by the High Court, unless the view taken by the learned trial Judge was a perverse or impossible view.”
The scope of such appellate scrutiny has also been summarised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.R. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2023 INSC 858. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in an appeal against acquittal. It was held thus:-
“7.In this appeal, we are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, „Cr.P.C.‟). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. can be summarised as follows: -
(a)The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
(b)The Appellate Court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
(c)The Appellate Court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
(d)If the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and
(e)The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
This principle has been further explained in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2024 INSC 104, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24.We may firstly discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal.”
Thus, the appellate jurisdiction in an appeal against acquittal, though undoubtedly wide enough to permit re-appreciation of the evidence, is not intended to facilitate a mere substitution of the opinion of the trial Court. The appellate Court must first ascertain whether the findings recorded by the trial Court are vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, or are so unreasonable that no prudent judicial mind could have arrived at such a conclusion. The strengthened presumption of innocence following an acquittal, as explained in Mallappa(supra), requires the appellate Court to exercise greater restraint before disturbing such finding. Therefore, unless the view taken by the trial Court is found to be perverse, impossible, clearly unreasonable or wholly unsustainable on the evidence available on record, the mere possibility of another view cannot constitute a sufficient ground for interference.
Testing the present case on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
The impugned judgment of acquittal was delivered on 26.03.1994. Three decades have already been lapsed in between. During this long interval, the presumption of innocence flowing from the acquittal has remained undisturbed. There is nothing on record to suggest that the respondents were involved in any other criminal case thereafter and, therefore, the presumption of innocence which stood reinforced by the order of acquittal has continued to remain in their favour. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in favour of the respondents for more than 30 years, as they were acquitted by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.
In view of the aforementioned, the Criminal Appeal stands dismissed.
This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Saswat Jena, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant in this case. Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) to be paid as a token of appreciation.